Hotel and Restaurant Emp. and Bartenders Union, Local No. 339 v. Boca Raton Club

• Decision Date: 06 July 1954
• Citation: 48 A.L.R.2d 986,73 So.2d 867
• Parties: 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2516, 48 A.L.R.2d 986, 26 Lab.Cas. P 68,554 HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES & BARTENDERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 339 et al. v. BOCA RATON CLUB, Inc.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 867

73 So.2d 867

34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2516, 48 A.L.R.2d 986, 26 Lab.Cas. P 68,554

HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES & BARTENDERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 339 et al. v. BOCA RATON CLUB, Inc.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

July 6, 1954.

Lucille Snowden and George S. O'Kell, Miami, for appellants.

Burns, Middleton & Rogers, West Palm Beach, and John Moore, Delray Beach, for appellee.

HOBSON, Justice.

One of the questions before us is whether the amended bill of complaint, which was dismissed by the chancellor, states a claim upon which relief may be granted on behalf of all or any of the plaintiffs, who have elected not to take advantage of the proffered leave to amend further and are appellants here. For convenience, we shall first summarize the amended complaint because it gives a complete statement of the plaintiffs' present case, although we shall consider other questions before reaching the one above referred to.

The following allegations of fact appear from a study of the amended complaint.

Boca Raton Club, Inc., the employer, defendant-appellee herein, operates a resort hotel at Boca Raton, Florida, during the 'season', which extends from about the first of December to the first of May each year. Plaintiffs are a labor union and a number of individual employees who are members of the plaintiff union and sue as employees, as union members and as individuals. The hotel operated by the employer is in an isolated location, far from other housing accommodations, and thus room and board are furnished for the employees. Living quarters and a 'canteen' for employees are located behind the hotel proper and surrounded by a high fence, the only entrance or exit being through gates at which the employer's police stand at all times.

As the season progressed, it developed among the employees regarding wages and hours, the one grievance alleged as common to all plaintiff employees being that tips, which 'make up most of the actual money earned by plaintiffs' were withheld, in whole or in part, permanently or for long periods of time, when paid by guests to the management rather than directly to plaintiffs.

'Employees in the liquor and food service department' of the defendant joined the plaintiff union. It is not clear from the complaint whether all, or indeed, any, of the plaintiff employees were members of this group, but from the declaration previously referred to that the named individual plaintiffs are suing 'as members of the union' it is inferable that all plaintiff employees are allegedly members of the liquor and food service department and are union members. On February 6, 1953, the union, by letter, notified defendant's manager, Carroll, 'of the employees unionization and their desire for collective bargaining'. The union sent further letters to Carroll on February 14 and 26, 1953, requesting a conference and suggesting an agenda, but without reply. On February 27, 1953, the union representative telephoned Carroll and was informed that there would be no meeting or collective bargaining agreement. By secret ballot and with a majority vote, the employees of 'the said department' decided to strike, and on March 4, 1953, 'all the employees of the catering department, except three' refused to work. The relationship between the 'liquor and food service department' the 'catering department' and the individual plaintiffs nowhere appears. The defendant refused to recognize the unjon, told the 'employees' (apparently the striking employees of the 'catering department') that they must leave their living quarters, and that they could resign and be rehired. On March 5, 1953, the defendant issued the following notice for distribution to 'said plaintiffs':

'Important Notice

'All Dining Room and Bar Employees Not Working Are Hereby Notified to Vacate the Boca Raton Hotel and Club Premises as of Today, March 5th, 1953.

'This Is a Final Notice

'I Am Glad and Willing Now and Have Always Been to Discuss With Any Employee of the Boca Raton Hotel and Club Any Problem or Grievance.

'Any Dining Room or Bar Employees Who Wish to Resume Working Will Please Communicate at Once With Mr. James Simms, Catering Manager, and Employment Will Be Guaranteed Until the End of This Season.

