Hosleton v. Dickenson

• Citation: 1 N.W. 550,51 Iowa 244
• Parties: JACOB HOSLETON, APPELLEE, v. D. T. DICKENSON ET AL., APPELLANTS.
• Decision Date: 05 June 1879
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

51 Iowa 244

1 N.W. 550

JACOB HOSLETON, APPELLEE,

v.D. T. DICKENSON ET AL., APPELLANTS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed June 5, 1879.

Appeal from Clinton district court.

On the eleventh day of January, 1873, the plaintiff conveyed a certain tract of timber land to the defendants. The deed contained the usual covenants of general warranty, and described the land as containing “thirty acres more or less.” The purchase money agreed to be paid was nine hundred dollars. Three hundred dollars were paid before the conveyance was made, and the defendants executed to the plaintiff their promissory note for three hundred dollars, payable in one year, with interest at ten per cent per annum, and also another note for a like amount, dated at the same time, and payable in two years, with interest at ten per cent per annum.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff on the sixteenth day of October, 1874, to recover a balance alleged to be due upon the first above described note.

The defendants filed an answer and cross-petition in which they averred in substance, that the plaintiff was guilty of fraud in pointing out the boundaries of said land previous to the purchase, and that the land actually conveyed was but eighteen and eighty one-hundredths acres, and that if the tract had included the land within the boundaries pointed out by plaintiff it would have contained twenty-five and forty one-hundredths acres only. That the land was chiefly valuable for the timber standing and growing thereon, and that if it had been bounded, located, and of the number of acres as represented by plaintiff, it would have been worth nine hundred dollars, but that said eighteen and eighty one-hundredths acres as it was actually located was not worth to exceed four hundred and seventy-five dollars. They averred that the plaintiff knew said representations to be false, and that defendants relied thereon to their damage in the sum of four hundred and twenty-five dollars, and they further averred that the plaintiff was still the owner of the last above described note, which was wholly unpaid. They prayed a decree requiring the plaintiff to produce said two promissory notes in court for cancellation, to the extent of the damages sustained by the defendants, and for other relief.

On the sixteenth day of January, 1876, the defendants amended their answer and cross-bill by alleging that at the time of the purchase it was agreed that the land should contain thirty acres, and that defendants should pay therefor the sum of thirty dollars per acre, and that defendants had no knowledge other than that derived from the plaintiff, of the quantity of said land, and purchased the same upon the faith and belief that the plaintiff's knowledge of the number of acres it so contained was correct; and that the plaintiff and defendants were mutually mistaken as to the number of acres said land contained, at the time of the purchase aforesaid. That subsequent to filing the original answer, the defendants paid the last above described note to another party, who claimed to be the owner thereof, before due, and in good faith, and without notice. They prayed that an abatement be made from the purchase money for said land equal to the deficiency in acres at the contract price per acre, and that an amount equal to the balance due upon the note sued upon be set off against the same, and that plaintiff be decreed to pay the defendants the balance thereof.

There were replies filed by the plaintiff, putting in issue the material allegations of the cross-petition and the amendment thereto.

The proper order was made for a trial upon written evidence, and such trial was had by the court. There was a judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the balance due upon the note on which suit was brought. Defendants appeal.

Kirke W. Wheeler, for appellants.

Merrill & Howat, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, C. J.

--I. The court below found that there were no fraudulent representations made by the plaintiff to the defendants at the time of, or before the conveyance of the land, and that the sale was not made by the acre as alleged in the amendment to the cross-petition.

An examination of the evidence satisfies us that these findings are correct. There is no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff knew that the land was less in quantity than thirty acres. On the contrary, all the facts and circumstances in the case lead to the conclusion that he believed there was thirty acres, or very nearly that quantity, in the tract conveyed.

The deed does not indicate that the sale was by the acre, and, although the evidence shows that the number of acres was in contemplation by the parties, we think it was a gross sale of what was supposed to be thirty acres of land for nine hundred dollars.

The court below further found as follows: “I am not satisfied that there was any mistake, but in the view I take of the law, I have not deemed it necessary to investigate this point so clearly as I should under other circumstances. My view of the law is, that this must be considered as a law action, and determined by the rules governing them, and that it cannot be considered an equitable action, so as to be brought within the rules laid down in Wilcox v. Iowa Weslyan University, 32 Iowa, 367.”

In other words, the court held that the cause of action set forth in the cross-petition was essentially one at law, and that it must be considered as an action at law for damages, although entitled in equity, and that under the authority of Holmes v. Clark, 10 Iowa, 423, and other cases, the defendants could not recover damages at law, for a mere mistake; a court of equity being the only forum wherein such relief can be granted.

The case of Holmes v. Clark was an action at law to recover damages for false and fraudulent representations in the sale of land. It was held, that to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must show by competent evidence “that the representations were false and fraudulent within the knowledge of the party making them, and that they were made intentionally to deceive and induce the completion of the purchase,” and that no recovery could be had if it appeared that the representations were made by mistake merely. But the court says, “It is true in a transaction of this kind, the plaintiff may have been equally surprised by a mistake or by a fraud. If so, he had a like easy and full remedy, not of this description in a court of law to be sure, but in a court of equity, whose peculiar province it is to rectify mistakes, and grant the appropriate relief incident to the same, and this could have been done, according to our conception of the true spirit of the Code, without leaving the court, by simply changing the statement in the petition so as to address the equity side of the court.”

The defendants in this cause entitled their pleading as a cross-bill, and prayed for a decree. The parties and the court all seem to have understood the issues to be tried as equitable, because no motion was made by the plaintiff for the correction of the cross-bill, and the cause was ordered to be tried upon written evidence as in equity. If there was an error in the kind of proceedings adopted it was waived by a failure to move for its correction at the proper time. Code, § 2519.

We think, under these circumstances, and in view of the ruling in Holmes v. Clark, supra, the defendants were entitled to have the cause tried by the rules and usages of equity, and not by the strict rules applicable to law actions.

But we may go further and properly hold that the relief sought by the cross-bill and amendment thereto while in its remote sense is compensation in damages for a mistake; yet, as the pleadings are framed, they present grounds for equitable relief. It was alleged that the plaintiff was the owner of the note given for the last payment on the land as well as the note in suit, and it is prayed that he be decreed to produce both of said notes in court for cancellation to the extent of the damages sustained by defendants. If the defendants had...