Hoover v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 5743.)
• Citation: 222 S.W. 244
• Parties: HOOVER v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

222 S.W. 244

HOOVER v. STATE.

(No. 5743.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 19, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Comanche County; J. H. Arnold, Judge.

John Hoover was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Reversed.

Hampton, Harris & Hampton, of De Leon, and George L. Sullivan and Goodson & Nabors, all of Comanche, for appellant.

Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MORROW, J.

The appeal is from a sentence of confinement in the penitentiary for six years for the offense of murder. The deceased was a supervisor of the construction of a "tank farm" in one of the oil districts, the construction work being done by employés of independent contractors. Appellant and his father had been such employés, and on Saturday preceding the homicide on Tuesday an altercation took place on the premises. In this altercation insulting epithets were exchanged between the deceased and the appellant; some blows were struck, the deceased obtaining and exhibiting a pistol, and ordering the appellant to leave and to refrain from coming back on the premises, also ordering appellant's father to cause this to be done. There were mutual threats made at the time, and evidence of their repetition later, those of the deceased being communicated to the appellant. Evidence pro and con touching the disposition and reputation of the deceased as a man of violence was introduced. There was also evidence that appellant had been informed after the difficulty on Saturday that the deceased was armed. The immediate scene of the homicide was at the depot of the village, near which was situated a restaurant belonging to the father of appellant, and a store kept by a witness named Barnes. Appellant testified that he had business at the depot, and while standing there the deceased passed, brushing the arm of the appellant, and then called for the railroad agent. The appellant then walked to the restaurant, and picked up a stick, which was used for packing ice in an ice cream freezer. Taking the stick to the depot for the purpose of protection, he laid it down on the ground. On his return the deceased was not observed by him, and he entered into conversation with others, and while so engaged this occurred:

"I looked up at the door, and Mr. Breen was standing in the door like, looking right down at me with his hand in his side pocket, and I looked back down again, and about that time he came out the door, and as he came out I grabbed the stick, and as he stepped on the engine, I hit him. The reason I hit him was because I thought he was going to shoot me. Just as Mr. Breen stepped on the engine he caught it with both hands, and then he dropped his right hand, and was sorter turning toward me, and just as he turned I hit him up above the ear somewhere. I did not intend to kill him, but hit him to keep him from getting his gun and shooting me. When I hit him he fell off the engine to the ground, and I threw the stick away and caught hold of his hands. I didn't know how badly he was hurt, and thought he might shoot me. When I found he was badly hurt I laid his hands down."

There were several eyewitnesses introduced by the state, one of them measurably corroborating the appellant's theory of a demonstration by the deceased. Most of them, however, exclude by their testimony this theory. The court in its charge took cognizance of the evidence raising the issues of murder, manslaughter, and self-defense based upon a demonstration following communicated threats.

In his instruction to the jury, the court embodied a part of article 1147, P. C., as follows:

"If the instrument be one not likely to produce death, it is not to be presumed that death was designed, unless, from the manner in which it was used, such intention evidently appears."

The homicide resulted from one blow upon the head of deceased, struck by the appellant, using a wooden stick about three feet long, three inches in diameter at one end, and tapering to two inches at the other end, somewhat in the shape of a baseball bat. The weight of the stick is not given. Under numerous expressions of the opinions of this court, the stick in question was not per se a deadly weapon. Among these are Crow v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 116 S. W. 52, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497, in which the instrument was a baseball bat. Others in which...