Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial Dist.
Decision Date | 15 July 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 5653,5653 |
Citation | 647 P.2d 1368 |
Parties | Robert W. HORN, Appellant (Defendant), v. DISTRICT COURT, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Appellee (Plaintiff), a contempt proceeding originating in: John E. BAINE, Jr., (Plaintiff), v. COWBOY BAR OF JACKSON HOLE, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, David Hauser, Rod Grathwal and Mark Watkins, (Defendants). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Don W. Riske, Cheyenne, for appellant, and Robert W. Horn, pro se.
Steven F. Freudenthal, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, and Michael J. Sullivan and William F. Downes of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for appellees.
Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.
The appellant, Robert W. Horn, while serving as the attorney for a plaintiff in a negligence action was summarily convicted of contempt of court during a trial being conducted in Teton County District Court. Acting under the authority of Rule 41(a), W.R.Cr.P., 1 the trial judge determined that appellant was in contempt and ordered him to pay a fine of $100 and to pay all costs incurred by the other party to the lawsuit, which costs amounted to $36,927.18. The judge also declared a mistrial. As a result of the trial court's action, the appellant filed the present appeal and he words the issues for review as follows:
While the appellant raises a number of contentions, his principal focus is on the propriety of the trial judge's invocation of the powers vested by Rule 41(a), W.R.Cr.P., and the imposition of the $37,027.18 fine. With this in mind, we view the pertinent issues for review as follows:
1. Did the trial judge act properly in finding the appellant in contempt under Rule 41(a), W.R.Cr.P.?
2. Did the circumstances present below warrant the imposition of the $37,027.18 fine which was levied against appellant?
In answering these contentions we will affirm the appellant's contempt conviction and reverse that portion of the fine payable to the other party in the underlying lawsuit.
Appellant was representing the plaintiff in a lawsuit in which his client was suing the Million Dollar Cowboy Bar in Jackson, Wyoming, together with several employees of the establishment. The plaintiff had alleged that he suffered severe injuries as a result of a beating he received at the hands of several doormen who had ejected him from the bar. 2
During the trial attorney Horn asked one of the defendants to step down from the witness chair so that appellant could perform a demonstration for the jury. It would seem that attorney Horn intended to demonstrate that the witness had testified to an impossible fact situation. The witness was asked to assume a position similar to the position he had assumed on the night of the incident, and to demonstrate to the jury how he, the defendant, had turned and swung his fist at the plaintiff after plaintiff had allegedly kicked him from behind. The witness was instructed to react upon hearing Mr. Horn say the word "Now." Suddenly, appellant Horn gave the signal and, without warning, kicked the witness with enough force to drive him into the jury box. The record reflects that the following dialogue took place:
During the short recess the appellant paid the $100 fine levied by the trial judge.
Some 15 minutes later the judge declared a mistrial and ordered appellant to pay "each and every cost" incurred by the defendants up to that point of the trial. At this juncture, appellant apologized to the court and attempted to explain that his only purpose was to represent his client zealously and to refute the witness' story. As noted earlier, the costs assessed against appellant totaled $36,927.18.
Before discussing the relevant aspects of the case at bar, it may be helpful to first examine the law of contempt.
Contempts of court are divided into a number of categories. They are usually classified as either civil or criminal in nature, although a given contemptuous act can involve both classes. It is clear, however, that the type of punishment to be imposed is the factor that decides whether a civil or criminal contempt has been committed. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941):
" ' * * * While particular acts do not always readily lend themselves to classification as civil or criminal contempts, a contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public.' " 313 U.S. at 42, 61 S.Ct. at 812 (citing from McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64, 59 S.Ct. 685, 686, 83 L.Ed. 1108).
Thus, a civil contempt is generally intended to compel a party to comply with a lawful court order, while a criminal contempt is punitive in character and is enforced so that the authority of the law and the court will be vindicated. Tucker v. State, 35 Wyo. 430, 251 P. 460 (1926); Laramie National Bank v. Steinhoff, 7 Wyo. 464, 53 P. 299 (1898). Another way of distinguishing between the two is to say that the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish, while the primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce. City of Wilmington v. General Teamsters Local Union 326, Del.Supr., 321 A.2d 123 (1974).
Contempts are also categorized depending upon the way that they occur. In Spriggs v. Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., Wyo., 378 P.2d 238, 240 (1963), we spoke of these distinctions:
"Generally speaking, contempts of court are classified as either direct or constructive, the latter being dependent upon whether the contemptuous conduct is committed in the presence or out of the presence of the court."
Thus, not only may a contempt of court be of a criminal or civil nature but it also can be either a direct contempt or a constructive, indirect one. Direct contempts are those committed in the court's presence and constructive contempts are those committed outside of the hearing or view of the judge.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS CASE
At oral argument a question was raised by the parties concerning the proper designation of the contempt in this case, keeping in mind that the major portion of the...
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