Hoopes v. Deere & Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17895,17895
• Citation: 117 Idaho 386,788 P.2d 201
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,426 Marie B. HOOPES, surviving spouse of Earl Hoopes; Marie B. Hoopes, Personal Representative of the estate of Earl Hoopes; Roger H. Hoopes, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes; Elizabeth Hoopes Poulsen, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes; and Gloria Hoopes, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEERE & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; John Deere Company, a Delaware corporation; and Farmers Equipment, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 201

788 P.2d 201

117 Idaho 386, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,426

Marie B. HOOPES, surviving spouse of Earl Hoopes; Marie B. Hoopes, Personal Representative of the estate of Earl Hoopes; Roger H. Hoopes, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes; Elizabeth Hoopes Poulsen, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes; and Gloria Hoopes, a surviving adult child of Earl Hoopes, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DEERE & COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; John Deere Company, a Delaware corporation; and Farmers Equipment, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 17895.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 28, 1990.

Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Webb, Twin Falls, for plaintiffs-appellants. Lloyd J. Webb and Curtis R. Webb, argued.

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, Idaho Falls, for defendant-respondent Deere & Co. & John Deere Co. William D. Faler, argued.

Wood, Stephens & Telford, Idaho Falls, for defendant-respondent Farmers Equipment, Inc. Stephen H. Telford, argued.

McDEVITT, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action brought by the appellants against Deere & Company (Deere), John Deere Company (John Deere), and Farmers Equipment, Inc. (Farmers), the respective manufacturers and retailer of the John Deere 8820 combine that caused Earl Hoopes's death. The trial court granted Deere and John Deere's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hoopeses' action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that, as retailers under I.C. § 6-1407, they were exempt from potential product liability as a matter of law under the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act. Hoopes appeals.

In September of 1982, Earl Hoopes purchased a John Deere 8820 combine from Farmers Equipment Co. The combine was designed and manufactured by Deere, marketed and distributed by John Deere, and sold by Farmers. On August 31, 1985, Earl Hoopes was tragically killed when his combine rolled backwards and crushed him while he was refueling it.

On August 22, 1987, Earl Hoopes's adult son, Roger, spoke to the president of Farmers, LaVar Grover. He told Grover about his father's death and that the Hoopes family was going to file suit against Farmers and John Deere.

The Hoopeses filed their original complaint on August 27, 1987. The complaint named John Deere Industrial Equipment Company (Industrial) and Farmers as the defendants. The Hoopeses alleged that the John Deere 8820 combine was defective and unreasonably dangerous. They also alleged that it was negligently designed because its hydrostatic transmission does not have a locking device, and is thus capable of holding the combine in a stationary position for only a short time when the engine is off and the transmission is in neutral. The statute of limitations for filing the complaint expired on August 31, 1987, four days after the complaint against Industrial and Farmers was filed.

Industrial was served with the complaint through its statutory agent, E.L. Miller, on October 20, 1987. Mr. Miller was also John Prior to trial, Deere and John Deere moved for summary judgment on the ground that the amended complaint was not timely. They argued that since it was not filed until after the statute of limitations had run, it could not relate back to the date of the original filing. The court granted the motion. Farmers also moved for summary judgment on the ground that since they were the retailers of the combine they were exempt from potential product liability as a matter of law under the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act. The trial court granted Farmers' motion. The Hoopes appeal from these summary judgments.

                [117 Idaho 388] Deere's registered agent in Idaho. 1  Mr. Miller forwarded the Hoopeses' complaint and summons to Deere & Company's legal department on October 21, 1987.  Farmers was served with the Hoopeses' summons and complaint on March 4, 1988.  On April 18, 1988, the Hoopeses amended their original complaint by removing Industrial as defendant and adding Deere and John Deere.  Service of the amended complaint/summons was accepted by Deere and John Deere on April 28, 1988
                

I. TIMELINESS OF THE COMPLAINT

Applying I.R.C.P. 15(c) and the U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), the district court ruled that the Hoopeses' amended complaint could not relate back because: (1) The complaint was not amended to name Deere and John Deere before the statute of limitations ran; and (2) prior to the time the statute of limitations ran, neither Deere or John Deere knew or had reason to know that, but for a mistake in naming Industrial, the action would have been brought against them.

The Hoopeses argue that the complaint filed against Deere and John Deere was timely because I.R.C.P. 15(c) permits plaintiffs to relate their amended complaints back to the date of original filing where the original filing was timely.

Rule 15(c) reads as follows:

Relation back of amendments.--Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. Any amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. The relation back of an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest shall be as provided in Rule 17(a). The delivery or mailing of process to the Idaho attorney general or his designee, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the state of Idaho or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant. (Emphasis added.)

Broken into the portions relevant to this appeal, I.R.C.P. 15(c) states that any amendment changing, the party against whom a claim is asserted, relates back if:

1. The claim or defense in the new pleading arose out of the same conduct ...; and

2. Within the statutory period for "commencing the action ..." the party to be brought in by amendment

a. has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will b. knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.

[117 Idaho 389] not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and

There is no doubt that Hoopes et al.'s claim against Deere and John Deere arose out of the same conduct as the original complaint. The question is whether Deere and John Deere received notice of the institution of the action within the statutory period for "commencing the action." This, in turn, raises the question of what is meant by "the statutory period for commencing the action." Does it mean the time for filing the complaint; as trial court ruled and as Deere and John Deere claim? Or does it mean the time within which process must be served; as the Hoopeses claim. ²

To answer this question we turn to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477, U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986). In Schiavone, the United States Supreme Court was faced with a question nearly identical to the one before this Court. Schiavone initially filed a complaint against Fortune Magazine which is published by Time, Inc. Then, after the applicable statute of limitations ran, Schiavone amended the complaint and named Time as the defendant. The Court determined that inasmuch as Time, Inc.'s first notice that suit had been instituted against it occurred after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Time did not receive notice "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against it," as required under Rule 15(c). The Court stated:

Under Rule 15(c), the emphasis is upon "the period provided by law for commencing the action against" the defendant. An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, and, so far as Time is concerned, no complaint against it was filed prior to May 19, 1983 [the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations].

The Schiavone court specifically declined to "temper the plain meaning of the language (of Rule 15(c)), by engrafting upon it an extension of the limitations equal to the asserted reasonable time ... for the service of a timely filed complaint." 106 S.Ct. at 2385. Schiavone is controlling.

In Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 723 P.2d 814 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that Idaho has adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated:

[P]art of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho.

Chacon at 275, 723 P.2d 814.

Chacon held that:

Our examination of case law directs us to conclude that the federal courts, both before and after our adoption of amended Rule 15(c), have held that an amended complaint designating the true names of fictitiously named defendants will not relate back and toll the statute of limitations unless the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c) are satisfied.

Consequently, Schiavone and Chacon show that, under amended Rule 15(c), the newly named party must receive notice of the commencement of the action before the statute of limitations runs. This applies where the...