Horn v. Davis Elec. Constructors, Inc., 23631

• Decision Date: 04 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 23631,23631
• Citation: 307 S.C. 559,416 S.E.2d 634
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: George Earl HORN, Respondent, v. DAVIS ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Petitioner. . Heard

Page 634

416 S.E.2d 634

307 S.C. 559

George Earl HORN, Respondent, v. DAVIS ELECTRICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Petitioner.

No. 23631.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 4, 1991.

Decided April 13, 1992.

Rehearing Denied May 6, 1992.

Wallace K. Lightsey, of Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, P.A., Greenville, for petitioner.

James C. Spears, Jr., of the Faucette Law Firm, P.A., Spartanburg, for respondent.

FINNEY, Justice:

In this action for retaliatory discharge, Petitioner Davis Electrical Constructors, Inc., (Davis) appeals from the holding of the Court of Appeals which affirmed a finding of liability and award of lost wages, reversed reinstatement and remanded the issue to the circuit court for reconsideration. See Horn v. Davis Electrical Constructors, Inc., 302 S.C. 484, 395 S.E.2d 724 (Ct.App.1990). We affirm as modified.

Respondent George Earl Horn was employed by Davis as an electrician's helper, which entailed climbing high ladders, lifting heavy objects and operating heavy machinery. On October 20, 1986, Horn was temporarily disabled as the result of an on-the-job injury to his back for which he received temporary total disability Workers' Compensation benefits. On August 20, 1987, Horn received a final release from his physician with restrictions of no lifting over fifty pounds, no climbing higher than ten feet, and no high vibrating factors such as a forklift. Horn's permanent partial disability was rated at eight percent.

Upon being released by his physician in 1987, Horn returned to Davis for work but was refused employment. The records of Davis introduced at trial reflect that on October 30, 1986, Horn was terminated and bear the notation "Worker's Comp Lay-off." Subsequently, Horn filed a Workers' Compensation claim which was settled ten months later based upon a permanent impairment rating of thirty percent.

On October 26, 1987, Horn instituted this action alleging that Davis terminated his employment because of Horn's claim for Workers' Compensation, in violation of S.C.Code Ann. § 41-1-80 (Supp.1991). The case was tried before a judge and jury on March 1-2, 1988. At the close of the plaintiff's case and at the close of evidence, respectively, Davis moved for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict on the following grounds:

1. It was undisputed that Horn had not obtained a full medical release;

2. There was insufficient evidence of a retaliatory motive on the part of Davis; and

3. There was no evidence that Horn had actually been discharged from his position.

The trial judge denied the motions. Additionally, the trial court construed Section 41-1-80 to permit the jury to decide only whether a violation of the statute had occurred and in the event of a verdict for the plaintiff, reinstatement and payment of back wages were mandatory. Davis excepted to the ruling.

The jury returned a verdict for Horn. By its order dated March 11, 1988, the trial court awarded Horn back wages from August 20, 1987, in the amount of $9,787.68, and ordered Davis to immediately reinstate Horn to his former position. Davis appealed, alleging:

1. That Horn had failed to establish a cause of action under Section 41-1-80 in that his undisputed medical restrictions rendered him incapable of performing his duties;

a. That Horn had failed to establish a prima facie case in that he offered no proof that he satisfied the job qualification of a full medical release;

b. That Horn had failed to offer any proof that Davis's nonretaliatory reason for his discharge was merely a pretext; and

2. That the trial court should have the discretion to decide whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy under Section 41-1-80.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Horn v. Davis, supra. Davis petitioned for rehearing and upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals sustained its initial decision.

The Court of Appeals held that Horn had established a prima facie case. It found that Horn's date of discharge was October 30, 1986, ten days after his work-related injury. That court held that while an employee may be discharged for inability to perform the duties for which he was hired, although not permanently totally disabled, the employee must be afforded a reasonable rehabilitation period prior to the making of such determination. The Court of Appeals concluded that Davis' claim of Horn's inability to meet the required work standard at the time of his termination was a pretext and that the record reflected other evidence of retaliatory motive on the part of Davis. Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C. 553, 389 S.E.2d 448 (Ct.App.1990), aff'd as modified, 305 S.C. 118, 406 S.E.2d 358 (1991) (quoting Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803 (Okla.1988)).

The Court of Appeals also reversed Horn's reinstatement and remanded the issue for reconsideration based upon its determination that reinstatement, as an equitable remedy, is similar to injunctive relief and, therefore, is discretionary. Sea Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 363 S.E.2d 891 (1987). We agree.

Section 41-1-80 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

No employer may discharge or demote any employee because the employee has instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Law ...

Any employer who violates any provision of this section is liable in a civil action for lost wages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation, and an employee discharged or demoted in violation of this section is entitled to be reinstated to his former position. The burden of proof is upon the employee.

An employer shall have as an affirmative defense to this section ... failure to meet established employer work standards ...

This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals with the following two modifications. First, the Court of Appeals interpreted Section 41-1-80 as implicitly mandating a reasonable period of time for rehabilitation from the work-related injury before an employer may discharge an employee for inability to meet established employer work standards.

Citing Burrow v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 88 N.C.App. 347, 363 S.E.2d 215 (1988), review denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910, the Court of Appeals relied primarily...