Hornfeld v. City of North Miami Beach

• Decision Date: 09 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-0580-CIV.,98-0580-CIV.
• Citation: 29 F.Supp.2d 1357
• Parties: Anne HORNFELD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, an Incorporated City in Dade County, Florida, and John Asmar, individually, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

29 F.Supp.2d 1357

Anne HORNFELD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, an Incorporated City in Dade County, Florida, and John Asmar, individually, Defendant.

No. 98-0580-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

November 9, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul A. Capua, and Peter M. Capua, Lorenzo & Capua, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

James C. Crosland, Denise Marie Heekin, Miller, Mintz, Kornreich, et. al., Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND III OF THE COMPLAINT

GOLD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law [D.E. # 10]. Defendants have moved to dismiss Count II, which alleges deprivations of Plaintiff Anne Hornfeld's rights conferred by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the City in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Count III, which alleges these same deprivations were committed by Asmar. Defendants seek to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), as arising under federal law and deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the Court concludes that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be denied.

I. Findings of Fact and Procedural Background

Anne Hornfeld ("Plaintiff") filed a three-count complaint alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that she was the victim of unlawful employment practices perpetrated by the City of North Miami Beach and John Asmar (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants"). Count I of the complaint alleges that the City of North Miami Beach (the "City") discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA. Count II alleges that the City violated Plaintiff's equal rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges similar violations of her right to equal protection under the laws by John Asmar ("Asmar"), in his individual capacity. Counts II and III were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants filed an answer to Count I of the complaint. They have moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss Counts II and III, asserting that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The City contends that Count II should be dismissed because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment. Asmar urges that dismissal of Count III is appropriate because he is qualifiedly immune from suit in his individual capacity.

The limited facts in the record at this stage of the proceedings reflect that Plaintiff, a 68-year old female, was employed by the Public Utilities Department of the City of North Miami Beach from April 1986 until her termination in May 1996. During her employment, Plaintiff performed her job responsibilities satisfactorily, receiving annual pay increases and bonuses commensurate with her performance.

In early 1996, Defendant Asmar, as acting Director of the Public Utilities Department, became Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. Upon his assignment, Asmar reduced Plaintiff's job responsibilities in preparation for an imminent downsizing by the City. Asmar, in an effort to effectuate the downsizing of the Department, designed and offered early retirement incentive packages for the Department's elderly employees, including Plaintiff. Without adequate time to consider her options, Plaintiff was informed that if she declined the early retirement incentive, she would be terminated. Plaintiff was also informed that a younger, less experienced employee was promoted to her position, and thus, Plaintiff's services were no longer needed. Finding she had no other choice, Plaintiff accepted the retirement package.

After complying with administrative requirements as a condition precedent to filing her federal ADEA action and receiving a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Plaintiff filed her civil complaint. Defendants contend that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, addressed in Counts II and III of the complaint should be dismissed. Defendants argue that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination, and therefore, Plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing a § 1983 claim predicated on the same behavior covered by the ADEA. Defendants additionally assert that the § 1983 claim against Asmar in his individual capacity should be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, because the claim against him is not pled with sufficient particularity. Since Defendants have answered Count I of the complaint regarding violations of the ADEA, the Court's analysis and holding addresses only the viability of sustaining Counts II and III at this stage of the proceedings.

II. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that dismissal of a complaint is appropriate "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all facts alleged and draw all inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir.1994). A very low sufficiency threshold is necessary for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In re Complaint of Sea Vessel, Inc., M/V Sea Lion v. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir.1994) (citation omitted). However, a plaintiff must do more than merely "label" his claims. Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423, 425 (M.D.Fla. 1996). Dismissal is appropriate only when no construction of the factual allegations of a complaint will support the cause of action. Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993).

III. Discussion and Analysis

A. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Against the City

Plaintiff alleges that shortly before she terminated her employment, the City implemented a policy to force its elderly employees into early retirement. She avers that the City's policy of unequal treatment of its elderly employees violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying Plaintiff the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Plaintiff asserts that the City, as a government entity within the meaning of § 1983, is liable for damages provided by that statute. The City challenges Plaintiff's ability to bring concurrent actions under the ADEA and § 1983, and therefore, argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim should be dismissed.

1. Exclusivity of Remedy Under the ADEA

The City contends that the ADEA "provides the exclusive remedial scheme for bringing claims of age discrimination." Therefore, because Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are based on the same allegations which underlie her ADEA claim, the § 1983 claims should be dismissed. Since no independent basis for Plaintiff's § 1983 claims has been identified, and since the ADEA provides its own enforcement scheme, the City argues that a concurrent § 1983 claim is precluded unless shown to be predicated on substantive rights distinct from protections afforded by the ADEA.

Plaintiff responds that she has alleged violations of her rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and thus, these allegations properly form the basis of her § 1983 claims against Defendants. She argues that the statutes clearly delineate the proscribed conduct and that the relief available under the respective statutes is neither duplicative nor mutually exclusive. Therefore, there is no basis for finding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's discrimination claim based on age forecloses her § 1983 claim based on deprivations of substantive, constitutional rights.

a. The City's Preemption Argument

To support its argument that an ADEA claim preempts a concurrent § 1983 claim, the City draws attention to cases not within this Circuit and which are distinguishable from the case at bar. Primarily, the City relies on a Fourth Circuit case, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850, 110 S.Ct. 147, 107 L.Ed.2d 106 (1989) for the proposition that the preemption issue has been resolved. However, Zombro is not persuasive in providing a basis for dismissing Plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for several reasons.

First, Zombro is procedurally distinguishable from the case before this Court. In affirming the trial court, the Fourth Circuit was reviewing the propriety of dismissing a cause of action pursuant to summary judgment standards. It is axiomatic that a plaintiff's burden to overcome a motion for summary judgment far exceeds that which a plaintiff must satisfy to defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). This is especially so in light of the federal rules' liberal pleading requirements, which mandate only notice pleading.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the plaintiff in Zombro did not bring...