Hopkins v. Barlin
Decision Date | 29 July 1948 |
Docket Number | 30458. |
Citation | 196 P.2d 347,31 Wn.2d 260 |
Parties | HOPKINS v. BARLIN. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2
purchase and acquire the property on the terms and conditions of the option, had he so elected, prospective purchaser could not, in action to recover amount paid under the option introduce proof of an alleged subsequent oral agreement that if prospective purchaser was unable to consummate purchase of business, money would be repaid to prospective purchaser since there was no independent consideration for alleged subsequent oral agreement.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, Judge.
Solie M. Ringold, of Seattle, for appellant.
Eggerman, Rosling & Williams, of Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought suit for the return of a sum of money which he had previously paid to defendant for the execution and delivery by defendant to plaintiff of a written instrument wherein defendant had granted to plaintiff the right, during a specified period, to purchase certain business property belonging to defendant. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained and, upon plaintiff's refusal to plead further, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the action. Plaintiff appealed.
Our statement of the facts is necessarily based upon the allegations of the complaint. Respondent, Benjamin Barlin, was engaged in business in the city of Seattle under the trade name of Commercial Linen Company. On August 26, 1946, he executed and delivered to appellant, Stephen D. Hopkins, a written instrument denominated 'Option To Purchase,' in return for which appellant paid respondent the sum of $5,000. A copy of the instrument is attached to, and by reference made a part of, the complaint. We quote the material portions and provisions thereof:
After setting forth, by reference, the provisions of the option to purchase, the complaint alleged that both prior and subsequent to August 26, 1946, the day on which that instrument was executed and delivered and the $5,000 paid, the parties thereto agreed that in the event appellant should be unable to consummate the purchase of the business from the respondent, the sum of $5,000 would be refunded and repaid to appellant; that appellant was unable to interest capital in the purchase of the business and was unable to consummate the purchase thereof within sixty days from August 26, 1946; and that, despite oral and written demands therefor, respondent had failed and refused to return the $5,000.
Upon this state of facts as alleged in the complaint, appellant sought, but was denied, recovery of the amount paid by him for the option to purchase respondent's property.
Appellant's contentions are: (1) That the instrument involved in this case is not a true and valid option, because it contains no definite and specific undertaking on the part of respondent, the offeror, not to revoke the offer during the specified time; (2) that respondent gave no consideration for the $5,000 paid by appellant; (3) that the instrument was simply a receipt for money paid by appellant or, in any event, was ambiguous as to the disposition to be made of the money, and hence parol evidence was admissible to show the true agreement of the parties; and (4) that parol evidence was admissible to prove a subsequent agreement by the parties that the money would be refunded to the appellant in the event he should be unable to consummate the purchase of the property.
Appellant's first contention necessitates that we set forth, in part, the nature and characteristics of an option, in order that we may properly determine whether the written instrument between the parties was in law an option agreement.
An option to purchase real property may be defined as a contract by which one party, owner of the property and termed the optionor, for valuable consideration, sells to another party, called the optionee, the right to buy, or agrees with that other party that the latter shall have the privilege of buying, the property within the time, for the price, and upon the terms and conditions specified in the option agreement, but which of itself imposes no obligation on the optionee to purchase the property. James, Option Contracts, 2-7, § 101, 102; 55...
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Flower v. TRA Industries, Inc., 22765-1-III.
...or other writings that are not contracts. Johnson v. Peterson, 43 Wash.2d 816, 820, 264 P.2d 237 (1953); Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wash.2d 260, 268, 196 P.2d 347 (1948). "`The burden of proving a contract, whether express or implied, is on the party asserting it, and he must prove each essentia......
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224 Westlake, LLC v. Engstrom Props., LLC
...to close and was free to pursue the return of the option payments as part of its damages. ¶ 70 Engstrom cites Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wash.2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948), where the Supreme Court denied a purchaser a return of his payments made under an option agreement. But in that case, the sel......
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Spokane School Dist. No. 81 v. Parzybok, 47426-5
...specified in the option, but which in itself imposes no obligation on the purchaser to acquire the property. Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wash.2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948); Crowley v. Byrne, 71 Wash. 444, 129 P. 113 (1912). A subsequent owner, having notice of the option, takes subject to the optio......
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Claassen v. City of Newton
...purchase the property in futuro, upon the terms and conditions prescribed by the option contract.’ Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wash.2d 260, 266, 196 P.2d 347 (1948). A pure option contract does not include the right to possess and improve the land during the option period.” Pardee v. Jolly, 163 W......