People ex rel. Chamberlin v. Trustees of Sch. of Twp. No. 1 South, Range 5 West

Decision Date08 July 1943
Docket NumberGen. No. 9376.
Citation49 N.E.2d 666,319 Ill.App. 370
PartiesPEOPLE EX REL. CHAMBERLIN ET AL. v. TRUSTEES OF SCHOOLS OF TOWNSHIP NO. 1 SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, ET AL.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Adams County; Fred G. Wolfe, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Rollin Chamberlin and others, for a writ of mandamus requiring the Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 South, Range No. 5 West, and other townships to call and hold concurrent meetings and grant or refuse a petition to detach certain territory from Clayton Community High School District No. 60 and annex it to Brown County Community High School District No. 67. From a judgment granting the writ, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

John T. Inghram, Jr., of Quincy, for appellants.

Williams & Williams, of Pittsfield, and Mark A. Penick, State's Atty., of Quincy, for appellees.

RIESS, Presiding Justice.

Defendants have appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Adams County granting to plaintiffs a writ of mandamus requiring the defendants, Township Trustees of Schools, to give due notice of meetings and hearings and to grant or deny plaintiffs' verified petition for detaching certain territory from one community high school district and attaching the same to another district and assessing the costs of such mandamus proceedings against the defendants.

Brown County lies adjacent to and adjoins Adams County on the easterly boundary line thereof. The Clayton Community High School District No. 60 embraces a number of adjacent townships and parts of townships in Adams County, including parts of three townships lying within and along the westerly boundary line of Brown County and three adjacent townships lying within and along the easterly boundary line of Adams County. The Brown County Community High School District No. 67 lies entirely within Brown County, immediately east of and adjoining the said Clayton Community High School District No. 60.

Decuple original petitions signed by 268 persons and duly verified, purporting to comprise more than two-thirds of a total number of less than 350 legal voters residing within the territory sought to be detached from Clayton Community High School District No. 60 and attached to and made a part of said District No. 67 in Brown County, were filed with the Clerks of the Boards of Trustees of Schools of ten townships, including the six townships above mentioned and affected, which petitions prayed that the territory comprised within said mentioned six townships be detached from said Clayton District No. 60 and be added and annexed to said Brown County District No. 67. Trustees of two of the three townships lying within Brown County gave notice of meetings and duly heard, acted upon and granted said petition. The third township in Brown County called and held a meeting, acted upon and denied the petition, and a statutory appeal from that decision was taken to the County Superintendent of Schools of Brown County where the same is pending. The Trustees of the three townships in Adams County failed to act upon or to either grant or refuse the petitions filed with the Clerk of the Board of Trustees of Schools of said respective townships.

A complaint praying issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the defendants to call and hold concurrent meetings and act upon the petition by either granting or refusing the same pursuant to the provisions and requirements of the statute was duly filed in the Circuit Court of Adams County. The defendants who were joined as Trustees of Schools of the three respective townships lying in Adams County and as individuals, being members of each Board of Trustees, were severally summoned and appeared and filed motions to strike the complaint, without limiting their respective appearances, which motions were overruled by the Court. Defendants were ruled to answer and all of the defendants except one Trustee named Padgett, who made default, then filed their answers to the petition, which answers were also stricken on plaintiffs' motion as not presenting any affirmative legal defense and as not admitting or denying material allegations of fact or showing factual lack of knowledge, duly verified, excusing such failure or by otherwise pleading facts tending to disprove or excuse their alleged failure to duly meet, act upon and grant or refuse the petition. Upon leave, amended answers were jointly filed by the defendants of each of the three townships, as Trustees and as individuals, pleading in substance the same matters that had been set up in their stricken answers. A further motion by plaintiffs to strike the verified amended answers setting forth numerous grounds therefor was heard and granted by the Court for want of sufficient answers, on similar grounds to those upon which their prior answers had been stricken. No further pleadings were filed by the defendants. The Court found that the above verified complaint stated a cause of action, which, with the attached petition, notices, returns and exhibits, made a part thereof, clearly entitled the plaintiffs to the relief prayed. The writ of mandamus was thereupon ordered to issue, requiring the respective defendants and Boards of Trustees to give notice of meetings as set forth in the order and to pass upon or conduct hearings on said petition and either grant or deny the petition and further ordered that the defendants pay the costs of suit. The defendants have perfected their appeal to this Court and have assigned errors in entering said orders and final judgment.

