Horner v. Huffman.

Decision Date29 November 1902
Citation52 W.Va. 40
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesHorner v. Huffman.
1. Fraudulent Gift.

Money or property delivered by a wife to her husband is presumed, in a contest between her and the creditors of her insolvent husband, to have been a gift, and the burden is upon her to show the contrary。 (p. 42).

2. Fraudulent Gift Presumption.

When the facts and circumstances tend to show, that a gift was intended, and that the husband used and dealt with the property as his own, the mere parol testimony of the husband and wife of a private understanding between themselves, that the transaction was by them considered or intended as a loan to the husband by the wife and not a gift, will not as against the creditors of an insolvent husband rebut the presumption of a gift. (p. 45).

Appeal from Circuit Court, Barbour County. Bill by A. F. & J. Wm. Horner against E. G. Huffman and others. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Melville Peck, for appellants. J. A. Bent, for appellees.

poeeenbaeger, judge:

Stripped of all erroneous assumptions and groundless contentions, this is a suit in equity by creditors of E. G. Huffman to charge their debt upon the real estate of Hattie A. Huffman, his wife, upon the ground that the debtor had purchased said property with his own money and caused it to be conveyed to his wife with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, she participating in the fraud. The plaintiffs are A. F. & J, Wm. Horner, of Baltimore, Maryland, who, in April, May, June and July of 1891, sold to E. G. Huffman, who was then engaged in mercantile business, certain goods, and afterwards, on January 13, 1892, obtained a judgment before a justice of the peace against Huffman, for the purchase money of the merchandise sold him, for the sum of two hundred and seventyfive dollars and seventy-six cents. Afterwards, on the 8th day of April, 1897, they recovered another judgment against him before another justice of the peace, upon the same judgment for the sum of three hundred and thirty-five dollars and twelve cents and two dollars and thirty-five cents cost.

In 1885, Huffman and his wife moved to the western states, and remained there for about three years, part of the time in Illinois and part of the time in Kansas. After returning, the husband began a mercantile business at Belington, in Barbour County, in which he continued until 1891, when some of his creditors, upon a creditor's bill, caused all his real estate to be sold and the proceeds applied to his debts. The plaintiffs in this bill, however, were not among those creditors, nor did they come in under the creditor's notice given therein and share in the distribution of the proceeds of the property. Of course, it was a prerequisite to the proceedings of creditors to enforce their judgment liens that all the personal property of the debtor was apparently exhausted, but the manner of its disposition is not disclosed by the record, except that the personal property seems to have passed into the hands of j. N. B. Crim, a heavy creditor of Huffman's, and to have been by him disposed of in some way.

While in Illinois, Huffman became the owner of a tract of land in that state, containing forty-six and one-fourth acres. While in business at Belington, in 1890, before he became indebted to the plaintiffs in this suit, he and his wife conveyed said tract of Illinois land to Charles N. Russell, of Randolph County, West Virginia, a brother of the defendant, Hattie A. Huffman. The consideration expressed in the deed was six hundred and fifty dollars, the receipt of which is thereby ac knowledged. E. G. Huffman, however, testifies that he considered the land worth only about one hundred dollars, and that he was indebted to his wife for one hundred dollars, which had been given to her by her parents, and which he had borrowed from her, and that he had conveyed the land to her for the sole purpose of paying his wife said debt of one hundred dollars, she having requested him several times to pay it back to her. After so testifying, he admits that Russell paid him thirty or thirty-five dollars some' time after the conveyance, but does not say whether he gave that to his wife or not. Russell, afterwards, in 1893 or 1894, E. G. Huffman says, sold the land to William Gaul, of Dahlgren, Illinois, for the sum of five hundred and fifty dollars. As to the date of that sale, there seems to be no testimony in the record, although the deposition of W. W. Burton, of Dahlgren, Illinois, who says he was the agent who negotiated the sale, was taken. He says that, in doing so, he acted as the agent of Huffman, and supposed the title to the land was in Huffman until about the time the deed was made.

