Horan v. Horan

Decision Date20 December 2022
Docket NumberCOA22-203
Citation2022 NCCOA 856
PartiesALEXIS HORAN, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN HORAN; HORAN FUNDING, LLC; HORAN INVESTMENT COMPANY, LLC; HORAN PROPERTIES, LLC; PAROSH, LLC; STEVEN L. HORAN, TRUSTEE OF THE STEVEN L. HORAN REVOCABLE TRUST; KEVIN HORAN, TRUSTEE OF THE STEVEN L. HORAN 2016 IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE TRUST, Defendants.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 November 2022.

Appeal by defendant from orders entered 3 and 6 August 2021 by Judge Brian Ratledge and orders entered 12 September 2019 by Judge Ashleigh Parker Dunston in Wake County, No. 19 CVD 9167 District Court.

Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Steve Mansbery, for plaintiff-appellee.

Arnold & Smith, PLLC, by Matthew R. Arnold and Ashley A Crowder, for defendant-appellant.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

¶ 1 Steven Horan ("defendant") appeals from the trial courts' orders of equitable distribution, alimony, and postseparation support. Defendant argues the trial court erred in classification of the marital assets, lacked competent evidence to support its findings, and committed an abuse of discretion in awarding equitable distribution and alimony in favor of Alexis Horan ("plaintiff"). Defendant also contends the trial court's order for postseparation support lacked competent evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial courts' orders.

I. Background

¶ 2 Plaintiff and defendant (collectively, "the parties") were married on 1 July 1989 and separated on 4 March 2019. The parties divorced in June 2020. Two children were born of the marriage, "both of whom have reached the age of majority."

¶ 3 Litigation between the parties began when plaintiff filed a complaint for postseparation support, alimony, attorney's fees, equitable distribution, and constructive trusts on 8 July 2019. The complaint also included a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from depleting marital assets and a motion for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff filed a motion for interim distribution on 15 August 2019. The foregoing matters were heard before Judge Dunston on 27 August 2019 in Wake County District Court. On 12 September 2019, Judge Dunston entered an order nunc pro tunc for postseparation support, postseparation support arrears, attorney's fees, and interim distribution in favor of plaintiff. Defendant was ordered to pay $48,000.00 in postseparation support arrears and pay an additional $8,000.00 per month in postseparation support which commenced on 1 September 2019.

¶ 4 Plaintiff filed an additional motion for interim distribution on 9 March 2020 and a motion for contempt and order to show cause on 11 March 2020, due to defendant's failure to abide by the orders entered by Judge Dunston. Defendant filed a response to plaintiff's motion and a motion to modify postseparation support on 30 April 2020. On 15 June 2020, plaintiff filed an amended motion for contempt and order to show cause. The matters of plaintiff's motion for interim distribution, contempt, and defendant's motion for modification of postseparation support were heard 7 July 2020 in Wake County Family Court, Judge Ratledge presiding.

¶ 5 Judge Ratledge found defendant to be in civil contempt and denied his motion to modify postseparation support. Judge Ratledge entered orders for interim distribution in the amount of $9,665.55 in attorney's fees and $82,750.00 in postseparation support arrears in relation to the order for civil contempt.

¶ 6 Trial was held before Judge Ratledge on 31 March and 1 April 2021. Multiple matters were being heard and considered by the trial court, including the following motions filed by plaintiff: motion to appear and show cause filed 16 June 2020; motion for contempt filed 9 October 2020; motion for attorney's fees filed 22 October 2020; and an amended motion for contempt filed 11 March 2021; and the original motions for equitable distribution and alimony filed 8 July 2019.

¶ 7 Following trial, Judge Ratledge entered an equitable distribution judgment and order on 3 August 2021. The trial court concluded a 75% distribution of the marital property to plaintiff, and a 25% distribution to defendant, was equitable. Defendant was also ordered to pay plaintiff a distributive award of $303,966.00 and ordered to transfer $539,456.00 from the Horan Funding, LLC IRA to plaintiff's Wells Fargo Securities IRA.

¶ 8 On 6 August 2021, Judge Ratledge entered an order for alimony. Based upon the parties' reasonable monthly expenses and net income, defendant was ordered to pay $6,000.00 per month for ten years, and $4,000.00 per month for an additional eight years thereafter.

¶ 9 On 1 September 2021, defendant timely appealed Judge Ratledge's orders of equitable distribution and alimony, and Judge Dunston's orders of postseparation support, arrears, attorney's fees, and interim distribution.[1]

II. Discussion

A. Equitable Distribution Judgment and Order

¶ 10 "Equitable distribution reflects the idea that marriage is a partnership enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions and which entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of the property acquired during the relationship." White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 775, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985) (citations omitted).

Equitable distribution requires the trial court to "(1) classify property as being marital, divisible, or separate . . .; (2) calculate the net value of the marital and divisible property; and (3) distribute equitably the marital and divisible property." Brackney v. Brackney, 199 N.C.App. 375, 381, 682 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2009) (citation omitted). "[T]o enter a proper equitable distribution judgment, the trial court must specifically and particularly classify and value all assets and debts maintained by the parties at the date of separation." Dalgewicz v. Dalgewicz, 167 N.C.App. 412, 423, 606 S.E.2d 164, 171 (2004).

¶ 11 Defendant contends the trial court initially erred by improperly classifying the property at 597 Chestertown Drive, as a marital asset in its entirety and that the trial court lacked sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that an unequal division of the marital property is equitable. We address each argument in turn.

1. Classification of 597 Chestertown Drive

¶ 12 The" 'classification of property in an equitable distribution proceeding requires the application of legal principles,'" therefore, we review de novo the trial court's "classification of property as marital, divisible, or separate." Green v. Green, 255 N.C.App. 719, 724, 806 S.E.2d 45, 50 (2017) (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 371 N.C. 485, 818 S.E.2d 273 (2018). As the trial judge in equitable distribution proceedings sits without a jury, a court's characterization of property as "marital, divisible, or separate will not be disturbed on appeal if there is competent evidence to support the determination." Brackney, 199 N.C.App. at 381, 682 S.E.2d at 405 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court must support its "conclusion that property is either marital, separate, or non-marital . . . [with] written findings of fact." Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C.App. 722, 729, 436 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1993) (citation omitted). "Appropriate findings of fact include, but are not limited to[:] (1) the date the property was acquired[;] (2) who acquired the property[;] (3) the date of the marriage[;] (4) the date of separation[;] [and] (5) how the property was acquired (i.e., by gift, bequest, or purchase)." Id. (citation omitted)

¶ 13 As set forth above, the equitable distribution process "requires the trial court to classify all of the marital and divisible property-collectively termed distributable property-in order that a reviewing court may reasonably determine whether the distribution ordered is equitable." Robinson v. Robinson, 210 N.C.App. 319, 323, 707 S.E.2d 785, 789 (2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(1) (2021) defines marital property as

"all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of separation of the parties, and presently owned, except property determined to be separate or divisible property[.]" Separate property is defined as all real and personal property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage. However, property acquired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be considered separate property only if such an intention is stated in the conveyance. Property acquired in exchange for separate property shall remain separate property regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both and shall not be considered to be marital property unless a contrary intention is expressly stated in the conveyance. The increase in value of separate property and the income derived from separate property shall be considered separate property.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(2). Divisible property includes "[a]ll appreciation and diminution in value of marital property and divisible property of the parties occurring after the date of separation and prior to the date of distribution, [unless] that appreciation or diminution in value is the direct result of the postseparation actions or activities of one spouse[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(4). "All appreciation and diminution in value of marital and divisible property is presumed to be divisible property unless the...

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