Horne v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 24 May 1939
• Docket Number: 611,612.
• Parties: HORNE v. EDWARDS et al. (two cases).
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

3 S.E.2d 1

215 N.C. 622

HORNE v. EDWARDS et al. (two cases).

Nos. 611, 612.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 24, 1939

E A. Hightower, of Wadesboro, and Thomas W. Ruffin, of Raleigh for appellant.

B M. Covington, of Wadesboro, for appellees.

SEAWELL Justice.

The complaint seems to have omitted no word necessary to the legal denunciation of the fraud which plaintiff conceives was committed against him in the procurement of the judgment which he seeks to have vacated. But, as was necessary to good pleading, he set up the facts constituting the alleged fraud McNeill v. Thomas, 203 N.C. 219, 165 S.E. 712; Colt Co. v. Kimball, 190 N.C. 169, 129 S.E. 406; and this brings it within a classification that is not particularly helpful to him in this proceeding. It has been held by much the greater weight of authority in American courts that equity will not interfere in an independent action to relieve against a judgment on the ground of fraud unless the fraud complained of is extrinsic and collateral to the proceeding, and not intrinsic merely,--that is, arising within the proceeding itself and concerning some matter necessarily under the consideration of the Court upon the merits. McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452; Kinsland v. Adams, 172 N.C. 765, 90 S.E. 899; United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93; Black on Judgments, 4th ed., Section 372; Freeman on Judgments, pp. 2582, 2585. In Duchess of Kingston's Case, 3 Smith's Lead.Cas. 9th ed. (Eng.) 1998, 20 How.St.Tr., 554, it is said: "Fraud is an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice."

A recognized leading case on this subject is United States v. Throckmorton, supra, from which copious extracts are made in McCoy v. Justice, supra. In both the McCoy case and the supporting Throckmorton case, extensive illustrations are given, appropriate to an understanding of the distinction and the necessity of applying the rule, and a reading of these cases will greatly aid our discussion of this case.

The paramount consideration involved is expressed in the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium"; that there should be an end of litigation for the repose of society. This demand of public policy yields to the ends of justice where extrinsic fraud has been practiced only because it is the main characteristic of such fraud that it deprives the party of the opportunity of presenting his case, or his defense, upon the hearing, and renders the result as to him no trial at all in the legal sense. United States v. Throckmorton, supra; McCoy v. Justice, supra. Intrinsic fraud, as for example, perjury, or the use of false or manufactured evidence, has no such effect.

It is apparent that protracted litigation between the same parties over the same matter and probably with the same witnesses would likely follow a relaxation of the rule. Embarrassing situations would arise in the administration of the law, since either any taint of fraud at all must be considered sufficient to set aside a judgment or the impossible task must be imposed on the Court to decide whether the fraud is of little or of grave importance, and what influence it may have had on the final result.

In the case at bar the complaint sets up as grounds for setting aside the judgment that the defendant, Nita Edwards, fraudulently pointed out a fictitious corner in the Horne tract of land as a true corner, and that the court surveyor Furr, with knowledge of its falsity and of the fraud intended to be perpetrated by Mrs. Edwards, adopted such corner and manufactured and built up a fictitious plat, which was subsequently presented to the Court, resulting in a judgment adverse to plaintiff. The complaint may be considered as alleging a conspiracy between Mrs. Edwards and the court surveyor, under which the false evidence was manufactured and given on the trial.

In the opinions of the courts, with few exceptions, such fraud has been classed as intrinsic and not sufficient ground for vacating a judgment in an independent action for that purpose.

"Although some few cases sustain the doctrine that equity may grant relief against a judgment obtained by means of false testimony, provided it was procured, concocted, and intentionally produced by the successful party, the weight of authority is to the effect that there is no ground for equitable interference with a judgment in the fact that perjury was committed by such party or his witnesses at the trial, or that he suborned the witnesses and conspired with them to secure a judgment in his favor." 34 C.J. pp. 475, 476, Section 744; Black on judgments, 4th ed., Sections 323, 372; Freeman on Judgments, pp. 2582, 2585.

In this State the rule has been qualified respecting judgments obtained through perjured or false evidence. In a long line of cases, running back to Peagram v. King, 9 N.C 295, 11 Am.Dec. 793 and Id., 9 N.C. 605, intrinsic fraud, consisting of perjured testimony or false evidence, is recognized as ground for equitable relief against the judgment in law upon condition that the perjured witnesses have previously been convicted of the perjury or the falsity of the evidence established by deed or writing or unimpeachable record. Kinsland v. Adams, 172 N.C. 765, 90 S.E. 899; Moore v. Gulley, 144 N.C. 81, 56 S.E. 681, 10 L. R.A.,N.S., 242; Dyche v. Patton, 56 N.C. 332; Burgess v. Lovengood, 55 N.C. 457; Peagram v. King, supra. See, also, McCoy v. Justice, 199 N.C. 602, 155 S.E. 452; McCoy v. Justice, 196 N.C. 553, 146 S.E. 214. Compare Scales v. Wachovia Bank & Trust co., 195 N.C. 772, 143 S.E. 868; Stockton v. Briggs, 58 N.C. 309, 314. An examination of these cases, however, will sustain the view that they proceed by way of a relaxation of the rule excluding intrinsic fraud as grounds for such relief in the particular instance of conviction, rather than by way of imposing a...