Hootselle v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.

Citation624 S.W.3d 123
Decision Date01 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. SC 98252,SC 98252
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri
Parties Thomas HOOTSELLE, Jr., et al., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Missouri Corrections Officers Association, Respondents, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant.

BURGER, GARY KARL JR., FLANNERY, MICHAEL JAMES, SAINT LOUIS, MO, BERMUDEZ, FERNANDO, CLAYTON, MO, for Respondents HOOTSELLE, THOMAS JR., DICUS, DANIEL, MISSOURI CORRECTIONS OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, HUFF, OLIVER.

SAUER, DEAN JOHN, Assistant Attorney General, BLAKE, JULIE MARIE, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, JEFFERSON CITY, MO, REITZ, MARY L., JEFFERSON CITY, MO, for Appellant.

Patricia Breckenridge, Judge

The Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC") appeals a judgment of the Cole County circuit court awarding a class of Missouri corrections officers approximately $113 million plus post-judgment interest for breach of contract. On appeal, MDOC claims, among other things, that the circuit court erred in determining MDOC is liable on the corrections officers’ breach of contract claims for time spent performing all preshift and postshift activities. The corrections officers’ statement of undisputed material facts in support of their motion for partial summary judgment demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the retrieval of keys and radios and the supervision of inmates while walking to and from the corrections officers’ daily posts are integral and indispensable to their work as correction officers. Under the continuous workday rule, all preshift and postshift activities after the first and before the last principal activity of either retrieving or returning keys and radios or supervising inmates are also compensable. The undisputed material facts do not establish, however, the chronological order of the preshift and postshift activities to permit a determination of which preshift and post activities are compensable under the continuous workday rule. Additionally, the undisputed facts are insufficient to show all the other preshift and postshift activities are compensable as principal activities, as a matter of law, so the circuit court's determination that all preshift and postshift activities are compensable was erroneous. The award of damages and the circuit court's declaratory and injunctive relief were based on that erroneous finding of liability, so those rulings are also erroneous.

The portion of the circuit court's judgment determining MDOC must compensate the corrections officers for time spent retrieving keys and radios and time spent monitoring and supervising offenders while not on post is affirmed. The remainder of the circuit court's judgment is vacated, and the cause is remanded.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are a class of corrections officers employed by MDOC1 and the corrections officers’ collective bargaining unit, the Missouri Corrections Officers Association ("MOCOA"). The class covers approximately 14,000 officers employed within 21 correctional facilities. MDOC employs the corrections officers to supervise, guard, escort, and discipline offenders incarcerated in Missouri prisons. Before arriving at their posts to perform these duties, however, the corrections officers have long been required to perform a variety of other tasks. These tasks are known within the MDOC as preshift activities.

As part of their preshift activities, the officers log their arrival, scan identification, sign entry and exit records or submit to biometric identification, pass through security, report to a supervisor, retrieve equipment, walk to their posts, and exchange information with other corrections officers. Corrections officers execute these same tasks in reverse upon leaving their posts. When performed after leaving a post, these activities are referred to as postshift activities. MDOC has never paid officers for time spent performing preshift and postshift activities and has consistently denied requests for overtime pay for time spent completing these activities.

In 2007 and 2014, the corrections officers, through MOCOA, entered into labor agreements with MDOC. The labor agreements govern a wide array of corrections officers’ rights and duties as MDOC employees and the agreements incorporated MDOC's procedure manual's definitions and terminology. The manual defines how state compensatory time and federal overtime are earned by corrections officers. Together, the agreement and the manual provide that MDOC will comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) regarding the accrual and payment of overtime. The procedure manual also states its purpose is to ensure departmental compliance with the FLSA and that the corrections officers must be compensated for "time worked."

In 2012, the corrections officers filed a class action lawsuit,2 alleging MDOC breached its statutory obligations under the FLSA and its contractual duties under the labor agreements to pay the corrections officers for preshift and postshift activities. As amended,3 the corrections officers’ petition contains seven counts. Counts I and II asserted freestanding claims for violations of section 105.935.3, RSMo Supp. 2005, and the FLSA, respectively. Count III alleged MDOC breached a contract created by operation of section 105.935.3, RSMo Supp. 2005, and 1 C.S.R. 20-5.010(1)(E) by failing to pay the corrections officers for preshift and postshift activities.4 Counts IV and V alleged claims for damages under unjust enrichment and quantum meruit theories, respectively. In Count VI, MOCOA alleged MDOC breached the 2007 and 2014 labor agreements by failing to pay the corrections officers for preshift and postshift activities under the FLSA. In the alternative to Count VI, MOCOA sought a declaration in Count VII that MDOC was contractually obligated to compensate the corrections officers for preshift and postshift work time pursuant to the labor agreements.