The Trustees of township Two (2) South Five (5) West in Adams County had called a special meeting for November 17, 1941 and caused due notice thereof to be given. On that date, the Trustees met with their counsel present and adjourned to December 8, 1941, when they again met with counsel present, and adjourned to January 5, 1942, at which time only one Trustee was present and no action of any kind was then or thereafter taken by said Trustees on that petition. The Trustees in township One (1) South Five (5) West in Adams County, met and called a similar meeting for November 18, 1941 and gave due notice thereof. On that date, they met and adjourned the meeting to December 16, 1941 when they again met, having counsel present, and adjourned to February 10, 1942, on which latter date one Trustee appeared and no action granting, denying or otherwise disposing of said petition was then or thereafter taken. The Trustees in township One (1) North Five (5) West in Adams County failed and refused to call any meeting and no action whatsoever was taken in the way of giving notice or calling a meeting or by granting or denying or otherwise passing upon said petitions. The Trustees of said respective townships were repeatedly urged to take action by holding due hearings and either granting or denying the petitions, but wholly failed to do so. The plaintiffs-appellees set forth in their verified complaint the various steps and procedure allegedly taken by them as indicated by statute, with copy of the signed and verified petition of resident legal voters, and contend that they had in all respects strictly complied with the requirements of the statute for detaching territory from one community high school district and adding and annexing it to another district in compliance with all such statutory provisions.

An answer in a mandamus suit must set up a sufficient defense and should deny facts alleged in the petition or confess and avoid them, by specifically averring facts, which are sufficient in law to defeat the claim or to lawfully excuse the conduct of the respondents. People v. Lueders, 287 Ill. 107, 109, 122 N.E. 374;People v. Board of Com'rs of Cook County, 180 Ill. 160, 54 N.E. 164. A failure to deny material facts well pleaded is an admission of their truth. People v. Board of Com'rs of Cook County, supra; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Suffern, 129 Ill. 274, 21 N.E. 824. An answer must be sufficient as a whole or it should be stricken upon motion therefor, since the suit is an action at law and not in chancery wherein parts of an answer may be stricken and the remainder permitted to stand. People v. Powell, 274 Ill. 222, 113 N.E. 614;People v. Board of Review, 329 Ill. 388, 394, 160 N.E. 755. The answer must state positive and definite facts upon which the defendants rely as a defense. Conclusions of the pleader are not sufficient, and if the answer consists merely of general statements and conclusions, the relief prayed for will be granted upon the petition. People v. City of Chicago, 377 Ill. 573, 576, 37 N.E.2d 151;City of Chicago v. People, 215 Ill. 235, 237, 239, 74 N.E. 137; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Suffern, supra; People v. Lueders, supra; Halliday v. Board of County Commissioners, 203 Ill.App. 178, 182.

Defendants, in their numerous amended answers which were stricken by the Court, persistently avoided direct admissions or denials of numerous allegations of the complaint by alleging lack of knowledge of many matters which were patently within their knowledge or of record in the offices of the respective defendants, and in each instance could have been independently answered by various defendants; who saw fit, however, to file answers jointly on behalf of all defendants of each township, pleading conclusions of lack of knowledge concerning such matters or concerning matters which could not be collaterally raised or attacked in a mandamus proceeding. Such evasive pleadings were properly stricken by the Court as not meeting the requirements of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, c. 110, § 125 et seq.

By their answers, defendants also sought to question the corporate legality of the high school districts. The legality or existence of a community high school district cannot be questioned by an answer in a mandamus proceeding, but must be directly presented by a proceeding in the nature of a quo...

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