Horton v. State
| Decision Date | 07 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 45819,45819 |
| Citation | 371 S.E.2d 384,258 Ga. 489 |
| Parties | HORTON v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
C. Michael Walker, Strauss & Walker, P.C., Covington, for Beverly horton.
John M. Ott, Dist. Atty., Covington, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Susan V. Boleyn, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Beverly Horton was convicted of the felony murder of Hosea Hillman and sentenced to life imprisonment. 1 Appellant and the victim, her boyfriend, had a stormy relationship for approximately six years. She testified that he had beaten her several times, and there was evidence that on more than one occasion she was arrested by police called to break up their quarrel. On Christmas Eve night, 1986, the appellant and the victim began to argue early in the evening over a Christmas gift. Witnesses testified that they both threatened the other during the night, but they left a party after midnight together, apparently reconciled. Appellant testified that the victim insisted that she go home with him and that when she resisted he pulled a knife. She ran and was cornered by him and pulled her own knife to defend herself. She stabbed the victim and then ran for help. His brother found one knife on the ground and turned it over to police. A second knife was found the following day.
At trial there was testimony by various friends and relatives about the relationship between the pair and about the events of the night the victim was killed. There were no eyewitnesses to the stabbing. Police officers who took appellant's statement testified as to her demeanor following the crime. One of these officers was allowed to testify that a cut on her hand appeared to be healing. The jury found appellant guilty of felony murder, the underlying felony being aggravated assault.
1. There was sufficient evidence to enable a rational finder of fact to find proof of appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. The appellant contends that the trial court impermissibly restricted her right of cross-examination of witnesses by not allowing impeachment of witnesses by their criminal records during the state's case. However, since appellant was allowed to fully explore the criminal records of these witnesses during the presentation of the case for the defense, there was no harm shown.
3. Appellant complains that the trial court did not suppress her statement to police. Appellant insists that her statement was not voluntary because she was under the influence of alcohol and emotionally upset. The officers testified that while they detected the odor of alcohol about her she was coherent and did not seem intoxicated. This court has held that intoxication does not always preclude an individual's making a knowledgeable waiver of his rights. Strickland v. State, 250 Ga. 624, 300 S.E.2d 156 (1983). The evidence presented at the Jackson-Denno hearing indicates that appellant was not prevented by her intoxication from knowingly waiving her rights and giving a voluntary statement. At the Jackson-Denno hearing the interrogating officers testified that during the interview, which occurred in a records room at the police station and lasted only twenty-two minutes, appellant was calm rather than emotionally upset, understood her rights, and gave her statement knowingly and voluntarily.
Appellant contends that the fact that officers did not inform her that she would be charged with murder until after the interrogation renders her statement involuntary. As long as appellant was made aware of her right to remain silent and her right to an attorney, the fact that she was not aware of the charge that would be brought against her does not render her statement involuntary.
4. In her fourth enumeration of error appellant insists that the court erred in allowing a police officer to testify that a cut on her hand appeared to be an old cut. Her complaint is that the witness was not an expert but was a lay person. However, her objection to the testimony at trial was that the witness was invading the province of the jury in giving opinion evidence as to facts within the comprehension of the jury. Even if a proper objection had been made to the testimony by...
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...of brain function so as to negate intent. Even then, the brain function alteration must be more than temporary." Horton v. State, 258 Ga. 489, 491, 371 S.E.2d 384 (1988). Accord Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 883, 426 S.E.2d 886 Although Bright offered evidence of a serious history of drug ab......
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