Horan v. Wahrenberger

• Decision Date: 01 January 1852
• Citation: 9 Tex. 313
• Parties: HORAN v. WAHRENBERGER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

9 Tex. 313

HORAN

v.WAHRENBERGER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1852.

Where the District Court renders judgment upon the merits in a case in which it has no jurisdiction, for example, in case of an appeal from a Justice's Court, its judgment is a nullity: and where the Supreme Court renders judgment upon the merits, on appeal from the District Court, in such a case, although in the instance cited such judgment be to reverse the judgment of the District Court and affirm that of the Justice's Court, the judgment of the Supreme Court is a nullity. (Note 53.)

The principle that a judgment of a court acting without authority is null seems to be of universal application. The only difference in its effect on the judgments of courts of general and courts of specially limited jurisdiction is that in support of the former, jurisdiction is presumed, while to sustain the latter, jurisdiction must be shown.

A sale under execution on a judgment in a case in which the court had no jurisdiction, whether it be the judgment of a Justice's Court, of the District Court, or of the Supreme Court, confers no right where the judgment creditor is the purchaser; but, Quere? As to the equities in case a third person should be a purchaser. (Note 54.)

Nor are we by this opinion precluded from sanctioning such equitable doctrines, consistent with the principles of law, as will protect officers enforcing process under a void judgment, and will meliorate the harshness of the rule as to the effect of jurisdictional mistakes.

Appeal from Travis. This was an action for the recovery of a lot or parcel of land. The plaintiff (who was appellant in this court) claimed under a judgment of the Supreme Court and by virtue of an execution and sale under said judgment. The suit in which that judgment was rendered was between the parties to this action, and it originated before a justice of the peace, whose judgment was taken by appeal to the District Court. The judgment of the District Court being brought to the Supreme Court for revision, was reversed, and the judgment of the justice of the peace affirmed, with damages for the delay. The defendant (who was the appellee in this court) set up in his answer that the judgment of the Supreme Court and all subsequent proceedings under it were null and void; and, on exception, the answer was sustained and the petition dismissed.

A. J. Hamilton, for appellant. It is no objection to the title of the appellant that the law by which the appeal was had from the Justice's Court and final judgment in the cause by this court was pronounced unconstitutional. (1 Morris R., 467, and authorities cited.)

The judgment of the Supreme Court was an exercise of jurisdiction, and its mandate obligatory; and being the highest judicial tribunal in the State, no court can ever look behind its judgment. (3 Peters, 193;6 Cranch, 267.)

This court had jurisdiction of causes coming up from Justices' Courts; and the mode of bringing them up is but a question of error, which must be brought to the notice of the court before pronouncing its final judgment, or it is too late.

The difference between judgments of this court and inferior courts, in respect of alleged want of jurisdiction, is, that in the one case the rendition of judgment is an assertion of jurisdiction that cannot be called in question, and in the other, that may be called in question, directly or collaterally.

The repose of property and the protection of rights based upon or arising from judicial proceedings requires that parties denying the jurisdiction of this court, in the rendition of its judgments, should make the objection of want of jurisdiction before the rendition of judgment, for the same reason that parties complaining of erroneous judgments of inferior courts are required to prosecute appeals and writs of error within a given time. In the last case, if no appeal or writ of error has been prosecuted, the judgment is final, and the right secured under such judgments cannot be disturbed. So in the former case, if no objection is made to the jurisdiction until the Supreme Court has pronounced judgment, such judgment is the law of the case, and rights acquired under it will be protected. (3 Peters, above cited, 202.)

There is no power or authority in this court to re-examine a decision of an inferior tribunal as to its jurisdiction in a case in which its judgment is final. The proposition that the decisions of a court in a case beyond its jurisdiction are void, although true in the abstract, is practically false. Such decisions must stand unless there is power in another court to reverse them. (Case in 3 Peters, above cited, p. 202.)

The judgment in this case by this court put at rest the subject-matter of the suit. The judgment being good, the purchase under it was good.

This court will not undertake to revise or set aside its own judgments after the term at which they were rendered has elapsed. (Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex. R., 517.)

