Hopson v. Boyd
| Citation | 45 Ky. 296 |
| Parties | Hopson <I>vs</I> Boyd. |
| Decision Date | 30 October 1845 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kentucky |
THIS action of detinue was brought in April, 1843, in the name of John Boyd, sueing as an idiot, by his committee, to recover two slaves which had been sold by Boyd in 1826, and for which a tract of land was conveyed to him in 1828, which was afterwards sold under an execution that issued on a replevin bond in which he had become security for his father. The cause was tried on the plea of non-detinet, and a plea denying the idiocy of Boyd at the time of his sale, which so far as it was material, amounted only to the general issue. The only question made in the progress of the trial were, first as to the admissibility of an inquisition returned a few weeks before the commencement of the suit, finding that Boyd was then, and had been from his birth, a person of unsound mind, and that he had no estate; and secondly, upon the defendant's motion for instructions to find as in case of a non-suit on the plaintiff's evidence. Both of these questions having been decided against the defendant, and further evidence having been introduced, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, assessing the value of the slaves and $220 damages for detention. And the defendant's motion for a new trial having been overruled, he has brought the case to this Court.
1. With regard to the first of the questions above stated, the doctrine seems to have been settled in England, and to have been recognized in this as well as other States, that an inquisition finding the person named to have been of unsound mind from a preceding day, is admissible as evidence of his incompetency during the period indicated, even against strangers who were no parties to the inquisition. But it has not been held to be more than prima facie evidence as to the past condition of the person. And although as prima facie evidence it might be sufficient, in the absence of all opposing testimony, to prove the fact, it must yield to the force of opposing testimony. The principle of its admissibility against strangers, seems to be, that it is a public proceeding, had under public authority, and in which the public are interested; and that, therefore, all persons being, to some extent, interested and represented in the proceeding, all should in some degree, be bound by it. In England the character and effect of the proceeding, and especially in cases of idiocy, were such as that the King, by whose attorney it was instituted, had an actually beneficial interest in opposition to that of the supposed non compos and his relatives. And in the opposition of these interests there was a guarantee that either in the inquisition or in the traverse which was allowed, the truth might be fairly attained. But in this State, while the proceeding is instituted and conducted by the attorney for the Commonwealth, it is often set on foot by the friends of the alledged non compos, for the purpose of having him placed as a charge upon the public, or for the purpose of overreaching, for their own benefit, his prior contracts. And although the Commonwealth is interested in the question as to the present and future condition of the person, she has no interest whatever in the question as to his past condition, except so far as the difference between idiocy and lunacy, and the consequent difference in the manner of keeping or sustaining the individual at the public expense may be involved in it. In this proceeding her attorney is on the side opposed to her pecuniary interest; and although the Court is directed by the statute, to appoint some proper person to attend or defend for the alledged non compos, this does not insure a representation of opposite interests, nor a fair adduction of the evidence where the question depends upon the testimony of...
To continue reading
Request your trial