Hooper v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 October 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:12–CV–5078–G.
• Citation: 979 F.Supp.2d 735
• Parties: Byron Leman HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

979 F.Supp.2d 735

Byron Leman HOOPER, Plaintiff,

v.MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:12–CV–5078–G.

United States District Court,

N.D. Texas,

Dallas Division.

Oct. 28, 2013.

Michael J. Todd, Law Office of Michael J. Todd, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

D. Bradley Dickinson, Dickinson Bartlett PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

A. JOE FISH, Senior District Judge.

Before the court are (1) the defendant's motion to apply Ohio law (docket entry 15) and (2) the defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 16). For the reasons stated below, the motion to apply Ohio law is granted, and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This case concerns a slip and fall in the lobby of a hotel in Cleveland, Ohio. Byron Hooper checked into a Marriott Courtyard hotel in Cleveland owned by Marriott International, Inc. on the evening of December 13, 2010. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Jury Demand (“Amended Complaint”) ¶¶ 5–6 (docket entry 39). It had been snowing that day, and there was snow on the ground when Hooper entered the hotel. Defendant's Appendix in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Marriott Appendix”) at App. 4–5 (docket entry 16–2). Marriott had placed a “wet floor” sign and laid out several rugs at the entrance of the lobby. Id. at App. 16–17. Hooper noticed several puddles in the entryway and by the front desk that appeared to have been formed by melting snow. Plaintiff's Appendix in Support of Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Hooper Appendix”) at App. 12–14 (docket entry 27–2). In addition to the wet floor sign by the front door, Hooper noticed another wet floor sign next to the front desk. Id. at App. 14. Marriott employees had also mopped the floor in the lobby area periodically throughout that evening in an attempt to clean up melted snow. See Marriott Appendix at App. 17.

After checking in, Hooper began walking away from the front desk, toward the elevators. See Hooper Appendix at App. 9. In that area of the lobby, there were no wet floor signs, nor any readily apparent water on the floor. Id. at App. 14. After Hooper had walked approximately 25 feet from the front desk, he slipped and fell. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Marriott Brief”) at 2 (docket entry 16–1). Hooper attempted to stop his fall with his right arm, but the impact jammed his arm into his shoulder socket and caused him to hit his head on the floor. Amended Complaint ¶ 12. After he fell, Hooper noticed that there was a “sheen on the floor” where he fell. Hooper Appendix at App. 15–16. He experienced pain in his head and shoulder for the rest of the evening and into the next day, when he checked out of the hotel. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14–16.

A few days after he returned to Texas, Marriott contacted Hooper to get a statement about the accident. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Hooper told Marriott that he was experiencing pain from the accident, and Marriott told him to consult a doctor. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. Hooper then had an x-ray taken which revealed that he had suffered a subacromial spur in his shoulder. Id. ¶ 22. He received a cortisone injection in his shoulder to relieve the pain. Id. ¶ 23. However, he began experiencing pain again several months later, so he had an MRI which revealed that he would need surgery to repair his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 25–29. He had that surgery on October 27, 2011, and has been undergoing physical therapy since that time. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.

B. Procedural Background

Hooper initially filed his complaint against Marriott on December 12, 2012. See generally Original Complaint. Marriott was not served until February 8, 2013, see Summons Returned as Executed as to Marriott International, Inc. at 3 (docket entry 6), and it filed its answer on March 1, 2013. See generally Marriot International, Inc.'s Original Answer (docket entry 7). On July 19, 2013, Marriott filed a motion requesting that the court apply Ohio substantive law to this dispute. See Motion to Apply Ohio Law (docket entry 15). It then filed a motion for summary judgment against Hooper's claim on July 26, 2013. See Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry 16).

After learning that Marriott had mopped the hotel lobby on the evening of the accident, Hooper presented new theories of liability in his response to Marriott's motion for summary judgment, see Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Hooper Response”) (docket entry 27–1), and filed an amended complaint containing those theories. See Amended Complaint. Marriott was then given the opportunity to file additional briefing in support of its motion for summary judgment, see Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (docket entry 38), but it declined to do so. The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Choice of Law

1. Legal Standard

“A federal court must follow the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.” St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company v. Lexington Insurance Company, 78 F.3d 202, 205 (5th Cir.1996). Texas courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) and the “most significant relationship” test. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 665 S.W.2d 414, 420–21 (Tex.1984) (explaining that the Texas Supreme Court had “abandoned lex loci delecti and replaced it with the most significant relationship approach set forth in §§ 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws”). Section 6(2) of the Restatement lists “factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law” as follows:

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2); Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H, 227 F.3d 308, 311–12 (5th Cir.2000). Section 145 of the Restatement lays out the specific contacts that are to be considered in tort cases:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2); see also Webb v. Rodgers Machinery Manufacturing Company, 750 F.2d 368, 374 (5th Cir.1985) (applying the Section 145 factors to determine which state's law to apply to a tort issue in Texas). The Restatement further explains that in tort cases, “[t]he applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury occurred.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 156(2). The Fifth Circuit has held that in applying these rules, “[t]he court's analysis under the [Restatement] does not turn on the number of contacts the event had with each jurisdiction, but, more importantly, on the qualitative nature of those contacts as they are affected by the policies of the rule.” Crim v. International Harvester Company, 646 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex.1979)); see also Jackson v. West Telemarketing Corporation Outbound, 245 F.3d 518, 523 (5th Cir.) (“Although the number of contacts is relevant, the qualitative nature of the contacts controls.”), cert. denied,534 U.S. 972, 122 S.Ct. 394, 151 L.Ed.2d 299 (2001).

The court is not required to apply the laws of a single state to all the issues raised within a case. See Webb, 750 F.2d at 374 n. 10 (“Stating that Texas and California law governs different issues in this litigation is fully consistent with choice of law principles”); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 302, cmt. d (“The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues under the local law of a single state.”) Rather, “the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue.” Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421; see also Tobin v. AMR Corporation, 637 F.Supp.2d 406, 412 n. 11 (N.D.Tex.2009) (Lynn, J.) (“Under Texas choice of law rules, the choice of law analysis applies to each claim or issue individually.”) (citing Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Tex.2000)).”

2. Application

Marriott argues that Ohio law should be applied to determine the liability issues in this case. See Motion to Apply Ohio Law at 1. In support of its position, Marriott asserts that the factors set forth in Section 145 of the Restatement weigh in favor of applying Ohio law—that (a) the injury occurred in Ohio; (b) the conduct causing the injury occurred in Ohio; (c) Hooper may be a resident of Texas, but Marriott is not; and (d) the relationship between the parties centered solely on the hotel in Ohio where the accident occurred. See id. at 4. Marriott also argues that the policy considerations under Section 6 of the Restatement point to Ohio law as the proper law to be applied. Id. at 6. Along these lines, Marriott contends that Ohio has a greater interest in defining the obligations of its business owners to invitees, and that considerations of certainty and uniformity urge against imposing different obligations on landowners depending on whether their guests are from Ohio or another state. Id. Furthermore, Marriott cites Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that the “application of Ohio law protects the landowners' justified expectation that their obligations vis-a-vis their land are governed by the law of the state in which the land is situated.” Id. (quoting Crim, 646...