Hott v. VDO Yazaki Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1996
• Docket Number: Civil A. No. 94-00064-H.
• Citation: 922 F. Supp. 1114
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: Tara HOTT, Plaintiff, v. VDO YAZAKI CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

922 F. Supp. 1114

Tara HOTT, Plaintiff, v. VDO YAZAKI CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil A. No. 94-00064-H.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.

April 2, 1996.

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Marilyn Ann Solomon, Winchester, VA and Annette Kay Rubin, Martin & Rubin, Leesburg, VA, for plaintiff.

Steven W. Ray and Jason M. Branciforte, Kruchko & Fries, McLean, VA, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court upon the defendants' respective motions for summary judgment as to all counts. In her "Motion for Judgment,"¹ the plaintiff alleges the following:

Count I: A claim of violation of Title VII of the so-called Civil Rights Act of 1991 against the defendant VDO Yazaki Corporation ("VDO")² on the ground of sexual harassment. The plaintiff alleges both "condition of work" sexual harassment and "quid pro quo" sexual harassment.

Count II: A claim of common law battery against both defendants.

Count III: A claim of wrongful discharge against the defendant VDO based both upon the ground of a violation of the so-called Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and upon the ground of sexual harassment.³

Count IV: A claim of negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision against the defendant VDO.⁴

On September 6, 1995, the Honorable B. Waugh Crigler, United States Magistrate Judge, filed his "Report and Recommendation."⁵ In his Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the court overrule the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Counts I and II, and grant the defendant VDO's motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and IV. The parties filed objections, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and on January 29, 1996, this court heard oral argument on the objections. The court has undertaken a de novo review of the record in this matter, pursuant to Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1982). For the reasons stated below, the court adopts the Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation" inasmuch as it recommends that the court overrule the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Counts I and II and that the court grant the defendant VDO's motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and IV.

I.

The plaintiff, Tara Hott, was employed by the defendant VDO Yazaki Corporation ("VDO"), a company with a facility located in Winchester, Va. The defendant Juergen Nies ("Nies") is a Production Manager employed by VDO. On August 25, 1989, VDO hired the plaintiff as a Temporary Assembler in its Production Department. The plaintiff's temporary position lasted eleven weeks.⁶

In August 1990, VDO hired the plaintiff on a permanent basis. VDO assigned the plaintiff to the warehouse and, shortly thereafter, transferred the plaintiff to the Production Department. Bill Simpson supervised the plaintiff.

On June 28, 1991, VDO transferred the plaintiff to the Purchasing Department, where the plaintiff worked as a Data Entry Clerk. Sue Saxion supervised the plaintiff in this position.

On March 12, 1992, VDO transferred the plaintiff back to the Production Department where she was supervised by Angie Pitta. VDO alleges that it was at this point that the plaintiff entered the company's so-called "corrective action program." The corrective action program functioned to address chronic absenteeism by employees. After a number of unexcused absences, an employee would enter Phase I, whereby the employee was monitored for continued absenteeism and tardiness. If absenteeism and tardiness continued, the employee would enter Phase II, where the requirements became more stringent. Again, if absenteeism and tardiness continued, the employee entered Phase III. If the employee failed to satisfy the requirements of Phase III, the employee would be terminated. If at any stage an employee satisfied the requirement of the then-applicable Phase, then the employee would ultimately exit the program. The plaintiff had progressed through the corrective action program and was in Phase III when she went on disability leave in January 1994.

The plaintiff remained on disability leave until February 28, 1994. When the plaintiff returned to work from her leave, VDO continued to monitor the plaintiff's absenteeism and tardiness under the requirements of Phase III. VDO informed the plaintiff that she could not be absent from work unless there was a death in her family, unless VDO initiated a shutdown, or unless the plaintiff was called to jury duty. On March 2, 1994, the plaintiff left her work station and notified her group leader that she was leaving work. The plaintiff provided VDO with a "Family and Medical Leave Certification Form," which the plaintiff claims excused her from work on March 2, 1994. Thereafter, a group of VDO management and supervisory personnel met to discuss the plaintiff's history of absenteeism. After one member of the group contacted the Department of Labor concerning the FMLA Certification Form, the group decided to terminate the plaintiff's employment. VDO terminated the plaintiff's employment on March 8, 1994. This action ensued.

II. Summary Judgment Principles

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "`As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.'" Doyle v. Sentry Ins., 877 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D.Va. 1995) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). "`Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice.'" Id. (quoting Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.1985)). In determining whether genuine and material factual disputes exist, resolution of which would require trial, the court should review the parties' respective memoranda and the many exhibits attached thereto, construing all facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Riley v. Technical & Management Servs. Corp., 872 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (D.Md. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). The summary judgment inquiry scrutinizes the plaintiff's case to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof at trial. Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir.1993). "Courts must take special care in considering summary judgment in cases involving questions of motive, such as in employment discrimination cases." Doyle, 877 F.Supp. at 1005. With these principles in mind, the court begins this odyssey.

A. Count I — Title VII

Title VII of the so-called Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides in relevant part that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). In Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir.1983), the court recognized two distinct varieties of sexual harassment: "`harassment that creates an offensive environment (`condition of work')⁷ and harassment in which a supervisor demands sexual consideration in exchange for job benefits (`quid pro quo').'" Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n. 18 (11th Cir.1982)). Because the plaintiff appears to allege both forms of sexual harassment, the court will address these forms separately.⁸

1. `Condition of Work' Harassment

"Sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment exists where there are sexual advances, fondling or a sexually suggestive workplace atmosphere that the claimant finds unwelcome." Walker v. Sullair Corp., 736 F.Supp. 94, 100 (W.D.N.C.1990). "Hostile work environment is characterized by a workplace `pervaded with sexual slur, insult and innuendo, ... verbal sexual harassment, ... or extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related epithets' directed to or about an employee." Id. (quoting Katz, 709 F.2d at 254). In Katz, the court established a two-part analysis for determining "condition of work" sexual harassment: "First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that sexually harassing actions took place, and if this is done, the employer may rebut the showing either directly, by proving that the events did not take place, or indirectly, by showing that they were isolated or genuinely trivial. Second, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, and took no effectual action to correct the situation." Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. "To prove such a claim, the plaintiff must show that the conduct in question was unwelcome, that the harassment was based on sex, and that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment." Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04); see also Hammill v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., Civ. Action No. 93-00031-C, 1994 WL 147753 (W.D.Va. Apr. 18, 1994). "The plaintiff also must show some basis for imposing liability on the employer." Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557; see also Hammill, at * 3-4. "The standard for determining that sexual harassment constitutes a hostile environment, `is not, and cannot by its nature be, a mathematically precise test,' and so the boundary of what is actionable is unclear." Spicer v. Commonwealth, 44 F.3d 218, 225 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, ___, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d...