In 2014, MDOC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I and II, which the circuit court sustained. MDOC next moved for summary judgment in 2016, claiming the corrections officers’ breach of contract claims should be treated the same as freestanding claims for violations of the FLSA and dismissed. The motion was overruled.

In June 2018, the corrections officers filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their breach of contract claims, Counts III and VI of the petition. Essentially, the corrections officers sought to have the circuit court determine MDOC was liable on its breach of contract claims and leave the issue of damages to be decided by a jury. As authorized under Rule 74.04(c)(6), the circuit court sustained the corrections officers’ motion, entering a partial summary judgment that determined MDOC was liable for all preshift and postshift activities under the terms of the agreements requiring compliance with the FLSA. The circuit court further held the only issue remaining for trial was a computation of the corrections officers’ damages.5

Before trial, the corrections officers filed a motion seeking to exclude the expert testimony of MDOC's experts, Dr. Chester Hanvey and Elizabeth Arnold, on grounds their testimony did not meet the statutory requirements of section 490.065.2, RSMo Supp. 2018. The circuit court sustained the corrections officers’ motion, and the case then proceeded to trial in August 2018. During trial, the corrections officers presented the expert testimony of Dr. William Rogers, who opined the corrections officers sustained actual damages of approximately $113 million. MDOC again sought to introduce the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Hanvey and made an offer of proof outside the jury's presence, but the circuit court ruled MDOC's expert testimony would remain excluded. The jury returned a verdict awarding the corrections officers approximately $113 million.

The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the corrections officers on Counts III and VI, the breach of contract claims. Counts IV and V were dismissed. The judgment also adjudicated Count VII and declared the parties’ contractual rights and obligations under the labor agreements. Among other things, the judgment declared the parties’ labor agreements imposed a contractual duty on MDOC to pay compensation for all work performed by the corrections officers as required by the FLSA, including preshift and postshift activities. The circuit court further ordered MDOC to pay overtime compensation for preshift and postshift activities prospectively and to implement a new department-wide timekeeping system to track time spent performing preshift and postshift activities. MDOC appealed, and this Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

II. Analysis

MDOC raises several issues on appeal, including claims that the circuit court erred in: sustaining the corrections officers’ motion for partial summary judgment because preshift and postshift activities are not compensable under the FLSA; sustaining the corrections officers’ motion for partial summary judgment because they cannot maintain a private cause of action; excluding MDOC's expert witnesses; overruling MDOC's motion to decertify the class; and granting the corrections officers declaratory and injunctive relief on an expired contract.

A. Corrections Officers Can Maintain Private Cause of Action

Whether the corrections officers may maintain a private cause of action to enforce contractual terms that incorporate the FLSA is a threshold issue. MDOC claims the circuit court erred in sustaining the corrections officers’ motion for partial summary judgment because the corrections officers’ breach of contract claims are indirect attempts to enforce the FLSA and a private cause of action cannot be maintained to enforce MDOC's statutory obligations. The corrections officers respond that MDOC is raising this issue for the first time on appeal and, even had MDOC raised the issue in...

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6 cases
  • Alexander v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • October 30, 2021
    ...through security screenings and receiving assignments was not "integral to supervising, guarding, escorting, or disciplining offenders."[3] Id. at 140. Hootselle court noted that the Tenth Circuit in Aguilar v. Management &Training Corp., 948 F.3d 1270, "found submitting to a correctional f......
  • Roberts v. State
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 8, 2022
    ...1289 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding the pre-shift security screenings of corrections officers compensable), with Hootselle v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. , 624 S.W.3d 123, 139–40 (Mo. 2021) (holding the pre-shift security screenings of corrections officers non-compensable). ¶12 In 1985, the Supreme Court......
  • Baytos v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • February 28, 2022
    ...the pleadings before this Court that would allow any such holding here. Therefore, the Court finds Henderson unpersuasive. In Hootselle v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., the determined that, although correctional officers submitting to a security screening is important to ensuring security at a c......
  • Faries v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 14, 2021
    ...section 512.020(5) in the context of an interlocutory order denying a motion to intervene); and Hootselle v. Missouri Department of Corrections , No. SC98252, 624 S.W.3d 123, 134–44 (Mo. banc June 1, 2021) (applying the rules for appellate review of summary judgments to review of the grant ......
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