Horgan v. Metropolitan Mut. Aid Ass'n
| Decision Date | 22 June 1909 |
| Parties | HORGAN v. METROPOLITAN MUT. AID ASS'N. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Francis R. Mullin and Paul F. Spain, for petitioner.
Russell A. Sears and Cyrus Brewer, for respondent.
The petitioner asked for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to reinstate him as one of its members. He was suspended from membership by a vote of the association on June 4, 1908, for nonpayment of an assessment of $1 regularly made. This was done without giving him any notice or opportunity of being heard. It is a generally recognized doctrine of law that, under a by-law like that of this association, a member, who by reason of his membership has valuable pecuniary rights and interests in such an organization, cannot be removed without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard. Wachtel v. Noah Widows' & Orphans' Society, 84 N.Y. 28, 38 Am. Rep. 478; Com. v. Pennsylvania Beneficial Institution, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 141; Sibley v. Carteret Club, 40 N. J Law, 295; Delacy v. Neuse River Navigation Co., 8 N. C. 274-279, 9 Am. Dec. 636; Fisher v. Keane, 11 Ch. Div. 353-359; Dean v. Bennett, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 489; Queens v. Sadlers' Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 404-423.
In this particular the suspension was irregular and unauthorized. The assessment became due on May 14th, and at that time the petitioner was disabled, and receiving benefits, or should have been receiving benefits, if the respondent had done its duty. Article 7, section 2, of the by-laws is as follows: 'A member, being at the time sick or disabled and receiving benefits, cannot be debarred from receiving a continuation of such benefits because of his inability to pay his assessment, the president being authorized to deduct from the sums paid him for benefits such amounts as will keep him in good standing, which money, so deducted, is to be paid to the financial secretary and his receipt taken therefor.'
It is found in the report that the petitioner was ill and unfit to work, by reason of general disability from consumption, from March 10, 1908, until after his suspension on June 4, 1908. A sick committee was appointed by the respondent, in accordance with its by-laws, to investigate his sickness or disability. Upon their report, sick benefits were paid him from March 17th to April 23d, at the regular rate provided for such cases, less $1.50 deducted under article 7, section 2, for a death assessment and for his monthly dues. Under article 5 section 3, he was entitled to receive his benefits until the committee declared him fit for duty, at which time he would be taken off the sick list. This, however, was subject to the limitation contained in article 7, section 3, which makes his right for that year end at the expiration of 10 weeks. The committee made no such declaration or report, and the respondent voted to drop his name from the sick list and to discontinue...
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