Horvath v. Dodaro, Civil Action No. 15-210 (CKK)

• Decision Date: 24 November 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15-210 (CKK)
• Citation: 160 F.Supp.3d 32
• Parties: Edward G. Horvath, Plaintiff v. Gene Dodaro, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

160 F.Supp.3d 32

Edward G. Horvath, Plaintiff

v.Gene Dodaro, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 15-210 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 24, 2015

Edward G. Horvath, Washington, DC, pro se.

Megan Anne Crowley, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

, United States District Judge

On June 23, 2004, Plaintiff Edward Horvath married his then-partner Richard Neidich in Massachusetts after marriage between two people of the same gender, or sex, became legal in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health , 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 ( 2003)

. Soon thereafter, Plaintiff, who was at that time an employee of the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)—now a GAO retiree—sought unsuccessfully to add his husband to his employer-sponsored health insurance plan. The GAO refused his request in light of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Almost ten years later, on June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013). In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor, Plaintiff successfully added his husband to his GAO health insurance policy. Plaintiff also sought compensation for the GAO's prior refusal to add his husband to his policy. After the GAO refused to provide backpay or other remedies with respect to its prior refusal to add Plaintiff's husband to his health insurance coverage, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se , brought this action seeking financial compensation (including backpay and interest) and punitive damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Presently before this Court is Defendants' [10] Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The question before the Court is not whether Plaintiff was harmed by the GAO's refusal to add Plaintiff's husband to his health insurance coverage; the question for the Court, rather, is whether Plaintiff can pursue the remedies that he seeks, after the fact, in this action. The Court concludes that he cannot. Upon consideration of the pleadings,¹ the relevant legal authorities, and the record for purposes of this motion, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion, for the reasons stated below. The Court dismisses this case in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court considers the facts as alleged in both the Amended Complaint and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss—as the Court must in a case filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se. See Brown v. Whole Foods , 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C.Cir.2015)

(holding that district court must consider facts alleged in all of pro se plaintiff's pleadings, including an opposition to a motion to dismiss, in resolving a motion to dismiss). However, the Court does “not accept as true ... the plaintiff's legal conclusions or inferences that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S. , 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C.Cir.2014).

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

The Court first describes the statutory and regulatory framework for the administration of federal health benefits, including disputes pertaining to such benefits, and then describes the statutory and regulatory scheme for resolving claims of discrimination against the GAO.

“The Federal Employee Health Benefits Act [the ‘Act’] establishes a subsidized health insurance program for civilian employees and annuitants of the federal government.” Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. , 145 F.3d 389, 390 (D.C.Cir.1998)

. “Under the Act, the Office of Personnel Management [‘OPM’] is given broad authority to administer the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.” Bolden v. Blue Cross Blue Shield , 848 F.2d 201, 203 (D.C.Cir.1988) ; see also 5 U.S.C. § 8913 (“The regulations of the Office may prescribe the time at which and the manner and conditions under which an employee is eligible to enroll in an approved health benefits plan”). Utilizing its rulemaking authority, OPM created a remedial scheme for the resolution of enrollment disputes. An initial decision regarding enrollment is rendered by “an employing office” when issued “in writing and stating the right to an independent level of review (reconsideration) by the agency or retirement system.” 5 C.F.R. § 890.104(b). An employee may seek reconsideration within 30 days of the initial decision. Id. § 890.104(d). Upon a request for reconsideration, an agency must conduct “an independent review designated at or above the level at which the initial decision was rendered.” Id. § 890.104(c)(2). “After reconsideration, the agency or retirement system must issue a final decision, which must be in writing and must fully set forth the findings and conclusions.” Id. § 890.104(e). “The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or claim against the United States founded” on the Act.² 5 U.S.C. § 8912.

