Hope v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 January 1938
• Docket Number: 14607.
• Parties: HOPE v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

195 S.E. 110

186 S.C. 85

HOPE v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14607.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 26, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of York County; A. L. Gaston Judge.

Action by Mrs. Edna C. Hope against the New York Life Insurance Company on the double indemnity provision of a life policy excluding coverage where death resulted from committing an assault or felony. From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for defendant.

Thomas Lumpkin & Cain, of Columbia, and Hart & Moss, of York, for appellant.

Finley & Spratt and R. B. Hildebrand, all of York, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

The New York Life Insurance Company issued its policy whereby it insured the life of Robert Meek Hope in favor of his wife Edna C. Hope, in the sum of $1,000, with a provision of double indemnity if the death of the insured resulted "directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means. * * Double indemnity shall not be payable if the insured's death resulted * * * from committing an assault or felony."

December 23, 1935, the insured became engaged in an altercation with Tom Joy, in which he suffered a knife wound at the hands of Joy, from which he died.

The insurance company paid the face of the policy, $1,000, but refused to pay the double indemnity, $1,000, and this action was brought. It was tried by Judge Gaston, with a jury, and resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

The defense, in brief, was that the insured did not come to his death from external, violent, and accidental means, but from and while he was committing an assault and felony, and that death from such cause was expressly excluded from the terms of the double indemnity benefit, and was a risk not assumed by the defendant.

There was much testimony relating to the fatal occurrence; its origin, renewal, and the final affray. A brief summary of the encounter may be thus stated:

It was two days before Christmas; a number of men were met in the evening at the filling station and store of Mr. Campbell at Tirzah; R. Meek Hope bought a Roman candle which he fired toward a group outside the store; a ball from it is alleged to have struck Tom Joy in the face, and an altercation arose between the two of them in which each of them drew his knife; others intervened, and each party shut up his knife and put it in his pocket. Tom Oates said: "You boys stop your foolishness, put up your knives and fight it out fair." Hope had advanced to the door of the store; he threw off his overcoat and said, "We'll settle this thing now." He advanced upon Joy and struck him a blow with his fist which felled him to the ground, as one witness said, "Like a beef." In the ensuing melee, Joy cut Hope in the side. From the pneumonia which ensued, Hope died.

At the close of the testimony for the plaintiff, the defendant moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to offer testimony sufficient to show that the death of the insured resulted from bodily injuries effected wholly through external, violent, and accidental means; and that the testimony offered by plaintiff conclusively showed that the death of the insured result from external means which were the result of an assault or felony committed by the insured.

The motion for nonsuit was denied.

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the defendant moved for the direction of a verdict on the grounds, that: The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the death of the insured resulted from the commission of an assault or felony; from which cause the coverage of double indemnity was expressly excluded from the policy.

The motion was overruled.

After the rendering of the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, defendant made a motion for a new trial on the grounds covered by the motions for nonsuit and directed verdict; because of error of the court in ruling and holding that an assault committed by striking with the fists was not such an assault within the contemplation of the parties as would relieve the insurer from the payment of the double indemnity, where the insured's death resulted after and as a direct consequence of such assault; because the jury did not follow the instructions of the court to the effect that if they found from the testimony that the death of the insured resulted from committing an assault or felony, their verdict must be for the defendant, it being uncontradicted that the death of the insured did result from committing an assault; because the verdict of the jury was contrary to the principles of law charged to them to the effect that if they found that the assured was the aggressor and provoked the difficulty which resulted in his death, the company would not be liable, and, under the uncontradicted testimony, the insured was the aggressor and did provoke the difficulty which resulted in his death.

This motion was refused.

The defendant appeals upon exceptions which embody the grounds of the several motions made and refused.

Appellant's counsel elect to argue their appeal under five heads, which we reduce to three propositions, viz.:

1. Was it error to refuse the motion for nonsuit?

2. Was it error to refuse the motion for directed verdict?

3. Was it error to refuse the motion for new trial?

The questions whether there was error in refusing the motions for nonsuit and for directed verdict may be discussed together.

In the case of Linnen v. Commercial Casualty Co., 152 S.C 450, 150 S.E. 127, 128, Mr. Chief Justice Stabler, for the court, said: "Under the pleadings, the plaintiff made out a prima facie case by proof of the policy of insurance and that the insured died from being stabbed with a knife; the presumption of law being that the wound was accidently inflicted, and was not the result of an illegal act of any one. The burden was then shifted to the defendant to show, as pleaded by it, that the death of the insured was brought about by injuries intentionally inflicted upon him. * * * In cases like this, before a verdict for the defendant can be properly directed, the evidence must not only support the...