Hoover v. Sandifur
Decision Date | 26 August 1946 |
Docket Number | 29958. |
Citation | 25 Wn.2d 791,171 P.2d 1009 |
Parties | HOOVER v. SANDIFUR et al. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2
Action by Claude G. Hoover against C. Paul Sandifur and Evelyn J Sandifur, his wife, and others to compel specific performance of an option clause in a contract. From a judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded with direction.
Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Louis F. Bunge, judge.
Keith & Winston and Stimson & Donahue, all of Spokane, for appellant.
Paul F. Schiffner, Randall & Danskin, and Arthur A. Lundin, all of Spokane, for respondents.
Plaintiff brought this action to compel specific performance of an option clause contained in a contract entered into between him and the defendant C. Paul Sandifur on November 19, 1942. The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint; whereupon plaintiff filed an amended complaint, a demurrer to which the court also sustained. The plaintiff refused to plead further, and the court entered judgment dismissing the action. Plaintiff appeals.
So far as concerns the question to be determined on this appeal, the essential facts set up in the amended complaint may be summarized as follows:
Prior to November 19, 1942, plaintiff owned and operated a taxicab business in Spokane, known as 'Radio Cab Company.' Defendants owned and operated a similar business, known as 'Spokane Cab Company.' On that date, plaintiff and defendant Sandifur entered into a contract whereby plaintiff sold the Radio Cab Company business and equipment to defendant Sandifur for fourteen thousand five hundred dollars. The contract provided that the
(Italics ours.)
As to what the parties meant by the term 'duration,' it is alleged in the amended complaint: 'That at the time of entering into such agreement on or about November 19, 1942, it was the intention and the purpose of the plaintiff and defendants to provide that such option for repurchase should be effective upon the cessation of actual hostilities of the war by the last enemy of the United States, after which event it might be expected that the plaintiff would be discharged from the military service and return to his civilian business and employment, unless plaintiff's discharge occurred after such cessation of hostilities, in which case such option for repurchase should be effective upon such discharge; that in the second paragraph of Section (6) of such agreement regarding the time when such option would be effective, the terms 'during the duration' and 'prior to the end of the war' were at all times used in the sense and intended by the parties to mean and designate the period of actual hostilities with the enemy, and the terms 'after the duration' and 'after the duration of the war' were at all times used in the sense and intended by the parties to mean and designate the period after the cessation of actual hostilities by the surrender of the last remaining enemy of the war.'
In sustaining the demurrer to the amended complaint, the court followed a line of decisions holding that the termination of a state of war is a political, rather than a judicial, question and may be brought about only by legislative resolution or executive proclamation. United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 9 Wall. 56, 19 L.Ed. 615; The Protector, 79 U.S. 700, 12 Wall. 700, 20 L.Ed. 463; Palmer v. Pokorny, 217 Mich. 284, 186 N.W. 505; State of Louisiana v. Burgess, 23 La.Ann. 225; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am.Rep. 639.
There is, however, another line of decisions holding that such terms as 'duration' and 'end of war' mean, as commonly understood, the cessation of actual hostilities. Nelson v. Manning, 53 Ala. 549; Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal.2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278; Zinno v. Marsh, Sup., 36 N.Y.S.2d 866; Scott v. Commissioner of Civil Service, 272 Mass. 237, 172 N.E. 218; United States v. Hicks, D.C., 256 F. 707; Re Cooper's Estate, All England Law Reports (Ann.), 1946, vol. 1, part 1, p. 28; LeFevre v. Healy, 92 N.H. 162, 26 A.2d 681; State ex rel. Peter v. Listman, 157 Wash. 229, 288 P. 913, 915.
In these decisions, the courts apply the rule that words and phrases contained in contracts and statutes will be construed in the light of common understanding and usage, rather than in a technical sense.
In the case last cited, the rationale of the decisions was stated by this court as follows:
While we are persuaded that this and kindred decisions are sound in reason and in their application of a fundamental rule in the...
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Darnall v. Day, 47417.
...A.2d 346, 348;Lincoln v. Harvey, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 764 (a lease ‘for the duration of the war’); Hoover v. Sandfur, 25 Wash.2d 791, 171 P.2d 1009, 168 A.L.R. 170, and Anno. 173; Samuels v. United Seamen's Service, 9 Cir., 165 F.2d 409, involving a lease; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Durh......
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Darnall v. Day
... ... 523, 53 A.2d 346, 348; Lincoln v ... Harvey, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 764 (a lease 'for the ... duration of the war'); Hoover v. Sandfur, 25 Wash.2d 791, ... 171 P.2d 1009, 168 A.L.R. 170, and Anno. 173; Samuels v ... United Seamen's Service, 9 Cir., 165 F.2d 409, ... ...
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Publix Asbury Corp. v. City of Asbury Park
...real intent of the parties. Speirs v. Spanko, 7 N.J.Super. 421, 71 A.2d 395 (Law Div.1950). A case of interest is the case of Hoover v. Sandifur, 25 Wash.2d 791: 171 P.2d 1009, 168 A.L.R. 170 (Wash.Sup.Ct.1946). In that case the court 'Extrinsic evidence is admissible to show what the parti......
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...too late. Where there is an ambiguity parol evidence is admissible to show the intention of the parties. Hoover v. Sandifur, 1946, 25 Wash.2d 791, 171 P.2d 1009, 168 A.L.R. 170. Under this rule testimony was taken to show the intention of the parties at the time the lease was executed. The ......