Hosp. of Louisa v. Johnson Cnty. Fiscal Court
| Decision Date | 24 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | 2009-SC-000280-DG |
| Parties | HOSPITAL OF LOUISA, APPELLANT D/B/A THREE RIVERS MEDICAL CENTER v. JOHNSON COUNTY FISCAL COURT APPELLEE |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
NOT BE PUBLISHED
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 07-CI-00103
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURTREVERSING AND REMANDING
Ernest Napier was a 56-year-old Vietnam veteran who, on April 26, 2006, was arrested and became a prisoner at the Big Sandy Regional Detention Center (hereinafter "Big Sandy") in Johnson County, Kentucky, following an assault against his girlfriend, Paula Compton. A detailed account of the pretrial proceedings is necessary because these developments are germane to the ultimate integrity of Napier's bond release which is at the heart of the case.
Upon his initial arrest, Napier's bond was set at $100,000 cash by the Johnson District Court. At a preliminary hearing held on May 3, 2006, the Johnson District Court found probable cause that Napier had committed first-degree assault and the case was bound over to the grand jury. At that time, Napier's bond was reduced to $50,000 cash. Napier subsequently filed a motion for bond reduction and, on June 7, 2006, the motion was sustained and an agreed order for pretrial home incarceration was entered. Then, on July 3, 2006, the Johnson District Court entered an order dismissing the case against Napier for failure to indict. That order stated that Napier "shall be immediately released from custody and/or any bond obligation."
Napier was eventually indicted by a Johnson County Grand Jury and charged with one count of assault in the first degree and for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. He was arrested on August 3, 2006 on the warrant of arrest on indictment and his bond was set at $50,000 cash. He was again lodged in Big Sandy. Napier was subsequently found to be indigent and a public defender was appointed and defended him in court. On March 3, 2007, Napier entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge of assault in the second degree and the persistent felony offender charge was dismissed. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
The issue before us involves Napier's releases from Big Sandy on two occasions prior to his guilty plea and sentencing. On August 8, 2006, Napier was released from Big Sandy for the sole purpose of obtaining medical treatment at the Hospital of Louisa, d/b/a Three Rivers Medical Center (hereinafter "Three Rivers"). Napier's release was conditioned upon his returning to the detention center after being discharged from Three Rivers. Napier was a patient at Three Rivers from August 8 to August 11. The bill forhis treatment was $34,477.17, based upon the full rate, and $4,671.00, based upon the Medicare rate. Later that month, on August 30, 2006, Napier was once again released from Big Sandy and admitted to Three Rivers on the condition that he return to Big Sandy upon completion of his medical treatment. During this hospital visit, Napier was a patient from August 30 to September 1. The cost of this stay was $26,057.87, at the full rate, and $7,669.00, at the Medicaid rate. Napier was also released from the custody of Big Sandy for medical treatment on two subsequent dates in October of 2006. However, none of the medical costs associated with either of these releases were incurred at Three Rivers and, thus, are not at issue in this appeal.
It is uncontested that Napier's medical treatment at Three Rivers in August and September was of an emergency nature and could not be postponed. The Veterans Administration refused to pay the hospital charges because Napier was—at least from their perspective—incarcerated. It is also uncontested that, at all times and for the purposes of this decision, Napier remained indigent. Further, there is no dispute that the purpose behind Big Sandy allowing Napier to be released from its custody in order to be admitted to Three Rivers was to enable the Johnson County Fiscal Court to avoid paying Napier's medical bills. The following is from the deposition of Henry "Butch" Williams, administrator of Big Sandy, who was deposed on February 1, 2008, as part of discovery in this action:
Three Rivers brought action against the Johnson County Fiscal Court, claiming that it was responsible for the payment of Napier's medical bills because Napier was a Johnson County prisoner in the custody of Big Sandy at the time of his hospitalizations at Three Rivers. The facts of the case are uncontested. The Johnson Circuit Court entered summary judgment on June 12, 2008, in favor of the Johnson County Fiscal Court. It held that, even though Napier was released solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment with the condition that he return to Big Sandy, he was not a prisoner for whom medical expenses were required to be paid by the county. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and this matter is now before us for consideration.
KRS 441.045(3) requires that "the cost of providing necessary medical, dental, and psychological care for indigent prisoners in the jail shall be paid from the jail budget." We must address the question of whether Napier was, at the time he received his medical treatment at Three Rivers, a prisoner of Big Sandy, or whether he was out on bond or on his own recognizance with certain non-financial conditions. The following is a chronological listing of Napier's pertinent releases and his bond conditions:
It is important to note that the $50,000 cash bond was not, in reality, reduced when Napier was at liberty to seek medical treatment at Three Rivers. Rather, the bond was simply lifted with no financial conditions so that Napier could be released from custody, obtain medical treatment, and then return to Big Sandy, where the cash bond was reinstated.
It is also significant to note that upon final sentencing, Napier was given 310 days credit for time spent in custody. A review of the record reflects that this credit includes the days Napier was released from Big Sandy for medical treatment. He would not have been entitled to jail credit if he was free on bond. Bartrug v. Commonwealth, 582 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.App. 1979). However, if Napier was hospitalized while still being considered "in custody," he would be entitled to jail credit. Prewitt v. Wilkinson, 843 S.W.2d 335 (Ky.App. 1992). Therefore, affording Napier jail time credit for the time he was receiving outside medical services is inconsistent with him not being considered "in custody" during that time.
The provisions of RCr 4.00 pertain to pretrial release through the posting of bail or other conditions. The obvious purpose of the criminal rules concerning bail is to ensure the accused's appearance at court. RCr 4.12 also authorizes the court to "impose any other conditions, including conditions requiring the defendant to return to custody after specified hours." Likewise, KRS 431.520(6) specifically allows the court to "[i]mpose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after specified hours."
KRS 520.010(2) defines custody as being any "restraint by a public servant pursuant to a lawful arrest, detention, or an order of court for law enforcement purposes, but does not include supervision of probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on bail." In other words, if a person is released from the custody of the jail to go to work and return at certain times, that person is still in custody. That is considered "restraint." However, if that person has posted bond and is out on that form of release, then he is no longer in custody.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, it is not necessary that a person be physically inside the confines of the jail to still be considered a prisoner. The definition of escape, under KRS 520.010(5), includes "failure to return to custody or detention following a temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or for a limited period." Therefore, an inmate failing to return to jail at a specified time, having been released for work purposes, can be charged with and convicted of escape. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 113 S.W.3d 647 (Ky.App. 2003); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615 S.W.2d 1 (Ky.App. 1981); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 270 (Ky. 2005). "A prisoner who has been favored by being made a trusty and given a degree of liberty by employment outside prison walls is still in lawful control and custody." Cutter v. Buchanan, 286 S.W.2d 902, 903-904 (Ky. 1956) (citing 30 C.J.S., Escape, § 5).
We find that the status of Napier, upon release from Big Sandy, was similar to that of a person who is released from the...
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