Hoskins v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 14 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-469-TLS-SLC |
| Parties | DON HOSKINS, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
The Plaintiff Don Hoskins seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision and that there is no basis to remand for further review.
On December 30, 2014, the Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning on July 18, 2014. AR 15, ECF No. 11. After the claims were denied initially and on reconsideration, the Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held before the ALJ on February 8, 2017. AR 15, 175. On May 31, 2017, the ALJ issued a written decision, finding the Plaintiff not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review. AR 1-5, 15-28. The Plaintiff brought a civil action and the Court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. AR 898-907. On remand, a new hearing was held, and the ALJ, consolidating the Plaintiff's applications with a subsequent claim filed in January 2018 issued a new decision dated October 30, 2019, finding the Plaintiff not disabled. AR 75673. The Appeals Council denied review. AR 743-45. Thus, the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). The Plaintiff now seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On December 20, 2021, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] in this Court, seeking reversal of the Commissioner's final decision. The Plaintiff filed an opening brief, the Commissioner filed a response brief, and the Plaintiff filed a reply brief. ECF Nos. 13, 15, 16.
For purposes of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, a claimant is “disabled” if he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).[1] To be found disabled, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that prevents him from doing not only his previous work, but also any other kind of gainful employment that exists in the national economy, considering his age, education, and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). An ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
The first step is to determine whether the claimant is no longer engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). In this case, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 18, 2014, the alleged onset date. AR 759. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). Here, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff has the severe impairments of major depressive disorder, trochanteric bursitis, congenital leg length discrepancy, hip deformity from previous slipped capital femoral epiphysis, lumbar and lower thoracic spine degenerative changes, bilateral hand numbness with some paresthesias most consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), generalized anxiety disorder, arthritis, lumbosacral neuritis, neuropathy of the bilateral upper extremities, and alcohol use disorder. AR 759.
Step three requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant's impairment(s) “meets or equals one of [the] listings in [appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404 of this chapter].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). If a claimant's impairment(s), considered singly or in combination with other impairments, meets or equals a listed impairment, the claimant will be found disabled without considering age, education, and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). The ALJ found that the Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listing. AR 761.
When a claimant's impairment(s) does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ determines the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (RFC), which “is an administrative assessment of what work-related activities an individual can perform despite [the individual's] limitations.” Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). In this case, the ALJ assessed the following RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except never climbing ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps and stairs; occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasional twisting and turning; frequent handling and fingering; must avoid extreme heat and cold; must avoid slippery and uneven surfaces and unprotected heights; must avoid hazards such as dangerous moving machinery; needs a cane for ambulation; able to understand, carry out, and remember simple, routine, and repetitive tasks not at assembly-line type production rate pace with only occasional, simple work-related decisions required; could have occasional interaction with supervisors apart from what is necessary for general instruction, task completion, or training; could have occasional interactions with coworkers and the general public; changes should occur no more than occasionally and be gradually introduced; could perform frequent overhead reaching; avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations; allows for a sit/stand option with no greater frequency than every 15 minutes.
AR 763.
The ALJ then moves to step four and determines whether the claimant can do his past relevant work in light of the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). In this case, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. AR 771. If the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the ALJ considers at step five whether the claimant can “make an adjustment to other work” given the RFC and the claimant's age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). Here, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff is not disabled because the Plaintiff can perform significant jobs in the national economy of address clerk, table worker, and cuff folder. AR 772. The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, whereas the burden at step five is on the ALJ. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512.
The Social Security Act authorizes judicial review of the agency's final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). On review, a court considers whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court will affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact and denial of disability benefits if they are supported by substantial evidence. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted). Even if “reasonable minds could differ” about the disability status of the claimant, the court must affirm the Commissioner's decision as long as it is adequately supported. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th Cir. 2007)).
The court considers the entire administrative record but does not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [the court's] own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). Nevertheless, the court conducts a “critical review of the evidence,” and “the decision cannot stand if it lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539 (citations omitted); see also Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014) (). The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or testimony presented, but the ALJ “has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record and must build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). However, “if the Commissioner commits an error of law,” remand is warranted “without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings.” White ex rel. Smith v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir. 1997)).
In this appeal, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made several errors in determining the Plaintiff's RFC, failed to properly consider the Plaintiff's subjective symptoms, and failed to support with substantial evidence the finding at step five that the Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The Court finds that...
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