Horn Const., Inc. v. Stran-Steel Corp., STRAN-STEEL

• Decision Date: 12 November 1965
• Docket Number: STRAN-STEEL,No. 93026,93026
• Citation: 26 Conn.Supp. 201,216 A.2d 833
• Court: Connecticut Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: HORN CONSTRUCTION, INC. v.CORPORATION.

Page 833

216 A.2d 833

26 Conn.Supp. 201

HORN CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. STRAN-STEEL CORPORATION.

No. 93026.

Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut, Hartford County.

Nov. 12, 1965.

George A. Downing, Manchester, for plaintiff.

Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, specially for defendant.

MIGNONE, Judge.

The defendant is a Michigan corporation which does not have an office in this state nor has it done business within the state. It was served with the complaint by resort to the provisions of § 33-411(b)(c) and (d) of the General Statutes by having the secretary of state address a copy of the complaint to the corporate office of the defendant as shown in the official registry of the state of its incorporation. The defendant appears specially herein to file a plea in abatement and to the jurisdiction attacking the validity of § 33-411 to give in personam jurisdiction over it in this court. The plaintiff has demurred to the defendant's plea in abatement, thereby raising the legal issue as to the legal validity and constitutionality of § 33-411(c). The complaint alleges that the plaintiff had a franchise agreement with the defendant pursuant to which the defendant provided plans and materials to the plaintiff for the construction of certain buildings in Connecticut. It alleges that the defendant was negligent in providing inadequate specifications and failed to provide adequate and suitable materials. It further alleges a breach of the franchise contract as a result thereof.

The plaintiff has submitted a comprehensive memorandum addressed to the legal issue involved, i. e., can this court exercise valid in personam jurisdiction over the defendant foreign corporation in the light of its remonstrance that it does not do business and has no office within this state? The plaintiff bases its claim of valid jurisdiction in compliance with our state statute on the claim of adequate adherence to the essential requisites laid down in the leading case on in personam service decided by the United States Supreme Court--International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). This state does have an appropriate statute (§ 33-411) which (a) authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction by its courts over a foreign corporation and (b) provides for an effective method of service to give notice to the foreign corporation of the pendency of the action.

The main thrust of the defendant's claim would appear to be that the 'minimum contacts' test, referred to in the International Shoe case, supra, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, with this state, which is a prerequisite to proper applicability of § 33-411, has not been met. The International Shoe case blazed the path with a newly liberalized and more realistic test of a foreign corporation's 'contacts' with a state, putting stress upon the nature and quality of those contacts-- rather than by quantitative measurement thereof. The plaintiff's brief makes reference to a number of recent cases which have followed the path of the International Shoe case to give further body to the 'minimum contacts' theory. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), the sole act of mailing a reinsurance certificate to a California policyholder was deemed a sufficient contact to give California courts in personam jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F.Supp. 908 (D.C.1961); Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F.Supp. 145 (D.C.1961); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959); Florio v. Powder Power Tool Corporation, 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.); Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909.

The court's own research reveals that in quite recent cases the theory of 'minimum contacts' required to confer jurisdiction is further elucidated. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' & Exhibits' Assn., 344 F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 1965), brings out that '[w]hile only one act may be enough to fulfill the venue requirements of the statute, in each case it is the totality of all of the facts which determines whether the defendant is doing business * * * in a district.' And it points out (p. 866) that '[t]here has been the doing of some act, or the consummation of some transaction, within the forum,' citing Mechanical Contractors Assn. of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Assn. of Northern California, Inc., 342 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1965).

The case of Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965), reviews the leading Supreme Court decisions and distills the main guidelines to a determination as to when valid in personam jurisdiction can be taken over foreign corporations in situations analogous to the instant one. These are (1) the quantity of the contacts; (3) service and quality of the contacts; (3) service and connection of the cause of action with those contacts; (4) interest of the forum state; and (5) convenience. At page 197, it further clarifies the fact that the 'Supreme Court has certainly not indicated that all five of these factors must be present in substantial degree for jurisdiction to be constitutionally effected.' It thereupon concludes (p. 197) that 'the use in this case of the Minnesota substituted service procedure on this defendant foreign corporation is consistent with fair play and substantial justice and does not violate...