Hopkinson v. Knapp & Spaulding Co.
| Decision Date | 22 October 1894 |
| Citation | 60 N.W. 653,92 Iowa 328 |
| Parties | JAMES W. HOPKINSON, Appellant, v. KNAPP & SPALDING COMPANY |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--HON. GEORGE W. WAKEFIELD Judge.
ACTION at law to recover damages which resulted from the death of the minor son of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by negligence on the part of the defendant. When the evidence had been fully submitted, the jury, on the motion of the defendant, was instructed to return a verdict for it, which was done, and judgment was rendered on the verdict. The plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
F. E Gill and Lynn & Sullivan for appellant.
Wright Hubbard & Bevington for appellee.
On the second day of January, 1891, Thomas W. Hopkinson, a son of the plaintiff, fell into an elevator shaft of the defendant, and received injuries which caused his death within about half an hour. He does not appear to have spoken or to have been conscious after receiving the injury. He was seventeen years of age at the time, and had been in the employment of the defendant about four months. He worked with his brother Will on the second and third floors of the warehouse of the defendant, in handling and packing merchandise. The building is supplied with a freight elevator, which is operated from below to the third floor. The shaft is inclosed on that floor by a barrier about three and one half feet in height. A part of the barrier consisted of a door or gate, which was hung with weights and cords, and was opened by raising and closed by lowering it. That afforded the means of passing into and out of the elevator. A gaslight fixture hung near the gate. The third floor was about one hundred and fifty feet long and one-third as wide, and was well filled with merchandise, which in places was piled to the ceiling. Narrow spaces had been left for walks, which extended in various directions, one of which led past the elevator. At a little after 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the accident, the decedent, who was then on the second floor, was told to go to the third floor, and bring down a dozen wire potato mashers. He ascended to the third floor by means of a stairway, obtained the mashers, and on his return fell into the elevator shaft onto the elevator, a distance of twenty-five or thirty feet, and received the injuries which caused his death. The plaintiff alleges that the accident was caused, without fault or negligence on the part of the decedent, by the negligence of the defendant in permitting the elevator gate to be and remain open and unfit for use, in piling goods too near the gate, and in piling them nearer to it than was customary, and in not lighting the way at and near the elevator.
I. The first three grounds of the motion to direct a verdict were that the evidence did not show negligence on the part of the defendant, that it failed to show that decedent was free from negligence, and that it shows affirmatively that he was guilty of contributory negligence. The appellee contends that these grounds are fully sustained by the evidence. There was evidence which tended to show facts substantially as follows Employees of the defendant were not permitted to use the elevator excepting to raise and lower articles which they could not readily carry up or down stairs. The gate was habitually kept closed when the elevator was below it, and the decedent and his brother had been cautioned frequently not to leave it open at such times. A few minutes before the accident, Mr. Spalding, the vice president of the defendant, and one or more customers, entered the elevator at the second floor, and ascended to the third floor for shovels. Just after they went up, the decedent went up, as has been stated. Mr. Spalding and his companions soon descended, and within three to five minutes thereafter the fall of the decedent occurred. There is some confusion in the evidence in regard to the condition of the gate, the goods near it, and the light; but the jury would have been fully authorized to find that the gate was open, and that it had been so left by Spalding; that the gas jet near it was not lighted; and that goods consisting of tubs and other wooden ware had been piled unusually near the gate during the afternoon. We are of the opinion that the evidence would have authorized the jury to find that the accident was due in part, if not wholly, to the negligence of the defendant. The testimony in regard to the alleged negligence of the decedent is not so direct and clear. It is shown that he might have ...
To continue reading
Request your trial