Hopson v. Clary, 2479
| Decision Date | 10 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 2479,2479 |
| Citation | 468 S.E.2d 305,321 S.C. 312 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Sandra D. HOPSON, Appellant, v. William L. CLARY, Jr., Respondent. . Heard |
Thomas E. Mosley, Columbia, for appellant.
Andrew F. Lindemann and John T. Lay, Jr., both of Ellis, Lawhorne, Davidson & Sims, Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant, Sandra D. Hopson, brought this action against respondent, William L. Clary, seeking damages arising out of an automobile accident. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of Clary and Hopson appeals. We affirm.
The record reveals on November 18, 1992, Hopson picked up her son from school and drove toward her mother's residence to deliver some groceries. Hopson was travelling down Read Street with Clary following behind her. Hopson slowed her automobile and pulled to the right. 1 Hopson attempted to make a U-turn and Clary's vehicle collided with hers.
The trial judge granted Clary's motion for directed verdict finding there was no evidence of actionable negligence on Clary's part and, assuming Clary was negligent in some manner, Hopson's own negligence was greater as a matter of law and therefore her claim was barred under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
On appeal, Hopson contends the trial judge erred in directing a verdict for Clary because the evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to whether her vehicle ever came to a complete stop, whether Clary was speeding and whether Clary crossed a solid yellow line in an attempt to pass her. We find no error.
On appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted; however, we cannot ignore facts unfavorable to that party and we must determine whether a verdict for the party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts. Haulbrooks v. Overton, 295 S.C. 380, 368 S.E.2d 676 (Ct.App.1988). If the evidence as a whole is susceptible to only one reasonable inference, no jury issue is created and the motion was properly granted. Whelan v. Welch, 304 S.C. 548, 405 S.E.2d 836 (Ct.App.1991).
Hopson first contends a disputed issue of fact exists as to whether she simply slowed down or came to a complete stop before she attempted a U-turn. While it is true the evidence is conflicting as to whether Hopson came to a complete stop, she has failed to indicate how this issue is material to the question of liability. The evidence is undisputed that Hopson slowed her automobile down and steered to the right hand side of the road before attempting to cross back over the lanes of traffic in making a U-turn. She has conceded she was at fault. She argued, however, Clary was at fault as well in attempting to go beyond the solid yellow lines to pass her and in speeding. Even assuming Hopson did not come to a complete stop but merely slowed down before attempting to make a U-turn, we fail to see how this issue affects the allegations of negligence Hopson lodges against Clary. We therefore find no merit to this argument.
Hopson also argues the case should have been submitted to the jury because there exists evidence Clary was speeding at the time of the accident. We disagree. Clary estimated he was travelling at "somewhere between 25 and 30 miles an hour." Hopson testified a school zone speed limit sign located on Read Street imposed a 25 mile per hour speed limit when flashing. However, Hopson presented no evidence the accident occurred within the school speed zone; rather, Hopson testified only that there were "quite a bit of schools in that area." There is simply no evidence the 25 mile per hour speed limit controlled the particular area in which the accident occurred. Moreover, we agree with the trial judge that Hopson failed to present any evidence Clary's speed was a proximate cause of the accident. See Odom v. Steigerwald, 260 S.C. 422...
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