The Court now turns to the framework for discrimination claims against the GAO. “GAO is a legislative branch agency for which the United States Congress has created a personnel system separate from the system of the executive branch.” Chennareddy v. Bowsher , 935 F.2d 315, 319 (D.C.Cir.1991)

(citing 31 U.S.C. § 731 et seq. ). “GAO employees, however, have the same rights and remedies under laws prohibiting discrimination in employment in the federal government as do employees of the executive branch.” Id. Therefore, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the GAO may not “fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) ; see also 31 U.S.C. § 732 (“This subchapter and subchapter IV of this chapter do not affect a right or remedy of an officer, employee, or applicant for employment under a law prohibiting discrimination in employment in the Government on the basis of race, color, religion, age, sex, national origin, political affiliation, marital status, or handicapping condition.”). “Before filing suit, a federal employee who believes that her agency has discriminated against her in violation of Title VII must first seek administrative adjudication of her claim.” Payne v. Salazar , 619 F.3d 56, 58 (D.C.Cir.2010). “Congress directed that the [Personnel Appeals Board] have the same authority over equal employment opportunity and discrimination matters at GAO as its counterpart agencies, e.g., the EEOC, the Merit Systems Protection Board (‘MSPB’), and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (‘FLRA’), have over such matters in the executive branch.” Chennareddy , 935 F.2d at 319 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 732(f)(2)(A) ) (additional citations omitted).

A GAO employee may file a discrimination claim either in Federal district court or with the Personnel Appeals Board (“PAB”). However, before filing such a claim, an employee must first exhaust administrative remedies. See Payne , 619 F.3d at 58

. Pursuant to GAO regulations, an employee must first contact an equal employment opportunity counselor at GAO's Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness and must do so within 45 days of the allegedly discriminatory action. See

Chennareddy v. Dodaro , 698 F.Supp.2d 1, 11 (D.D.C.2009)

aff'd in part sub nom.

Davis v. Dodaro , No. 10–5044, 2010 WL 3199827 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 10, 2010) (citing GAO Order 2713.2). If informal counseling does not resolve the issue, the employee may file a formal discrimination complaint with the Office of Opportunity and Inclusiveness. See 71 Fed. Reg. 65,525, 65,525 (Nov. 8, 2006). Upon the issuance of a final decision by the GAO, an employee may file a civil action in district court within 90 days or may file a charge with the PAB within 30 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (establishing deadline for civil action under Title VII); 31 U.S.C. § 732(f)(2) (applying Title VII provisions to GAO employees); 4 C.F.R. § 28.98 (deadline for filing PAB charge); see also GAO Order 2713.2 at ch. 6, ¶ 2 (setting out appeal rights for GAO employees).³ Decisions of the PAB are appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 31 U.S.C. § 755 ; 4 C.F.R. § 28.90.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Edward Horvath, a man, married his longtime partner Richard Neidich, also a man, on June 25, 2004, in Massachusetts, Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14, approximately one month after it became legal for two men to marry each other in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, see id. ¶ 13.⁴ At that time—and until Plaintiff's retirement in January 2014—Plaintiff was a full-time employee of GAO. Id. ¶ 15. Prior to Plaintiff's marriage to Neidich, Plaintiff elected medical coverage for “Self-Only” through the Federal Employee Health Benefit (“FEHB”) program provided by his employer, GAO, Compl. ¶ 20, which is a “legislative branch agency” of the Federal government, Chennareddy v. Bowsher , 935 F.2d at 319

. After his marriage in Massachusetts, Plaintiff sought—ultimately unsuccessfully—to change his FEHB election. Specifically, within 60 days of his marriage, Plaintiff submitted a Health Benefits Election Form (SF 2809), seeking to change his health benefit election to “Self and Family.” Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. As proof of his marriage, he provided a copy of the marriage certificate issued and recorded by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. ¶ 23. By letter dated September 27, 2004, Plaintiff communicated to Carolyn Mitchell, a senior GAO benefits specialist, that his online personnel data report did not reflect “Self and Family” insurance coverage and that his pay and earnings statements had not...