Horneyer v. City of Springfield

• Decision Date: 05 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 25031.,25031.
• Citation: 98 S.W.3d 637
• Parties: Stacey HORNEYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 637

98 S.W.3d 637

Stacey HORNEYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 25031.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

February 5, 2003.

Petition for Rehearing and Transfer Denied February 26, 2003.

Application for Transfer Denied April 1, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Alan Kimbrell, Chesterfield, for appellant.

Rex C. McCall, Springfield, for respondent.

JAMES K. PREWITT, Presiding Judge.

Stacey Horneyer ("Appellant") brought this action against the City of Springfield ("the City") following a vehicle collision that occurred in the City at the intersection of Chestnut Expressway and East Trafficway, where Appellant's vehicle was struck by another vehicle being driven at night with its headlights off. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. With one point relied on, Appellant contends that the trial court erred because the City failed in the duty it assumed, when it undertook to light the intersection, to exercise a high degree of care in the continued illumination of that intersection.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Murphy v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 83 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo.App.2002). On appeal, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, and afford the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that record. Winn ex rel. Winn v. Pollard, 62 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Mo.App.2001). If the trial court's judgment does not specify the basis upon which summary judgment was granted, we will uphold the decision if it was appropriate under any theory. Murphy, 83 S.W.3d at 665.

If there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Daniels v. Senior Care, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Mo. App.2000). The key to summary judgment, however, is the undisputed right to judgment as a matter a law, not simply the absence of a question of fact. Murphy, 83 S.W.3d at 665.

On September 20, 1999, Appellant had returned to the City after visiting her parents in St. Louis, and was traveling westbound on Chestnut Expressway. She pulled into the turnoff lane in order to turn onto East Trafficway, stopped at the yield sign, looked both to the right and to the left, saw the headlights of a vehicle approaching the intersection that she estimated was over 300 feet away, and proceeded to cross the eastbound lanes of Chestnut Expressway. As she pulled into the eastbound lanes of Chestnut Expressway, Appellant's vehicle was struck by a car driven by Heather Baker, which was being driven with its headlights off. The time of the collision was approximately 8:20 p.m. and it was "completely dark" at the intersection at that time.¹

The streetlights in place at this intersection were not functioning at the time of the collision and had been off since at least September 9, 1999, due to a faulty controller. The City and Appellant agree that the collision would not have occurred if Appellant had seen Baker's car prior to attempting to cross the intersection. The City has an ordinance under which "[n]o person shall drive a vehicle during the period from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour before sunrise without front and rear lights, which shall meet the requirements of state law." Under state statute, headlights or "lighted lamps" are required "at any time from half-hour after sunset to a half-hour before sunrise." § 307.020(9), RSMo Supp.1999.

Appellant brought this action against the City, alleging that the intersection was "unreasonably dangerous and hazardous" and that "at the time of the ... collision the overhead lighting devices at the intersection were not illuminated." The City filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it "had no duty to light the intersection so that [Appellant] could see a vehicle operating illegally with no headlights." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, stating only that there was no genuine issue of material fact and the City was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. This appeal followed.

In her single point on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City because the City failed in the duty it assumed, when it undertook to light the intersection where Appellant's vehicle was struck by another vehicle being driven with its headlights off, to exercise a high degree of care in the maintenance of the illumination of that intersection.

We begin our analysis by addressing the issue of sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides public entities with protection from liability for negligent acts. Benoit v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 33 S.W.3d 663, 673 (Mo.App.2000). A municipal corporation is a "public entity" within the meaning of §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo Supp.1999. Thompson v. City of West Plains, 935 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Mo.App. 1996).

Under longstanding Missouri law, a city is not immune for neglect or breach of a ministerial duty, whereas, it is generally immune from suit in its performance of governmental duties. See Metz v. Kansas City, 229 Mo.App. 402, 81 S.W.2d 462, 465-66 (1935). At one point in Missouri law, the installation and maintenance of streetlights was considered a governmental duty; however, cases in which that basis was used to grant sovereign immunity were later overruled. Wilkes v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 762 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Mo.banc 1988).

Disregarding the ministerial/governmental distinction, under the provisions of § 537.600, RSMo Supp.1999, sovereign immunity may also be waived in cases where the injuries are caused by the dangerous condition of a public entity's property. Thompson, 935 S.W.2d at 337; § 537.600.1(2), RSMo Supp.1999. This dangerous condition exception to sovereign immunity refers only to physical defects in a public entity's property. Oldaker v. Peters, 869 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Mo.App.1993). Lack of adequate lighting that renders property not reasonably safe for its intended purpose is, under certain circumstances, considered such a physical defect. Id. It fits within the exception where a duty exists to provide the lighting. Id.

In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish three items: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) the failure of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) the defendant's failure to perform that duty proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr., Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo.banc 2002).

Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Benoit, 33 S.W.3d at 668. For a duty to exist, it must be foreseeable that the action or omission will cause harm or injury. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257. If the existence of a duty is established, it is not a duty to protect against every possible injury that might occur. Id,. In particular, a public entity does not have a duty to protect against all possible injuries, only those that are reasonably foreseeable. Benoit, 33 S.W.3d at 668. Foreseeability is generally measured according to whether a reasonably prudent person (or entity) would have anticipated danger and provided against it. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257.

Thus, we must determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, a duty existed on the part of the City to protect Appellant from injury. Along with foreseeability, determining whether a duty exists in a particular case involves consideration of the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Benoit, 33 S.W.3d at 668.

There is no common law duty to provide streetlights. Carruthers v. City of St. Louis, 341 Mo. 1073, 111 S.W.2d 32, 35 (1937). However, a city has the duty to construct and maintain its streets in such condition that they will be reasonably safe and therefore, a city is liable for injuries caused by negligent construction or by a failure to keep the streets from nuisances, defects, and obstructions caused by itself or by third parties if it had actual or constructive notice in time to appropriately address the nuisance, defect, or obstruction. Id. at 36.

A city must properly light a dangerous place at night in order to discharge its absolute duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its streets in reasonably safe condition for travel. Metz, 81 S.W.2d at 467. Provisions in city ordinances, such as an ordinance requiring the illumination of headlights during certain parts of the day, do impose a duty on the operators of vehicles, but do not relieve a city of its duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel and to properly light dangerous places along those streets. Boyd v. Kansas City, 291 Mo. 622, 237 S.W. 1001, 1008 (banc 1922).

In Metz, the court found that Kansas City had a duty to maintain lighting at an island and the curb surrounding it. Metz, 81 S.W.2d at 472. The evidence in Metz showed that travelers frequently ran into the island and knocked down whatever warning lights were there and that the city assigned employees to check the area each day to check the lights and replace as needed. Id. at 469. There were no lights at the time of the collision in Metz. Id. Based upon the city's recognition that lighting was necessary, the city had a duty to maintain such lighting. Id.

Boyd involved a bridge dangerous to travelers at night without lights on it, and the city was found to have failed in its duty to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel by opening and maintaining the bridge without lights. Metz, 81 S.W.2d at 467. As noted earlier, an ordinance regarding headlights on vehicles did not relieve the city of its duty. Boyd, 237 S.W. at 1008.

Neither Metz nor Boyd have fact situations that make them directly on point with the facts...