Hotchkiss v. City
| Decision Date | 18 November 1941 |
| Docket Number | No. 26232.,26232. |
| Citation | 37 N.E.2d 332,377 Ill. 615 |
| Parties | HOTCHKISS et al. v. CALUMET CITY et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mandamus action by Jayne W. Hotchkiss and others against the City of Calumet City and others to command the defendants to take steps for the enactment of an ordinance providing for an issue of bonds, the levying of an annual tax to meet the bonds, and an appropriation of the proceeds of the bonds to the payment of the several judgments. From an adverse judgment, the defendants appeal, and the plaintiffs move to dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; D. J. Normoyle, judge.
Roman E. Posanski and Francis L. Brinkman, both of Chicago (Franklin J. Stransky, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Arthur A. Sullivan, of Chicago (Henry O. Nickel and Howard B. Bryant, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in a mandamus action in the circuit court of Cook county. The appellees are judgment creditors of the city of Calumet City holding judgments in various amounts totaling more than $490,000. The claims of the judgment creditors arose out of the city's alleged misapplication of special assessment funds. The city of Calumet City, William F. Zick, mayor of the city, and Peter E. Horst, and nine others, described as aldermen of the city, were made defendants. An answer was filed on behalf of all defendants, a hearing was had and on December 20, 1940, a judgment was entered finding that appellees, 178 of them, had previously obtained judgments against the city and that such judgments were unpaid and remained in full force and effect.
A peremptory writ of mandamus was directed to the city of Calumet City, William F. Zick, as mayor, and the ten aldermen, naming them, commanding them to take steps for the enactment of an ordinance providing for an issue of bonds, the levying of an annual tax to meet the bonds and an appropriation of the proceeds of the bonds to the payment of the several judgments. An alternative was ordered, that if the city should elect not to sell the bonds it should deliver them to the several judgment creditors in accordance with the terms stated in the judgment order.
William F. Zick as mayor of the city, Joseph Breclaw and Peter Soczyk, two of the aldermen named as defendants and described as aldermen of the city in their notice, filed a notice of appeal. The city did not join in such action and has not filed a separate notice. A substitution has been made in this court, by permitting John W. Jaranowski, the present mayor, to be substituted in Zick's place.
Appellees made a motion to dismiss the appeal which was taken with the case. The conclusions reached on the motion will make it unnecessary to consider the case on its merits. Appellees urge that the record does not show appellants to have a sufficient interest in the judgment to support the appeal.
It is the established rule that the right to appeal exists only in favor of a party whose rights have been prejudiced by the judgment or decree appealed from. McCollister v. Greene County Nat. Bank, 171 Ill. 608, 49 N.E. 734. Zick and his successor, Jaranowski, and Breclaw and Soczyk must be considered as being parties to the record in their official capacity, for no relief was asked or granted that affected any of their individualrights. The judgment directed them to do certain things but the command was limited to actions pertaining to their official duties. The gist of the action was to compel the city to do that which appellees perceived they had a right to demand. The agencies or instrumentalities through which the city could perform the acts required was the city council and to give effect to the commands of the peremptory writ it was proper to direct the writ to those persons who, by virtue of their official positions constituted the city council and whose official duty it was to act. Village of Glencoe v. People, 78 Ill. 382. However, the naming of the mayor and the aldermen in the writ did not require them to do an act that was in any way related to their personal interests. The action commanded to be taken was the action of the corporate body and referred solely to the performance of its legal duties in reference to appellees' judgments.
Appellants say they have a personal interest arising out of the possibility of being prosecuted for contempt. Contempt such as referred to would necessarily arise out of appellants' refusal to follow the commands of the judgment order and perform their official duties. The possibility of such defiance of a court order on their part and their utter disregard of official duties can not serve to create in appellants a personal appealable interest in the judgment.
Since they can not be considered as parties of record in their individual capacity, their right to appeal individually, as parties not of record, under section 81...
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...Co. v. Jones, 384 Ill. 222, 51 N.E.2d 122;People ex rel. Altorfer v. City of Peoria, 378 Ill. 572, 39 N.E.2d 42;Hotchkiss v. City of Calumet City, 377 Ill. 615, 37 N.E.2d 332. Under said section 81 of the Civil Practice Act, any person who is not a party to the record has the right to have ......
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...will not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed against the Board and its member Trustees. Hotchkiss v. City of Calumet City, 377 Ill. 615, 620, 37 N.E.2d 332. We hold further that where the duty of a public official is fixed and a mandamus writ necessarily issues to compel him to ......
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...the appeal for want of sufficient interest in those filing the notice was allowed and the appeal was dismissed. Hotchkiss v. Calumet City, 377 Ill. 615, 37 N.E.2d 332. On January 23, 1941, the city council passed an ordinance authorizing the issuanceof bonds in accordance with the mandate o......
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Hadley v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Pension Fund of City of Batavia
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