Hughes Wood Products Inc. v. Wagner
| Decision Date | 25 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-0074,99-0074 |
| Citation | 18 S.W.3d 202 |
| Parties | (Tex. 2000) Hughes Wood Products, Inc. and Bailey Wagner, Petitioners v. Mack M. Wagner, Respondent |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas
This case presents a choice of law question. Plaintiff was injured while performing logging operations in Louisiana and filed a personal injury suit against the defendants in Texas. Defendants moved for summary judgment contending that, as a matter of law, the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision barred plaintiff's Texas action. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Texas law applied under the "most significant relationship" test found in sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement. See 979 S.W.2d 84, 86-87; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 145 (1971). Defendants contend that the appeals court erred in failing to apply section 184 of the Restatement, which precludes tort recovery if the defendant is immune from liability under another state's workers' compensation statute. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 (1971).
We hold that the court of appeals erred in its conflicts analysis by failing to consider which state has the most significant relationship to the issue to be resolved, that is the exclusive-remedy issue. Nevertheless, the defendants failed to show that they are immune from liability under Louisiana's workers' compensation law and thus failed to prove that they are entitled to Restatement section 184's protections. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment reversing the trial court's summary judgment and remanding the case to the trial court. See 979 S.W.2d at 88. We leave open the question of which state's law the trial court should apply to the particular substantive issues to be resolved below.
Plaintiff, Mack Wagner, lives in Newton, Texas, and was recruited in Texas to work as a logger. As a logger, he drove equipment owned by Bailey Wagner and cut timber owned by Hughes Wood Products, Inc. in Louisiana. After the timber was cut, at least some of it was hauled to Hughes's mill in Texas. Hughes is a Texas corporation, and its home office and principal place of business are in Newton, Texas. Bailey Wagner also lives in Texas. While plaintiff was working as a logger in Louisiana, a tree fell and crushed his foot. He received emergency treatment for his injury in Louisiana and then returned to Texas, where the rest of his medical treatment took place.
When plaintiff was injured, Hughes had Louisiana workers' compensation coverage, but the company did not file a report with the Louisiana office of workers' compensation administration reporting the injury. Hughes did make payments to the plaintiff after his injury, but it is not clear from the record what these payments were for or how many were made. Hughes did not have Texas workers' compensation insurance when the plaintiff was injured. Bailey Wagner had neither Texas nor Louisiana workers' compensation insurance.
Plaintiff filed this personal injury suit against the defendants, Hughes and Bailey Wagner, in Texas. Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that, under Restatement section 184, Louisiana law controls and plaintiff's suit was barred by the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision. Alternatively, they argued that even under Texas law, workers' compensation benefits were plaintiff's exclusive remedy because he was "an employee covered by workers' compensation insurance," Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a), albeit in Louisiana. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment without specifying the basis for its ruling.
The court of appeals held that Texas law applied and that therefore summary judgment on the basis of defendants' alleged immunity under Louisiana law was improper. See 979 S.W.2d at 87. The appeals court also rejected defendants' alternative ground, holding that the defendants, who did not carry Texas workers' compensation insurance, could not invoke the Texas workers' compensation statute's exclusive-remedy provision. See id. at 88. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment. On appeal to this Court, defendants do not argue that they are entitled to protection under the Texas workers' compensation statute's exclusive-remedy provision. They argue only that, under Restatement section 184, Louisiana law controls and the immunity conferred by that state's workers' compensation scheme bars this suit. Because we hold that defendants failed to prove that they are entitled to immunity under Louisiana's workers' compensation law, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.
Which state's law governs an issue is a question of law for the court to decide. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984). But determining the state contacts to be considered by the court in making this legal determination involves a factual inquiry. See Parra v. Larchmont Farms, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 93 (1997) (per curiam). Thus, a movant for summary judgment seeking to have the law of another state applied must satisfy its burden of proof with respect to fact questions necessary to the choice of law decision. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true. See id. at 548-49. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. See id. at 549.
Since 1979, this Court has applied the Restatement's "most significant relationship" test to decide choice of law issues. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 145 (1971); Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 420-21; Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979). Section 6 of the Restatement sets out the following general factors relevant to the choice of law:
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2) (1971); see Gutierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318-19. Section 145 contains the factual matters to be considered when applying these principles to a tort case.1
Applying these Restatement sections, the court of appeals determined that Texas has the most significant relationship to the case and that therefore Texas law should apply to all issues. See 979 S.W.2d at 86-87. But the Restatement requires the court to consider which state's law has the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue to be resolved. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1971). Section 145(1) specifically provides that "[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Id. (emphasis added); see Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 421. In its analysis, the court of appeals failed to consider which state has the most significant relationship to the issue to be resolved, that is the exclusive remedy issue.
Section 184 of the Restatement provides the standards by which a court is to determine immunity from a tort suit when an employee is covered by workers' compensation insurance. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 (1971). That section provides:
Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not be permitted in any state if the defendant is declared immune from such liability by the workmen's compensation statute of a state under which the defendant is required to provide insurance against the particular risk and under which
(a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the injury, or
(b) the plaintiff could obtain an award for the injury, if this is the state (1) where the injury occurred, or (2) where the employment is principally located, or (3) where the employer supervised the employee's activities from a place of business in the state, or (4) whose local law governs the contract of employment under the rules of §§ 187-188 and 196.
Id. The court of appeals erred in failing to consider section 184's application to the exclusive-remedy issue.2
Section 184 articulates and applies the principles of section 6 to the workers' compensation exclusive-remedy issue. Its application protects the parties' justified expectations because "[i]t is thought unfair that a person who is required to provide insurance against a risk under the workmen's compensation statute of one state which gives him immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death should not enjoy that immunity in a suit brought in other states." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 184 cmt. b (1971); see id. § 6(2)(d). Section 184 also recognizes the relative interests of other states in providing an exclusive workers' compensation remedy, because "to deny a person the immunity granted him by a workmen's compensation statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts...
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Table of cases
...1976), §29:3.A Texas employmenT law a-812 Wagner v. Hughes Wood Prods. , 979 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. granted), aff’d , 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000), §30:11.B.1 Wagner v. Taylor , 836 F.2d 578, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1987), §37:3.D.1.b.(5) Wagner v. Texas A&M Univ. , 939 F. Supp. 1297 ......
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Table of cases
...1976), §29:3.A TEXAS EMPLOYMENT LAW A-96 Wagner v. Hughes Wood Prods. , 979 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. granted), aff’d , 18 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. 2000), §30:11.B.1 Wagner v. Taylor , 836 F.2d 578, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1987), §37:3.D.1.b.(5) Wagner v. Texas A&M Univ. , 939 F. Supp. 1297 (......