Hough v. City of North Adams

Decision Date16 October 1907
PartiesHOUGH v. CITY OF NORTH ADAMS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Oct 16, 1907.

COUNSEL

W. F Barrington, for petitioner.

John H Mack and P.J. Ashe, for respondent.

OPINION

RUGG, J.

This is a petition for the abatement of taxes for the year 1905. The property taxes consisted of land, buildings and machinery of a mill known as the Johnson-Dunbar Company. The Johnson-Dunbar Company was a foreign corporation, and this property had been assessed to it as owner prior to 1905, and it was so assessed for that year. On October 10, 1904, the Johnson-Dunbar Company was adjudicated a bankrupt, and on November 30, 1904, one Squires was appointed trustee of said bankrupt, both the adjudication and appointment having been recorded on January 6, 1905, in the registry of deeds for Northern Berkshire within the district in which the property was situated. On April 13, 1905, the Commercial Trust Company of New Jersey, a foreign corporation, mortgagee named in a mortgage given to it by the Johnson-Dunbar Company upon said property in 1901, entered for the purpose of foreclosing the mortgage, a certificate thereof being recorded in said registry of deeds, and duly foreclosed the mortgage, and on June 23, 1905, conveyed by deed all the property in question to the petitioner, which deed was duly recorded July 17, 1905. The tax bill for 1905 was sent to the petitioner, who was not a resident of this commonwealth, and who on October 2, 1905, paid the tax under protest in writing, and on September 30, 1905, made application to the assessors for an abatement, which was refused. The question raised is whether under these circumstances the petitioner is 'a person aggrieved by the taxes assessed upon him,' within the meaning of these words as used in section 73, chapter 12, of the Revised Laws, so as to enable him to maintain a petition for the abatement of taxes. As used in this statute, the words 'a person aggrieved' mean one whose pecuniary interests are or may be adversely affected. A similar meaning is given to nearly the same words in certain statutes relating to appeals. Pierce v. Gould, 143 Mass. 234, 9 N.E. 568. The inquiry then is whether the assessment of the tax in question could work any harm to the property rights of the petitioner.

It is stated in the petition that the trustee in bankruptcy conveyed the interest acquired by him by operation of the bankruptcy act to one Gluck on March 17, 1905, subject to said mortgage. The answer to the petition is, in substance, a general denial, and, although it is stated in the report that the pleadings may be referred to, yet there is no finding in the report as to this conveyance, and it cannot therefore be regarded for the purposes of this decision. If this be the fact, the assessment to Johnson-Dunbar Company on May 1, 1905, was void, and no valid action could be founded upon it. Desmond v. Babbitt, 117 Mass. 233; Tobin v. Gillespie, 152 Mass. 219, 25 N.E. 88. We must, however, assume that the only change in the record title between May 1, 1904, and May 1, 1905, was the adjudication in bankruptcy of the Johnson-Dunbar Company. Under these circumstances the situation of the title was the same as it would have been under a deed of conveyance from the bankrupt to his trustee. It does not appear whether the certificate of entry of the Commercial Trust Company of New Jersey, under its mortgage, was recorded before or after the 1st of May, 1905. In any event, its only effect was to authorize the assessors to make the assessment to the mortgagee in possession, and as no attempt was made to do this, this circumstance may be disregarded. Under the federal bankruptcy act (Act Cong. July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 565 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3451]), 'the trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, * * * shall be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudicated a bankrupt, * * * to all * * * (5) property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have...

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