Hopson v. Schilling

• Decision Date: 15 July 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. No. L 75-30.
• Citation: 418 F. Supp. 1223
• Parties: Jerusha Blanche HOPSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. W. Keith SCHILLING et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

418 F. Supp. 1223

Jerusha Blanche HOPSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. W. Keith SCHILLING et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. L 75-30.

United States District Court, N. D. Indiana, Hammond Division at Lafayette.

July 15, 1976.

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Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, Susan H. Schwandt, Ind. Center on Law & Poverty, Valparaiso, Ind., Alfred E. McClure, Lafayette, Ind., for plaintiffs.

Hoffman & Melichar, Lafayette, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

JESSE E. ESCHBACH, Chief Judge.

This cause is now before the court on the "Multiple Motion of Defendant" Schilling, filed December 31, 1975, on plaintiffs' "Motion for Order Determining Classes and Allowing Discovery from Absent Members of Defendant Class," filed February 10, 1976, and on intervening defendant State of Indiana's motion to dismiss, filed June 4, 1976. On May 5, 1976, the court determined most of the contentions raised by Schilling's "Multiple Motion," leaving only those relating to the propriety of class certification. On June 16, 1976, a hearing was held in regard to the class action issues at which all parties appeared and participated. In light of the evidence taken and for the reasons given below, defendant Schilling's motions to dismiss will be denied, plaintiffs' motion for certification of classes will be granted as modified, and intervening defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied.

Plaintiff is an indigent eligible for assistance¹ under Indiana's poor relief laws, Ind. Code §§ 12-2-1-1 to -39 (Burns 1973); co-plaintiff is a welfare rights organization. The defendant is the trustee of the township in which the principal plaintiff maintains her legal settlement. Pursuant to Ind.Code § 12-2-1-1, defendant, as township trustee, is ex officio the "overseer of the poor" within his township. Plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions she applied for assistance pursuant to the poor relief laws, that on certain occasions she was denied assistance without written statement of the reasons for the adverse action and without statement of her right to appeal, and that the trustee's actions were not based on any written, published standards regarding the granting or denial of benefits. Plaintiff asserts that the poor relief laws are unconstitutional on their face in that they fail to provide for the procedures which the trustee failed to follow, and that the statutes have been unconstitutionally applied to plaintiff in that the trustee failed to give the notice of reasons and of right to appeal and failed to base his decision on public, written standards.²

In the second count of her complaint, plaintiff asserts that defendant improperly denied her certain benefits for payment of mortgage obligations. Under Ind.Code § 12-2-1-10(b), the trustee "may" pay for "shelter." Defendant in fact pays rental obligations in appropriate circumstances. Plaintiff asserts that the refusal to pay her mortgage payments violates the Indiana statute; alternatively, she asserts that the failure to pay mortgage payments violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff seeks certain class certifications in both counts of her complaint. In her first count, dealing with alleged deprivation of due process in the handling of assistance applications, plaintiff seeks to certify a defendant class conditionally consisting of all township trustees in Indiana and a concomitant plaintiff class consisting of all present and future applicants for poor relief within the state. Final certification is not sought until discovery is completed, at which time it would be known which trustees do not now follow the procedures which plaintiff asserts are constitutionally required. Under Count II, plaintiff seeks a plaintiff class only, to consist of all eligible poor relief recipients in Fairfield Township of Tippecanoe County, Indiana, who now or in the future may be denied payment of mortgage obligations.

Under Count I, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the poor relief laws are unconstitutional on their face and as applied, and an order to "require the defendant Schilling to submit a plan for implementation of the court's judgment." Plaintiff Hopson also seeks damages against defendant Schilling, but only in plaintiff's individual capacity and not as class representative. Under Count II, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Schilling, only her demand for damages is made in her own name and not as class representative.

Jurisdiction

Count I of this suit is brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction laid under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Count II is brought under the court's pendent jurisdiction and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Plaintiff's class action claims in Count I, seeking as they do a remedy against a state statute administered on a state-wide basis, bring into play the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2281:

"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute . . . shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges . . .."

Although no party has requested the convening of a three-judge court, the question is jurisdictional and may be raised by the court sua sponte. See, e. g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 417 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1969). In a case properly to be heard by a three-judge court, the single judge must inquire into the jurisdictional facts necessary to found federal jurisdiction and those necessary to found the jurisdiction of the three-judge court. If three-judge court jurisdiction is properly found, all actions concerning the merits must thereafter be made by the three-judge court. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794 (1962). If the case is one for three judges, consideration of the propriety of plaintiff's class action allegations should await the convening of the three-judge court. Cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 291 F.Supp. 772, 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); but cf. Ortiz v. Engelbrecht, 474 F.2d 977, 978 (3d Cir. 1973). Accordingly, the court must first determine the jurisdictional question before turning to the issues raised by the request for class certification.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment determining the unconstitutionality of a state statute, to be issued against all township trustees in the state. Although the requested relief would have state-wide effect, a declaratory judgment is not an "injunction" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2281, for the granting of which a three-judge court would be required. Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 90 S.Ct. 1763, 26 L.Ed.2d 378 (1970); Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 1966).

Plaintiff has requested, under the first count of her complaint, that the court "Require the defendant Schilling to submit a plan for implementation of this Court's judgment." Should the court declare unconstitutional the failure to promulgate standards and give the notice requested, it is apparently plaintiff's demand that defendant Schilling take affirmative action within his township to "implement" the declaratory judgment.

Although not expressly denominated an "affirmative injunction," the coercive relief requested against Schilling goes well beyond the passive relief anticipated within the meaning of declaratory relief. The requested order whereby defendant would be directed to alter his allegedly unconstitutional practices is implicitly injunctive in nature. Cf. Spencer v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1972) (action to declare school segregation unconstitutional; relief sought included demand that state officials submit a plan to rectify the racial imbalance as "implementation" of the declaratory judgment. Held: A three-judge court was properly convened.) It is not of consequence that the injunctive relief is sought as implementation of a declaratory judgment rather than directly as a remedy of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, for when the injunctive relief is sought at the same time the declaratory relief is sought, the distinction is one of pleading only and not of substance.³ Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp., 392 F.Supp. 1023, 1030 (M.D.Fla.1974).

Although plaintiff seeks declaratory relief effective as against all trustees in the state, her injunctive relief is sought only against one trustee. This is sufficient to invoke Section 2281 which requires a three-judge court when "any officer" of the state is sought to be enjoined.

Defendant Schilling, as "Overseer of the Poor," is an officer of the state within the meaning of Section 2281. He is, of course, a township trustee. Under the poor relief laws, he has primary responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the poor relief act. Ind.Code § 12-2-1-1. There is no state-level office or administrator having jurisdiction over the trustee's conduct as overseer of the poor. Ind.Code § 12-1-20-1. Under these circumstances, the township trustee is a state officer, for "it has long been settled that a three-judge court is proper even in a suit against a local official, although localized in his geographic activities and mode of his selection, when he is engaged in enforcing a policy of statewide application whose constitutionality is challenged." Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S. 541, 545 n.2, 92 S.Ct. 652, 654, 30 L.Ed.2d 697 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353 n.10, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970).

A three-judge court is required when the injunctive relief is sought on the basis of the unconstitutionality...