Hoskins v. Crabtree's Adm'r

• Decision Date: 02 February 1898
• Citation: 103 Ky. 117,44 S.W. 434
• Parties: HOSKINS et al. v. CRABTREES ADM'R et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

44 S.W. 434

103 Ky. 117

HOSKINS et al. v. CRABTREES ADM'R et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 2, 1898

Appeal from circuit court, Hopkins county.

"To be officially reported."

Action between Lou E. Hoskins and B. W. Crabtree's administrator and others. From the judgment Hoskins and others appeal. Affirmed.

Petree & Downer and Edward W. Hines, for appellants.

W. G. Bullitt and C. H. Bush, for appellees.

HAZELRIGG, J.

It is the contention of the appellants that the act of March 15, 1894, entitled "An act to amend and reenact article three (3) of an act entitled 'An act relating to and entitled "Husband and Wife,"' approved May 16th, 1893," is unconstitutional in so far as it provides that the widow shall have an absolute estate in one-half of the surplus personalty left by her deceased husband; and that this is so because, without reference to the act relating to "Descent and Distribution," under which title this subject has always been provided for in our law, the amendment in question materially affects the law of descent and distribution; and that its title is deceptive and misleading, because it purports to be an amendment merely of the act relating to "husband and Wife," under which title the question of the rights of the surviving wife and children are not and never have been regulated. We think it manifest, however, that legislation regulating the rights of the wife in the deceased husband's estate, real or personal, may constitutionally be under either the title of "Husband and Wife" or "Descent and Distribution," and therefore the amendment found in section 2132 of the Kentucky Statutes is germane to the title of the act, and is constitutional. Under it the widow is entitled, in any event, to an absolute estate in one-half of the surplus personally left by her husband, and not merely to one-third if the intestate leave issue, and one-half if he leave no issue, as is provided in the law of descent and distribution. Nor do we think it possible to reconcile the two conflicting provisions by construing the act of March 15, 1894, as giving the widow one-half the surplus personalty only when there are no children. Such a construction would do violence both to the language and to the manifest intention of the lawmakers. The Judgment below conforms to these views, and is therefore affirmed.