Hoschler v. Kozlik
| Decision Date | 11 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. A-93-771,A-93-771 |
| Parties | , 10 IER Cases 896 Ann L. HOSCHLER, Appellant, v. Emily Cunningham KOZLIK, Appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Pleadings: Appeal and Error. Whether a petition states a cause of action is a question of law regarding which an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the inferior court.
2. Demurrer: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. In an appellate court's review of a ruling on a general demurrer, the court is required to accept as true all the facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable 3. Torts: Intent: Proof. The necessary elements of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectation include (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted.
inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the conclusions of the pleader.
4. Pleadings: Words and Phrases. A cause of action is stated where a narrative of events, acts, and things alleged in the petition to have been done or omitted shows legal liability on the part of a defendant to a plaintiff.
5. Demurrer: Pleadings. In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, the petition is to be construed liberally. If as so construed the petition states a cause of action, a demurrer based on the failure to state a cause of action is to be overruled.
6. Actions: Torts: Employer and Employee. A cause of action for tortious interference can be maintained even when the business relationship being interfered with is an at-will employment relationship.
7. Torts. Although malice, as such, is not an element of the tort of tortious interference in Nebraska, it is persuasive evidence on whether the defendant's conduct was proper and justified or improper and not justified.
8. Actions: Torts: Intent: Employer and Employee. The intentional interference by a fellow employee, including an officer, director, or other employee, in the employment relationship of another employee with a common employer, when it is malicious and thus unjustified or is outside the scope of authority of the interfering employee, gives rise to a cause of action for tortious interference.
Tim B. Streff and J. Patrick Green, of Wintroub, Rinden and Sens, Omaha, for appellant.
Brian D. Nolan, of Hansen, Engles & Locher, P.C., Omaha, for appellee.
Ann L. Hoschler filed a petition alleging that Emily Cunningham Kozlik intentionally interfered with her contract of employment with the YWCA. Kozlik demurred to the petition on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The district court sustained Kozlik's demurrer and, upon Hoschler's election to stand on her petition, dismissed the action. Hoschler then appealed to this court.
Whether a petition states a cause of action is a question of law regarding which an appellate court has an obligation to reach a conclusion independent of that of the inferior court. Vanice v. Oehm, 247 Neb. 298, 526 N.W.2d 648 (1995); K Corporation v. Stewart, 247 Neb. 290, 526 N.W.2d 429 (1995).
In an appellate court's review of a ruling on a general demurrer, the court is required to accept as true all the facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the conclusions of the pleader. Merrick v. Thomas, 246 Neb. 658, 522 N.W.2d 402 (1994). Hoschler asserts that she was employed by the YWCA as a program coordinator in the "Women Against Domestic Violence" program until she was terminated on February 5, 1993. Kozlik was the executive director of the YWCA. Hoschler's petition further alleges:
3. ... Plaintiff's employment was governed by an employee handbook provided by the YWCA which in part provided certain procedures, policies, and guidelines for termination of an employee. These policies limited the power and authority of officers of the YWCA such as Defendant.
4. The Plaintiff was fired by the Defendant on February 5, 1993 without the benefit of due process as required by the procedures, policies, and guidelines in effect 5. Defendant's conduct was an intentional interference with Plaintiff's contract of employment with the YWCA.
in the employee handbook at the time. Such firing of Plaintiff was outside the scope of the authority granted to Defendant by the YWCA and was done with malice to inflict harm on Plaintiff and to destroy her ongoing relationship with the YWCA.
Hoschler claims that as a consequence, she suffered damages resulting from lost wages, both past and future; a diminution in the value of her pension; a loss of fringe benefits; mental distress; humiliation; and embarrassment.
Hoschler's sole assignment of error is that the district court erred in sustaining Kozlik's demurrer and dismissing the petition.
Although Hoschler's petition characterizes her action as one for "intentional interference" with her contract of employment, we construe it as an attempt to state a cause of action generally labeled in Nebraska jurisprudence as one for "tortious interference with a business relationship or expectation." The question before us is whether Hoschler's petition states a cause of action under that theory of recovery. In Nebraska, it is established that the elements necessary to state such a cause of action include (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted. Matheson v. Stork, 239 Neb. 547, 477 N.W.2d 156 (1991).
A cause of action is stated where a narrative of events, acts, and things alleged in the petition to have been done or omitted shows legal liability on the part of a defendant to a plaintiff. K Corporation v. Stewart, 247 Neb. 290, 526 N.W.2d 429 (1995). In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, the petition is to be construed liberally. If as so construed the petition states a cause of action, a demurrer based on the failure to state a cause of action is to be overruled. Wheeler v. Nebraska State Bar Assn., 244 Neb. 786, 508 N.W.2d 917 (1993), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1835, 128 L.Ed.2d 463 (1994). We thus proceed to analyze Hoschler's petition under the foregoing principles.
We have no reservation in concluding that the petition satisfies elements Nos. 2, 4, and 5 as required by Matheson, supra. That Kozlik, as executive director of the YWCA, had knowledge of Hoschler's employment relationship with the YWCA and that the alleged interference caused harm and damages to Hoschler is obviously stated. Thus, we concentrate our analysis on the first and third elements as identified in Matheson.
Valid Business Relationship or Expectancy.
To be actionable as tortious interference with a business relationship, the interference must necessarily impact on a valid business relationship or expectancy. Matheson, supra. Thus, the nature of the relationship with which Kozlik allegedly interfered must be examined. Hoschler did not allege the existence of a contract obligating the YWCA to employ her for a particular period of time or that the employee handbook contractually modified her employment. In such circumstance, we must properly infer that she was an at-will employee. See Matheson, supra. Does an at-will employment relationship constitute a "valid business relationship" that can be the subject of an action for tortious interference? Although Kozlik does not raise this issue, it was expressly left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Matheson, supra, and we view it as a threshold issue in this appeal.
We are mindful that the Supreme Court has previously held, in White v. Ardan, Inc., 230 Neb. 11, 430 N.W.2d 27 (1988), that there is no cause of action in Nebraska for the tort of "malicious termination." In White, plaintiffs brought an action against both their employer, Ardan, Inc., and an Ardan security executive for malicious termination, breach of contract by wrongful or "bad faith" discharge and defamation. Plaintiffs were presumed to be at-will employees and argued that they were terminated based upon false statements made by the security executive that they were involved in dishonest acts during their employment. Hoschler's petition obviously has similarities with the claim of the plaintiffs in White, i.e., that a coemployee, through his or her intentional and malicious acts, interfered with their at-will employment. Nevertheless, the facts in Matheson were also similar to those alleged by the plaintiffs in White. In Matheson, some 3 years later, the court specifically framed the issue in the context of "tortious interference" and not "malicious termination." We believe that the Supreme Court would approach Hoschler's petition similarly and not deem White as dispositive of whether Nebraska recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference involving an at-will employee.
The majority of courts addressing this issue have concluded that a cause of action for tortious interference can be maintained even when the business relationship being interfered with is an at-will employment relationship. See, e.g., Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn.1991); Toney v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa 1990); Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327 (N.D.1987); Benny M. Estes and Assoc. v. Time Ins., 980 F.2d 1228 (8th...
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