Hottel v. Read

Decision Date18 December 1940
Citation66 Ohio App. 323,33 N.E.2d 1011
PartiesHOTTEL v. READ.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

The driver of an automobile was confronted with a perilous situation due to his inability to stop on icy pavement behind a bus which had slowed down preparatory to stopping. From the evidence, reasonable minds could conclude only that he exercised some care to avoid injuries to a guest in the automobile after he first became conscious of the danger of the situation, rather than that he proceeded without any care whatever and in utter heedlessness of his guest's jeopardy and with a knowing disregard of her saefty. Held that, it was the duty of the trial judge to determine as a matter of law that the driver was not guilty of wanton misconduct.

Critchfield Critchfield & Critchfield, of Wooster, for appellee.

Weimer & Miller, of Wooster and Power & Barton, of Columbus for appellant.

DOYLE Judge.

The major questions involved in this appeal on questions of law from the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne county are, whether the evidence admitted on the trial is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff in an action based solely upon the claimed wanton misconduct of the defendant, and warranted the ruling of the court in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial and entering judgment on the verdict.

The question is also presented as to whether the evidence adduced at the trial upon the subject of wanton misconduct was such as warranted the trial court in submitting that issue to the jury. Following the rendition of a verdict for the plaintiff, the court overruled a motion for a new trial and entered judgment on the verdict. From this judgment the present appeal has been taken.

The plaintiff in the trial court, the appellee here, one Bessie Hottel, while riding as a guest in an automobile owned and driven by the defendant, J. Harold Read (appellant), received severe personal injuries in a collison between the automobile in which she was riding as a guest and another car on the highway. Her right to recover under the facts of this case can be only upon sufficient proof of wanton misconduct of the defendant in the operation of his car, and such wanton misconduct the proximate cause of the accident. See Section 6308-6, General Code, which provides:

'The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

On the morning of February 24, 1938, the appellant, with three passengers, one of whom was the appellee, drove his automobile from his home near West Salem, into the city of Ashland, and from there onto state highway No. 42, which runs in a generally easterly and westerly direction, toward Mansfield, and in the general direction of Lima, in which latter city all were to attend a convention.

After the car had proceeded over the crest of a hill approximately five miles from Ashland, the defendant observed a passenger bus ahead of him, proceeding in the same direction down the hill. He then observed that the bus was proceeding at a very slow rate of speed, preparatory to stopping to pick up a passenger, and, after first attempting to slow his own car so that he could remain behind the bus, he discovered that the slippery condition of the pavement prevented him from so doing; and, to avoid a collision with the bus, he attempted to pass it by turning his car to the left on the three-lane highway. This movement caused his car to skid, and, while skidding, it collided with a car proceeding in the opposite direction. The accident occurred on the defendant's left side of the highway while his car was skidding sideways and out of control.

The evidence most favorable to the appellee showed that the highway was covered with a sheet of ice which made travel most difficult; that the appellant drove his car at a rate of speed of between 40 and 50 miles an hour; that other vehicles on the highway proceeded mush slower, due to the icy condition of the highway; and that the appellant was familiar with the route and knew of the hill upon which the accident occurred.

The following is quoted from appellee's brief, and is fairly supported by evidence:

'Mr. Read was familiar with the road and with the hill on which the accident happened, but, nevertheless, knowing of a long, steep hill, knowing that he was traveling on clear sheet ice, he proceeded without slackening his speed along the road, over the crest of the hill and down the hill. Coming down the hill without slackening speed, Mr. Read then sees a bus ahead of him, with two wheels off the road on the berm, proceeding at a very slow speed. At that moment he attempts to avoid the inevitable crash. His car swerves across the road and into an automobile approaching from the opposite direction.'

As heretofore stated, the foregoing recital depicts evidence most favorable to the plaintiff's case. There was evidence adduced by the defendant which tended to controvert some of it. However, on this appeal we concern ourselves only with the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, and the quaere is--Is it sufficient to establish a situation such as warranted submission to the jury of the issue of wanton misconduct?

It should first be observed that this case contains none of the features of those cases of wanton misconduct where the physical condition and reckless conduct of the operator of a motor vehicle constitute the peril or impending danger. See Fischer v. Faflik, 52 Ohio App. 69, at page...

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