This court's “jurisdiction is exclusively appellate; but its revisory power is to be exerted, not over its own judgments, but over those of inferior jurisdictions.” (Ib.)

If the judgment rendered by this court, under which the appellant purchased, was a nullity, the officer making the levy and sale was a trespasser. (3 Peters, 103.)

The question is, Was the sheriff in this case bound to obey the mandate of this court or the process authorized by the mandate?

W. P. & T. H. Duval, for appellee. I. It is manifest that Horan's claim to the property could not be maintained under the present action. It was derived under a judgment of the Supreme Court, upon an appeal coming up from a Justice's Court, when no such appeal was permitted by the Constitution of the State. The District Court had no jurisdiction. (Titus v. Latimer, 5 Tex. R., 433.) If the court a quo had no jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had none. (Aulanier v. The Governor, 1 Tex. R., 653.) The Supreme Court having no jurisdiction over the case, their judgment in the premises was absolutely null and void, and consequently the execution issued under the same, the levy upon and the sale of the lot in question, and all other subsequent proceedings, were equally void. A void judgment can confer no rights. (Dean ex dem. Fisher v. Harnden, 1 Paine C. C., 55.)

II. To obtain a reversal of the judgment of the District Court, the appellant relies upon three decisions. The first is reported in 1 Morris R., 467. This case certainly goes to great lengths. But it is at war with all the authorities bearing upon the question now presented to this court. Its reasoning with regard to the validity of judgments of courts rendered without jurisdiction or under unconstitutional laws is wholly unsupported by the very cases which the learned judge cites in his opinion. (See 10 Peters, 471; 16 Pick. R., 87.)

The case which seems to be mainly relied upon here, and which is also cited in the case reported in 1 Morris, is that of “ ex parte Tobias Watkins,” 3 Peters, 193. This case has no application here. The court will see by reference to it that a judgment was rendered against Watkins, on a criminal prosecution in the Circuit Court of the United States in the District of Columbia. A petition was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the legality of his confinement, &c. The petition was founded on the allegation that the indictment charged no offense of which the Circuit Court could take jurisdiction, and that consequently its judgment was coram non judice, and totally void. The writ was refused on the grounds--

1st. That the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in criminal cases.

2d. Because the writ was sought upon a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and which judgment was withdrawn by law from the revision of the Supreme Court, even upon a writ of error.

The case is totally unlike the one at bar; but, giving the greatest possible effect to every portion of the learned opinion therein pronounced, it nowhere establishes the principle that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is merely voidable and not absolutely void.

But it is said that the want of jurisdiction in this case should have been alleged and brought to the notice of this court before its judgment was rendered. In answer to this we say that when this court had itself solemnly decided that appeals from Justices' Courts were unconstitutional, and that it had no jurisdiction over the same, it was time enough to plead that fact when the judgment in this case was sought to be enforced by bringing an action of ejectment against Wahrenberger.

In the case of Delafield v. The State of Illinois, 2 Hill's R., 159, the court says: “It is never too late to object to the jurisdiction where the want of power to hear and determine appears upon the face of the proceedings.” Again, in the case of Lathan v. Edgarton, 9 Cowen, 227, it is said, “The want of jurisdiction makes a record utterly void and unavailable for any purpose.” * * * “The want of jurisdiction may be always set up against a judgment when sought to be enforced, or when any benefit is claimed under it.”And in Bloom v. Benedick, 1 Hill, 130, it is said, that “whenever it appears that there was a want of jurisdiction, the judgment will be void, in whatever court it was rendered.”

The third case relied upon by the appellant is that of Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex. R., 517. It is there stated that the jurisdiction of this court “is exclusively appellate, but its revisory power is to be exerted, not over its own judgments, but over those of inferior jurisdiction.” In this the court only asserted what is true as to the general powers and duties of a court simply appellate. It was not meant thereby that this court should be excluded, under all circumstances, from a revision of its own judgments.

The case of Skillern's Ex'ors v. Mays' Ex'ors, 6 Cranch, 267, referred to in the case ex parte Tobias Watkins,...