Horgan v. United States, Case No. 18-00721-CV-W-NKL

• Decision Date: 11 March 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 18-00721-CV-W-NKL
• Parties: JAMES HORGAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and TREY HUNT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

JAMES HORGAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and TREY HUNT, Defendants.

Case No. 18-00721-CV-W-NKL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI WESTERN DIVISION

March 11, 2019

ORDER

Plaintiff James Horgan alleges that his car was damaged as the result of a collision in February 2018 caused by Defendant Trey Hunt, who at the time was acting as an agent and employee of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). Defendants United States of America and Mr. Hunt move to dismiss Mr. Horgan's claims on the grounds that Mr. Horgan's claim against Mr. Hunt is barred by absolute immunity and Mr. Horgan's claim against the United States fails because of his failure to file an administrative claim. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the motion to dismiss.

I. The Claim Against Mr. Hunt

There is no dispute that Mr. Hunt was acting in the scope of his employment with the United States Postal Service at the time of the vehicular collision at issue. See Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶ 6 ("At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hunt was acting as an agent and/or employee on behalf of the United States Postal Service, and acting within the scope of said agency or employment."); Motion of the Federal Defendants to Dismiss, Doc. 10, p. 3 ("[T]he United States Attorney (as the proper designee) has certified that Hunt was acting in the scope of his employment with the USPS at the time of the February 4, 2018 automobile accident."). Where, as here, the United States Attorney General has certified that a federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment, any pending civil action against the employee for that conduct must "be deemed an action against the United States," and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). This immunity for federal employees extends even to state law tort claims. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1184-85 (1991) (holding that the Liability Reform Act "makes the [Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")] the exclusive mode of recovery for the tort of a Government employee even when the FTCA itself precludes Government liability"); Brown v. Armstrong, 949 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[B]ecause the FTCA is an exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, if recovery is not available against the United States under § 2680, it is not available at all."). Thus, Mr. Hunt is immune to Mr. Horgan's claim, and the claim against Mr. Hunt must be dismissed.

II. The Claim Against the United States

The FTCA is, with exceptions that do not apply here, the exclusive remedy for property damage "arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Therefore, Mr. Horgan's claim against the United States can survive only insofar as it comports with FTCA requirements.

The FTCA constitutes a limited waiver by the United States of its general immunity to suit. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 304-05, 112 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1992) ("Prior to 1946, the sovereign immunity of the United States prevented those injured by the negligent acts of federal employees from obtaining redress through lawsuits; compensation could be had only bypassage of a private bill in Congress. The FTCA replaced that notoriously clumsy system of compensation with a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.") (quotation marks and citations omitted). The "limitations and conditions upon which the government consents to be sued must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S. Ct. 2698, 2702 (1981); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1993) ("We should also have in mind that the Act waives the immunity of the United States and that we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended. Neither, however, should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). "A waiver of sovereign immunity is strictly construed in favor of the United States, and the party bringing suit bears the burden of demonstrating waiver." May v. United States, No. 17-04157-NKL, 2017 WL 6419298, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2017), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 994, 995 (8th Cir. 2018).

The FTCA requires a claimant to timely file a written administrative claim with the federal agency at issue. See Bohac v. Walsh, 386 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a claimant must present her 'claim to the appropriate Federal agency' and the agency must make a final decision before the claimant may bring an action against the United States." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Here, although Shelter Insurance Companies as subrogee of James and Kelly Horgan filed a claim with USPS, there is no dispute that Mr. Horgan himself has filed no such claim. The question before the Court is whether Shelter's filing of the administrative claim constitutes a filing by Mr. Horgan himself.

Mr. Horgan argues that, because Shelter is subrogated to the rights of the insured, Shelter's claim belongs to Mr. Horgan under Missouri law and must be brought in his name, rather thanShelter's name. However, Mr. Horgan does not suggest, or submit evidence to show, that Shelter's claim and his own claim are coextensive, such that Shelter's claim would have given the government a sufficient basis to evaluate his own claim.¹ The prerequisite of an administrative claim setting forth the "sum certain" sought "assures an agency of the basic information necessary to initiate prompt settlement proceedings," and "an insurer's request for reimbursement alone may not adequately perform those notice-giving functions" because "[t]he claims of an injured party and his insurance carrier are not always coextensive." Shelton v. United States, 615 F.2d 713, 715 (6th Cir. 1980). While "[a]n insurer's claim will never exceed that of the...