Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 58949,58949 |
| Citation | 88 Misc.2d 619,388 N.Y.S.2d 235 |
| Parties | , 7 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,122 HORIZON ADIRONDACK CORPORATION, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim |
| Court | New York Court of Claims |
Claimant is a subsidiary of Horizon Corporation, a large-scale land developer, and is the owner in fee of a tract of land comprising approximately 24,000 acres in the Town of Colton, St. Lawrence County, New York. The parcel is situated within the 'blue line' of the Adirondack Park. It was purchased by Horizon Adirondack Corporation for the purpose of constructing thereon an extensive housing and recreational development. This property, together with all other land situated within the Adirondack Park, is subject to the Adirondack Park Agency Act (Executive Law, § 800, Et seq.) (hereinafter the 'Act'), and to the jurisdiction of the Adirondack Park Agency (hereinafter 'APA') created thereby. In 1973 the Act was amended to provide for a comprehensive and extensive system of land use controls applicable to privately-owned land within the Park. (L.1973, ch. 348, § 1.) Alleging that Chapter 348 constitutes a 'taking' of its property, the claimant filed the present claim on December 11, 1974. The State has moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter and the claim fails to state a cause of action.
Beginning in 1968 with the Temporary Study Commission on the Future of the Adirondacks, the State and various of its agencies and commissions have undertaken, with some degree of local input, the task of developing a program of regional land use control within the Adirondack Park. The APA was formed in 1971, and was given the responsibility for formulation of a land use and development plan and recommendations for implementation. (L.1971, ch. 706, § 1.) This process culminated in 1973 with the adoption of Chapter 348, referred to above. By this chapter the Act was substantially amended, and the system of regional land use controls which are the subject of this litigation was enacted.
The restrictions imposed by the amendment may be summarized as follows. First, the Legislature formally adopted the 'Adirondack Park Land Use and Development Plan' prepared by the APA, as a guide to development of private lands within the Park. (Executive Law, § 805, subd. 1 a.) An official land use map attached to the Plan delineates the boundaries of land use areas throughout such private lands. Within 20 days after the enactment of Chapter 348, the APA was required to file the official map at its headquarters, file a certified copy thereof with the Secretary of State, and file reasonable facsimiles thereof with the Adirondack Park Local Government Review Board and with the Clerk of each county and local government within the Park. (Executive Law, § 805, subd. 2 b.)
Chapter 348 provides that,
'The official Adirondack park land use and development plan map shall have the land use planning and regulatory effect authorized under this article.' (Executive Law, § 805, subd. 2 a.)
The plan map classifies land within the Park into six types of land use area: hamlet, moderate intensity use, low intensity use, rural use, resource management, and industrial use areas. With respect to each land use classification, Chapter 348 sets forth a 'character description', a statement of the purposes, policies, and objectives to be achieved in the area, intensity guidelines, and a classification of compatible uses including lists of 'primary' and 'secondary' uses. (Executive Law, § 805.) In this manner, land use and density are regulated. It should be noted, however, that the drafters intended to provide a greater degree of flexibility of control and administration than is present in more traditional zoning ordinances. As stated in the Memorandum of the State Executive Department:
(1973 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., pp. 2201, 2203.)
The former counsel of the APA has written,
'In fact, the land area concepts employed in the plan are less designed to control uses than they are designed to control density of development, and no uses are flatly outlawed anywhere. The Plan speaks in terms only of 'compatible uses'.' Davis, 'Land Use Control and Environmental Protection in the Adirondacks', 47 N.Y.S. Bar J. 189, 220.
The intensity requirements are approximations and are not absolute. For example, the 'guideline' for intensity of development of land located in any rural use area provides that development '* * * Should not exceed Approximately seventy-five principal buildings per square mile.' (Executive Law, § 805, subd. 3 f(3) (emphasis added).) In resource management areas, the guideline is fifteen principal buildings per square mile. (Executive Law, § 805, subd. 3 g(3).) Rather than mandating minimum single-family lot sizes, these provisions would seem to permit clustering of structures, particularly in the case of largescale developments.
In addition to adoption of the plan and map, Chapter 348 imposes restrictions on use, development, and subdivision of lands along shorelines. These restrictions include controls on lot width, setback, clearing of vegetation, and shoreline frontage Clustering of structures is encouraged. (Executive Law, § 806.)
Finally, of significance to the claim herein, Chapter 348 provides for an application, review and approval process for certain types of land development, designated as 'class A or class B regional projects'. Class A and B regional projects are defined separately for each land use classification. In general, regional projects are designated as such on the basis of (1) location within a 'critical environmental area' (such as a wetland), (2) type of use (a factor apparently related to the nature or character of the use and its impact on the area), and (3) size (also related to impact). (Executive Law, §§ 808--810; Davis, Supra, 47 N.Y.S. Bar J., 189, 221--222.) As the land use classifications become more restrictive, more types of development and developments of lesser intensity are brought within the ambit of the regional project approval process. For example, in rural use areas a subdivision involving twenty or more residential lots is designated as a class A regional project; whereas, in the more restrictive resource management areas all subdivisions of land involving two or more lots are designated as class A regional projects. The lists of uses constituting Class A and B regional projects are lengthy and detailed. (Executive Law, § 810.)
In addition to the Agency's review powers over regional projects, the provisions of the Act and certain rules and regulations or orders adopted pursuant thereto were enforceable by fine or imprisonment. The Attorney General was granted powers to institute any appropriate action or proceeding to enforce such provisions, regulations or orders, or to prevent, restrain, enjoin, correct or abate any violation thereof. (L.1973, ch. 348, § 1, Supra; Executive Law, § 813 (McKinney Supp., 1975--1976).) A recent amendment substituted civil penalties for the criminal sanctions, but the equitable enforcement powers of the Attorney General were retained. (L.1976, ch. 898, § 1.)
The land owned by the claimant is located within APA designated rural use and resource management areas, and is subject to the strict intensity 'guidelines' and use classifications applicable to such areas. The primary effect of these restrictions is to limit the development originally proposed by the claimant for 6,955 dwelling units to a maximum of 1,608 dwelling units. (Answering Affidavit of Russell C. Wilde.) As this is a large scale development, it is presumably subject to the regional project approval provisions. Due to the imposition of these controls, the claimant asserts that it has been deprived of almost all economic use of its property, and that the controls imposed constitute a 'taking'. The legislation is alleged to effect a De facto appropriation, for which just compensation is claimed.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the State contends that (State's Memorandum of Law, p. 3.) If such was claimant's legal posture, I would agree with the State's contention that the Court of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter; and, that claimant must initially seek a declaration by a court of general jurisdiction as to whether the Act, on its face or as applied, is constitutional or not.
However, claimant does not challenge the constitutionality of the Act. In its claim, after reciting a description of its real estate holdings affected by the Act, the claimant asserts:
'4. That on May 22, 1973, the State of New York caused to be enacted into law Chapter 348 of the Laws of 1973, entitled the 'Adirondack Park Agency Act'.
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