By deed dated the 12th day of August, 1892, A. S. Bosworth conveyed to Hattie A. Huffman a house and lot in the town of Elkins, in consideration of two hundred dollars, paid in cash, and. four hundred and twenty-three dollars and ninety cents to be thereafter paid in installments, secured by a vendor's lien on the property reserved in the deed. In April or May, 1891, Huffman and his wife had separated, and she and theii children went to the home of her mother. Immediately thereafter, she brought suit for divorce, during the pendency of which the court decreed against him alimony pendente lite, and it is claimed by them that about two hundred dollars was paid as such alimony. Huffman says his wife sent him word, shortly before the Elkins property was bought that she and her children could no longer stay with her mother, that she had a litle money and wanted to buy some property, and would pay what money she had on the property and not further prosecute her suit for divorce, if he would help her to meet the deferred payment on the property, and that they met at Elkins about the time the property was purchased and agreed, and the property was pur chased. He says his wife had the money and paid the two hundred dollars. She also says she paid it, with what money she received from her husband as alimony and some other small means she had. Ralph Dardan, who made the sale as agent for Bosworth, swears the money was handed to him by E. G. Huffman. Both husband and wife say this is not true and that Mrs. Huffman paid the money to him herself. The balance of the purchase money was evidenced by two promissory notes, executed by Mrs. Huffman, for the sum of one hundred and eighty-eight dollars and five cents each, and a note for twentythree dollars and ninety cents, due II. G. Davis, the payment of which, she assumed. The two notes of one hundred and eightyeight dollars and five cents, were paid by C. N Russell May 20, 1893, as appears from his check exhibited with the deposition of Mrs. Huffman. How the small twenty-three dollars and ninety cents note was paid, does not appear, although Bosworth says he knows the payments were all made and it is his impression that they were made through Russell.

Very soon after the purchase of the Elkins property, Huffman and his wife became reconciled, and the divorce suit was finally dismissed.

On the 18th day of September, 1893, J. W. Shank and wife, in consideration of one hundred and fifty dollars, conveyed to Hattie A. Huffman a lot in. the town of Belington, Barbour County, fronting on Crimes avenue of said town. Of the purchase money, fifty dollars was paid in cash, and Mrs. Huffman's two notes were taken for the residue. The Huff mans say the cash paid was derived from the rents of the Elkins property. On. this lot, there is a two story frame house with six rooms and a plank kitchen, in which the defendants reside and which is valued by witnesses at from five hundred dollars to one thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of the lot. According to the cost of construction, as given by E. G. Huffman, these valuations are entirely too high, and his statements, as to the amounts paid certain laborers who worked on it, are corrob- erated by their receipts given to Mrs. Huffman. The husband says he did the hauling of materials for her but paid very little money, if any at all. He says Mrs. Huffman's brother sent her a check for twenty-five dollars or thirty-five dollars and another for sixty dollars and ordered doors and windows for her amounting to about twenty-five dollars. Mrs. Huffman says her brother sent her checks for eighty-five dollars, which she used in building the house and also furnished her the windows and doors for it. Thirty-five dollars is the amount mentioned as the purchase money for the lumber used in the construction of the house.

While it is deemed not to have any bearing on the merit? of this case, the fact is that J. W. Shank, who conveyed said last mentioned lot, had no deed for it and one W. S. Corbitt now claims the lot. The Tygart's Valley Mineral and Oil Company seems to have laid out in town lots a certain tract of land belonging to it for sale, and to have had an arrangement for facilitating the sale of its stock, whereby a lot was to be conveyed to such of the stockholders as should take three shares and pay seventy-five per cent, of their par value, contemplating that a stock dividend of twenty-five per cent, could be declared and credited to the stockholders and thus pay their subscriptions in full. Under a resolution of the board of directors, setting aside one hundred and sixty-seven of the lots for the benefit of the stockholders, as aforesaid, and an allotment afterwards made, in pursuance thereof, Shank claimed the lot he conveyed to Mrs. Huffman. Claiming that Shank's stock was delinquent, the board of directors, on the 18th day of June, 1897, directed a sale of his stock and the lot which was made to Corbitt, and a deed was made conveying the lot to him. Shank claims he was not in arrears upon his stock and that upon a settlement, giving him credit for moneys that he had paid out for the corporation in procuring its charter, etc., it will be shown that his...

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