Hopewell v. Com.

Decision Date23 November 1982
Citation641 S.W.2d 744
PartiesDarnell HOPEWELL, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Jack E. Farley, Public Advocate, Edward C. Monahan, Asst. Public Advocate, Frankfort, for appellant.

Steven L. Beshear, Atty. Gen., Linda Carnes Wimberly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

STERNBERG, Justice.

Appellant Darnell Hopewell, on January 26, 1982, was indicted by the Grand Jury of Boone County, Kentucky, for the offense of robbery in the first degree (KRS 515.020) and for the offense of kidnapping (KRS 509.040). He was convicted on both offenses and sentenced to a total of 35 years in the penitentiary.

During the wee hours of the morning of December 31, 1981, appellant was driving a 1977 Buick in Boone County, Kentucky, with Harold Taylor as a passenger. He stopped at an Amoco service station at the intersection of Highway 338 and I-75 to get some gas and oil. After servicing the car, the attendant, James Virgil Perry, entered the office where he was confronted by Harold Taylor holding a pistol pointed at him. Taylor ordered Perry to give him his money and to lie down in the back of the office. Upon departing, appellant ordered Perry to go with them and to lie down in the back of the car while Taylor tied his hands. The appellant drove south on I-75 to the Crittenden exit, a distance of approximately 20 miles, where Perry was blindfolded and put out of the car. Perry thereafter was able to loosen his bonds and the blindfold and call the police. He described the robbers and the car in which they were traveling. Appellant and Taylor were apprehended driving south on I-75 and asked by the police to follow them back to the service station, which they voluntarily did. Appellant was questioned twice on December 31, 1981, and at about 1:00 p.m. gave the police a statement wherein he admitted the robbery. Taylor was indicted separately for the same offense. While in jail Taylor stated to the Boone County jailer "... that Darnell didn't know anything about the robbery, that he had pulled up to the service station and Taylor went in and came back out with the guy and Darnell didn't know about it."

On appellant's trial his counsel called the jailer to testify. During the course of the interrogation, appellant's counsel asked whether Taylor made any statement to the jailer concerning Hopewell's involvement in the robbery. The Commonwealth objected to the question on the ground that it was hearsay. After an in-chambers conference, the court sustained the objection and did not permit the jailer to answer the question. However, the propriety of the question was placed in the record by avowal.

On this appeal two issues are raised.

I. "The trial court erred by preventing appellant from introducing a statement of the codefendant that appellant was not culpable for the charged offenses."

The purpose for which counsel for appellant sought to introduce this question and secure an answer is stated by him to be "... the statement is not being offered to show whether or not it is true that Darnell had anything to do with it. The only reason the statement is being offered is to show the fact that it was made." In his brief to this court, however, the appellant charges that "(t)he failure of the trial court to allow appellant's counsel to introduce the statement of Taylor made to the jailer denied appellant his right to present a defense in violation of fourteenth amendment due process."

It is evident that counsel for appellant has changed his approach to the admissibility of the statement. He raised no question before the trial judge that this statement was anything other than testimony without indicia of reliability; not a defense to the charges, or either of them, made against appellant. In Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219 (1977), this court stated: "The appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court." In Daugherty v. Commonwealth, Ky., 572 S.W.2d 861 (1978), in discussing preservation for appellate review, we said: "Regardless of the merits of this argument, these grounds, being different from those asserted in the court below, are not properly preserved for appellate review."

It appears that the error, if any, was not preserved for appellate review.

II. "The boilerplate competency 'hearing' afforded appellant denied him due process of law and effective assistance of counsel."

The question of the capacity of the appellant to stand trial was brought to the attention of the trial court. RCr 8.06, dealing with insanity, provides:

"If upon arraignment or during the proceedings there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant lacks capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to participate rationally in his defense, the proceedings shall be postponed and the issue of incapacity determined as provided by KRS 504.040."

KRS 504.040, to which RCr 8.06 makes reference, provides for referring a defendant to a medical facility for the purpose of an evaluation and report upon the competence of the defendant. This the trial court did. On February 3, 1982, the trial court entered two orders as follows:

"By agreement between defendant and Commonwealth made in open court in the presence of defendant, it is ordered that defendant is referred to Comprehensive Care for evaluation of mental state.

The above styled action is ordered set for trial/hearing in the Circuit Court of Boone County on 2/22/82 at 10:00 a.m. Defendant's motion to reduce bond is hereby overruled."

"Defendant and his attorney having this date appeared in open court for arraignment; counsel for defendant and the Commonwealth attorney having agreed that the defendant's competency to stand trial should be determined,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendant is hereby referred to Comprehensive Care Center for examination of his present mental condition by a staff psychiatrist or psychologist for expert opinion on the following issues:

1) Whether the defendant, as a result of mental disease, lacks capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, and

2) Whether the defendant can participate rationally in his own defense.

The examining psychiatrist or psychologist shall report to the Court."

On February 19, 1982, the report of Michael G. Downer, M.S., a certified clinical psychologist from the Florence, Kentucky, Comprehensive Care Center, was filed with the trial court. The report states:

"In regard to the questions asked by the court, it is my impression that this individual is able to appreciate the nature of the crime he is accused of and is able to understand the legal proceedings against him. Also, for the most part this individual should be able to rationally participate in his own defense. However, there are two areas where he has mildly impaired ability. One concerns the quality of relating to an attorney. This man has had one or two contacts with public defenders regarding this case, and was very negative in describing what transpired. He seems to think that they are disinterested in defending him unless he has money and generally are not highly motivated to listen to his story. The second area of mildly impaired ability concerns planning of legal strategy. The client mentioned that in his previous meetings with the public defenders there was mention of plea bargaining to a lesser charge. Darnell is very much against such a plan since he claims he was mainly coerced and thus not directly responsible. With such a strong attitude, certain planning along such lines can be considered in jeopardy.

In regard to other areas concerning competency, this individual demonstrated adequate awareness of his available legal defenses, is aware of the role of various court involved people, understands court procedure, is aware of the charges against him and the possible penalties, should be able to challenge prosecution witnesses, is able to testify relevantly, and is highly motivated...

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22 cases
  • Taylor v. Simpson, Civil Action No. 5: 06-181-DCR
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
    • September 30, 2014
    ...no merit." 63 S.W.3d at 168. A determination of competency to stand trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Ky. 1982). The defendant has theburden to prove that he was incompetent to stand trial. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (19......
  • Stacy v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • March 21, 2013
    ...is held on motion for a new trial, and the trial court rules on the issue.” 3Humphrey, 962 S.W.2d at 872–73(citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744 (Ky.1982); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky.1980)). And here, we find that there is nothing present in the record which ......
  • Bishop v. Caudill
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • October 23, 2003
    ...psychologist, a Corrections Department hearing officer, and the police detectives who took the defendant's statement); Hopewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 744 (1982) (testimony from appointed psychologist (through his report, which was admitted into evidence by stipulation) and defend......
  • Stacy v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 2016
    ...held on motion for a new trial, and the trial court rules on the issue." Humphrey, 962 S.W.2d at 872-73 (citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744 (Ky.Page 7 1982); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1980)).[W]e find that there is nothing present in the record which woul......
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