'James J. Carroll

'Boca Raton Hotel & Club'

Simultaneously, at about 3:00 p. m., on March 5, defendant closed the gates to plaintiffs' living quarters, preventing plaintiffs from passing in or out, and also stationed police at the stairs leading to plaintiffs' rooms so that 'plaintiffs were held prisoner wherever they happened to be'. At 7:00 p. m., on the same date, plaintiffs held in the 'canteen' were permitted to go to their rooms. On the following day, 'plaintiffs outside the gates could not go to their rooms, and plaintiffs inside the gates could not leave, unless they accepted absolute discharge and accumulated their possessions from their rooms'. The defendant then stated that it would meet with a committee consisting only of employees on the following morning, March 7, 1953, provided all employees requesting a meeting for bargaining purposes would first take their possessions and leave the premises. Plaintiffs declined this offer, and defendant informed them that they would be evicted. From midnight of March 6, 1853 to early morning of March 7, defendant caused plaintiffs 'not locked out' to be arrested for criminal trespass. No regard was given to individual status, and some plaintiffs were arrested who were unable to work because of illness. At no time did plaintiffs conduct themselves in other than an orderly manner, but defendant surrounded their quarters with thirty policemen. Whether or not these plaintiffs were actually evicted does not appear from the amended complaint. 'Many of the plaintiffs' were, however, fined for criminal trespass on March 10, 1953.

On March 11, 13 and 14, the picture appears to have undergone a complete change. On those dates defendant met with plaintiff union representatives and 'definite agreements were entered into with plaintiff union on all phases of the labor dispute * * *.' 'Letter confirmation' of this agreement was sent to defendant, and plaintiffs returned to work on Sunday, March 15, 1953. Thereafter, however, defendant began to retract, i. e., breach, the agreement, according to the complaint, although no facts are set up in support of this allegation.

The above are the main factual allegations of the amended complaint, which concludes with a prayer that the court 'construe the sworn allegations herein, the exhibits attached, and the testimony presented, and ascertain to what extent the defendant has committed unfair labor practices * * *. That if unfair labor practices have been committed, and are being committed * * * that after final hearing a permanent injunction be entered ordering said defendant to cease and desist further unfair labor practices * * * and that plaintiffs have damages * * * and that the court allow such other relief as in equity may be just.'

Compared with the amended complaint, the original complaint contained an abbreviated historical recital of events occurring up to the time of filing, on March 5, 1953, and the prayer for relief was substantially the same as in the amended complaint, except that in addition it asked 'that if unfair labor practices are being committed by said employer, a decree to that effect be entered and the rights of the parties be set forth in said decree; that said acts of said employer which are unfair labor practices * * * be enjoined and injunction without notice be entered * * *.'

A hearing was held on the prayer for temporary relief on March 6, 1953, the day following the filing of the original complaint. The chancellor was understandably perplexed at the nature of the temporary relief requested, and was informed that the injunction desired would reach the evictions or threats of eviction and the 'unfair labor practices'. At the outset, the court stated that it would not grant a temporary mandatory injunction to compel collective bargaining. This ruling was well within the discretion of the chancellor. Mandatory injunctions are looked upon with disfavor, especially before final hearing, and the right shown must be clear and free from reasonable doubt. Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So.2d 345; Miami Bridge Co. v. Miami Beach Ry. Co., 152 Fla. 458, 12 So.2d 438; American Fire and Cas. Co. v. Rader, 160 Fla. 700, 36 So.2d 270.

After the hearing, in the course of which three witnesses testified for the plaintiffs and documentary evidence was received, including the 'important notice' reproduced above, the chancellor on March 13, 1953, entered on order denying all temporary relief and on the same date, on motion of defendant, dismissed the original complaint for failure to state an actionable claim, granting, however, leave to amend. The amended complaint was filed on April 17, 1953.

Was it error, as appellants contend, for the chancellor to dany all temporary injunctive relief and to dismiss the original bill? We are of the opinion that each of these rulings was correct as to the plaintiff union, because the rights sought to be enforced were personal to the employees, Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry, Linen etc., Local Union No. 935, Fla., 41 So.2d 305; Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26...