Hoover's Estate, Matter of
Decision Date | 16 March 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 2-57740,2-57740 |
Citation | 251 N.W.2d 529 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Minnie A. HOOVER, Deceased. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Claimant, Appellee, v. John S. REDD, Administrator of the Estate of Minnie A. Hoover, Deceased, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John S. Redd, of Getscher, Redd & Getscher, Hamburg, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Lorna Lawhead Williams, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael P. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Heard by MOORE, C. J., and MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.
Administrator Redd appeals from trial court's allowance of a Department of Social Services claim, filed in the Minnie A. Hoover estate, for old age assistance and medical assistance furnished decedent and her predeceased spouse.
The events which bring this appeal here are set out in an agreed record submitted pursuant to rule 340(d), Rules of Civil Procedure.
Over a period of years the department advanced $18,389.17 as old age assistance to Minnie Hoover and her husband Elmer, and $8,470.31 in medical assistance to Minnie, who died February 23, 1973.
June 11, 1973, the department filed a claim in Minnie's estate. The amount advanced for old age assistance was claimed under § 249.19, The Code, 1973:
* * *."
The amount advanced for medical assistance was claimed under § 249A.6, The Code, 1973:
* * * ."
However, before the department's probate claim had been acted upon, § 249.19 was repealed by Ch. 186, § 1, 65th G.A. (1973) effective January 1, 1974, and § 249A.6 was repealed by Ch. 1165, § 6, 65th G.A. (1974) effective May 21, 1974.
June 5, 1974, the administrator requested hearing on the department's claim. By its September 27, 1974 ruling, trial court found repeal of the above sections did not void department's claims for old age assistance and medical assistance.
The administrator appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I. After this appeal was taken, the legislature amended § 249.10, The Code (which was enacted as part of Ch. 186, 65th G.A. (1973)) to render void claims as well as liens against decedents' estates for old age assistance under former § 249.19. See Ch. 149, 66th G.A. (1975). The department now concedes this issue, leaving before us only the question of the validity of its claims for medical assistance.
II. We thus examine the remaining issue whether the department's claim filed for recovery of medical assistance was voided by repeal of § 249A.6 prior to allowance or disallowance of the claim.
The repealing statute, Ch. 1165, § 6, 65th G.A. (1974) simply provided, "Section two hundred forty-nine A point six (249A.6), Code 1973, is repealed."
Under the general rule, when a law is repealed the rescinded act is operationally deemed never to have existed. Buchhop v. General Growth Properties, 235 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Iowa 1975); 1A Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 23.33, at 279 (Sands 3d ed. 1972); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 439.a, at 1012 (1953).
There are several exceptions to this principle. These include a reenactment of the statute in substantially the same terms or existence of a savings clause or general statute limiting the effect of such repeal. See Garrison v. Garrison, 179 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1970). Another exception protects rights which have become vested or accrued while the statute was in force. See Leach v. Commercial Sav. Bank, 205 Iowa 1154, 1165-1167, 213 N.W. 517, 522 (1927); 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 421, at 760-762 (1964); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 435, at 1010 (1953).
Obviously, the statute repealing § 249A.6 did not include a savings clause. But at all times relevant here, the Iowa code contained a general saving statute:
Similar provisions are incorporated in the following Iowa statute:
§ 4.13 General savings provision. The reenactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect: 1. The prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder; 2. Any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder;
* * * ."
Both of the above statutes save accrued rights and commenced proceedings. "Accrue," with reference to a cause of action, was defined by the Oregon supreme court in Berry v. Branner, 245 Ore. 307, 312, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966) to mean "when an action may be maintained thereon." In Blacketer v. State, 485 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Okla.Ct.Cr.App.197...
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