Houghtaling v. Com.
| Decision Date | 14 October 1968 |
| Citation | 163 S.E.2d 560,209 Va. 309 |
| Parties | Raymond M. HOUGHTALING, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Humes J. Franklin, Sr., Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Waynesboro (J. B. Stombock; Franklin, Poindexter & Franklin, Waynesboro, on brief), for plaintiff in error.
William P. Bagwell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.
Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO, GORDON and HARRISON, JJ.
Raymond M. Houghtaling, Jr., the defendant, was convicted by the jury of murder in the first degree of Carol L. Taft, and his punishment was fixed at life imprisonment. To the final order confirming the conviction and imposing the sentence, the defendant was granted a writ of error.
The evidence shows that the defendant and Mrs. Taft had lived together illicitly as man and wife in the city of Waynesboro for several years and that she had not obtained a divorce from her husband, who resided in New York State. The defendant treated Mrs. Taft 'like a queen * * * until she wanted to go home and back to her family,' and then 'she was in danger.' He had said 'several times' that 'he'd never let her go back to her husband, he'd kill her first.'
On August 20, 1966, the defendant telephoned Mrs. Taft's mother, Mrs. Helen Johncox, at her home in Waynesboro, and asked her 'to collect some money, so that him and Carol could leave the City.' Mrs. Johncox 'picked up' the defendant's 15-year-old daughter, Patty, and they drove to the appointed place and collected the money.
Mrs. Johncox became alarmed over something Patty told her during the trip, and she called the police 'to get protection for Carol.'
Mrs. Johncox and Patty met the defendant and Mrs. Taft at the parking lot of B & B Buick, and the police arrived at about the same time. The police officers placed Mrs. Taft in the police cruiser and conversed with her. They then took her to police headquarters; and the defendant, Mrs. Johncox, and Patty followed.
At police headquarters, Mrs. Taft was taken 'in a room alone' for a conference, while her mother, the defendant, and Patty waited in the lounge. At the end of the conference, the officers told the defendant that Mrs. Taft 'wanted to go back to New York' and that he should let her 'go back where she belonged.' He 'acted like he agreed with them.'
The defendant, Mrs. Taft, Mrs. Johncox, Patty, and several police officers then went to the parking lot in front of police headquarters, and the defendant helped remove Mrs. Taft's clothes from his car and place them in Mrs. Johncox's automobile. The defendant asked Mrs. Taft if she had money for bus fare, and when she replied in the negative, he stated that he would go to his shop to 'get her some money.' He asked Mrs. Taft to accompany him, but Mrs. Johncox said, 'no we will wait here for you to bring the money.' The defendant left in his car, and the police officers returned to their building.
Mrs. Taft, Patty, and Mrs. Johncox entered the latter's automobile, with Mrs. Taft sitting on the passenger's side of the front seat, Patty in the middle, and Mrs. Johncox under the steering wheel.
The defendant returned in about 20 minutes, alighted from his car, and walked to the side of the Johncox vehicle where Mrs. Taft was seated. He 'dropped' a bank deposit bag in Mrs. Taft's lap and asked her, 'are you going to kiss me good-bye?' When she made no reply, he leaned through the window and kissed her. He stepped back and shot her in the head with a revolver, causing her death. He then turned the weapon on himself and fired into his own head, causing the loss of one eye and partial blindness in the other.
The bank deposit bag which the defendant 'dropped' in Mrs. Taft's lap was later found to contain no moeny, 'just paper.'
The defendant alleged insanity as a defense, and he contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion made by his court-appointed counsel to 'furnish funds for employment by defendant of an independent expert witness to aid in the determination of his mental condition and the preparation of his defense of temporary insanity.' The defendant argues that 'unless defense counsel in the case of an indigent accused, who has pleaded insanity, is given the aid of a psychiatrist, there can be no illusion of an 'adequate' opportunity to present the insanity defense or of 'substantial equality' in an adversary procedural system orientated towards a fair trial.' The refusal of such assistance, the defendant says, is 'a denial of equal protection and due process of law.'
We are of opinion that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion. There was no duty upon the Commonwealth to provide the defendant with funds to employ phychiatric assistance.
Following the tragic events of August 20, 1966, the defendant was hospitalized in the Ophthalmology Service of the University of Virginia Hospital for treatment of his self-inflicted wounds. On August 29, he was transferred to the Psychiatric Service because he was 'profoundly depressed.'
Then on September 7, he was committed by the Civil and Police Court for the City of Waynesboro to Southwestern State Hospital at Marion for observation and report, the court having before it the written recommendation of Dr. J. Powell Anderson, the defendant's own physician, that 'further hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital (is) highly desirable if not mandatory.' Dr. Anderson's report showed that he had conferred with one of the defendant's attending physicians at the University of Virginia Hospital.
On November 18, 1966, Southwestern State reported to the Civil and Police Court that the defendant was not psychotic or insane, and he was returned for trial.
In the court below, the defendant called as a witness Dr. Bernard H. Kasinoff, a psychiatrist in private practice in Stauton and also Director of the Valley Mental Health Center. The record shows that defense counsel were in communication with Dr. Kasinoff 'about ten days' before trial and that they provided him at that time with 'a report in letter form' from Southwestern State Hospital. On the day before trial, Dr. Kasinoff reviewed the records of the Psychiatric Service of the University of Virginia Hospital; and on the morning of trial, he reviewed the records of Southwestern State, which included a report that the defendant was 'diagnosed with a psychiatric disease * * * in one of the state hospitals in the State of New York' in 1942. Dr. Kasinoff did not examine the defendant personally, but testified at length about his condition, based upon the records he had seen.
Two psychiatrists and a psychologist from Southwestern State Hospital testified in behalf of the Commonwealth upon the issue of the defendant's insanity.
Thus, in addition to Dr. Kasinoff, the psychiatrist secured by the defendant, there were available to the defense, for consultation and advice as to the mental condition of the defendant, the three doctors from Southwestern State; Dr. Anderson, the defendant's own physician; and the doctors at the Psychiatric Service of the University of Virginia Hospital, who had treated the defendant while he was a patient there.
The record does not reveal any motion for a continuance asserting the necessity of additional time for defense counsel to consult with the doctors or to permit further psychiatric examination of the defendant. The record does display an intelligent understanding of the subject of insanity on the part of defense counsel and a thoroughness in preparation for trial.
The precise point in issue, arising under similar circumstances, was before the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549, 556 (1953). There, the defendant contended that 'the assistance of a psychiatrist was necessary to afford him adequate counsel' and that 'he should have been given technical pretrial assistance by the State.' The court said, 'We cannot say that the State has that duty by constitutional mandate.' That holding is applicable to and dispositive of the question before us.
The defendant next contends that the trial court 'erred in commenting to the Jury at the...
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