Horizon Corp. v. Weinberg

• Decision Date: 20 February 1975
• Docket Number: CA-CIV,No. 2,2
• Citation: 531 P.2d 1153,23 Ariz.App. 215
• Parties: HORIZON CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Steven J. WEINBERG, Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 1661.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1153

531 P.2d 1153

23 Ariz.App. 215

HORIZON CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Steven J. WEINBERG, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CIV 1661.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Feb. 20, 1975.

Rehearing Denied March 25, 1975.

Robertson, Molloy, Fickett & Jones, P.C. by Michael J. Meehan, Tucson, for appellant and cross-appellee

Quigley & Quigley, P.C. by John M. Quigley, Tucson, for appellee and cross-appellant.

OPINION

HATHAWAY, Judge.

This appeal and cross-appeal arise out of an action instituted by Mr. Weinberg against Horizon Corporation to recover damages for an alleged breach of an employment contract. The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, findings of fact and conclusions of law ere made, and judgment entered in Weinberg's favor in the amount of $2,301.67. Horizon seeks reversal or in the alternative, reduction of the damages award, whereas Weinberg seeks an increase in the amount of damages awarded to him.

The pre-trial order recites the respective positions of the parties. Weinberg's position was that he had an agreement with Horizon for employment in the capacity of a financial analyst for a reasonable period of time, such reasonable period being at least one year. Further, that he had begun his employment on April 14, 1972 and had been terminated without proper cause on November 8, 1972. Horizon's position was that the employment contract was for an indefinite period of time, hence terminable at will by either party, and that Weinberg's dismissal was for cause. The issues of fact and law set forth in the pre-trial order included: (1) 'What were the terms of the employment contract between the parties?' and (2) 'Was the contract terminable at will by defendant?'

The following findings of fact were made:

'1. Plaintiff accepted employment with defendant as the result of inducement from defendant that such employment would be for an indefinitely long period of time, and for at least one year.

2. In consideration of acceptance of employment with defendant, plaintiff made material changes in his circumstances by:

a. Moving his residence cross-country;

b. Servering (sic) an advantageous employment relationship with Procon Corporation;

c. Terminating a post-graduate collegiate course; and

d. Severing his ties in the Chicago area in order to make a new home in Tucson.

3. The methods employed by defendant, in advertising, interviewing and having plaintiff sign a 'relocation expense agreement' indicated a contemplated employment of at least one year.'

The trial court made the following conclusions of law:

'1. An employment contract was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant for an indefinitely long period of time, but not less than one year.

2. Plaintiff was discharged by defendant from his employment pursuant to said contract after less than seven months without legal justication.'

(Other findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to damages were also entered.)

The significant facts are essentially undisputed. According to Weinberg, he responded to a Horizon advertisement in the Wall Street Journal describing career opportunities for financial analysts and extolling Tucson as a place to live. He made two trips to Tucson for employment interviews and on one was accompanied by his wife. The expenses of these trips were paid for by Horizon. No definite term of employment was agreed upon but, according to Weinberg, his understanding was that the job would last for a long period of time and he assumed that the position would last at least one year.

Between the first interview and Weinberg's commencement of work, there was some correspondence between him and the assistant controller of Horizon. The letters consisted of one from Weinberg expressing interest in the job with Horizon, a letter from Horizon confirming a telephone offer of $13,500 per year plus an offer to reimburse relocation expenses, a letter from Weinberg enclosing a statement of travel expenses and expressing thanks for being employed, and a letter from Horizon enclosing a check for expenses and confirming the employment. There was no reference in this correspondence to any specific term of employment.

Approximately one month before he commenced working for Horizon, Weinberg signed a Horizon relocation expense agreement in which he agreed to repay to Horizon the moving expenses 'in the event I resign for reasons within my control within 12 months after the starting date of my employment with Horizon.'

We are unable to agree with the trial court's conclusion that the employment contract between Horizon and Weinberg was 'for an indefinitely long period of time, but not less than one year.' The fact that Horizon advertised the employment as 'permanent' ...