Martini v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 08 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0392-15-4 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | TARA LYNNE MARTINI v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, McCullough and Senior Judge Haley
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
1
Jessica Newton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Tara Martini ("Martini") appeals her conviction for driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), second offense within ten years, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Martini claims the circuit court erred in denying her motion for a court reporter and her various motions to suppress the evidence. Additionally, Martini asserts the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.
Martini first argues that the circuit court erred by denying her request for a court reporter to be provided at the court's expense for all motion hearings and the jury trial. Martini claims that her due process rights were violated because transcripts of her pre-trial proceedings were necessary to prepare for trial and to impeach witnesses at trial and because such transcripts werenecessary for an "adequate" appeal. "On appeal, constitutional arguments present questions of law that this Court reviews de novo." Crawford v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 84, 97, 704 S.E.2d 107, 115 (2011).
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized "constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection" in holding that indigent defendants are entitled to the basic tools necessary to prepare an adequate defense or appeal when those tools are available to others for a price. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). The Supreme Court of Virginia subsequently held that refusing an indigent defendant a free transcript of the trial court record in order to perfect an appeal constituted a denial of fundamental constitutional rights. Cabaniss v. Cunningham, 206 Va. 330, 334-35, 143 S.E.2d 911, 913-14 (1965). Later, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified that, "the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). The Britt Court concluded that where the defendant had "an informal alternative which appear[ed] to be substantially equivalent to a transcript," the lower court did not err in denying him a free transcript. Id. at 230. "In determining whether a defendant needs a free transcript, two factors are relevant: '(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.'" Anderson v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 208, 211, 450 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1994) (quoting Britt, 404 U.S. at 227).
In this case, the value of a transcript to Martini is not contested by the Commonwealth. Instead, the key inquiry is whether an alternative device was available and fulfilled the same function as a transcript. The circuit court allowed Martini's counsel to audio record any proceedings in the case using her own recording device. The majority of the proceedings relatedto Martini's case were in fact recorded by counsel, with the exception of one hearing that was recorded by the recording system in the courtroom, and portions of the proceedings that were not recorded when Martini's recorder stopped working. Importantly, Rule 5A:8(c) permits a statement of facts to be used in lieu of transcripts on appeal. The parties can submit written facts to the circuit court, which can address objections to the facts by the parties and approve a final statement of facts. See Rule 5A:8(c)-(d); see also Houghtaling v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 315, 163 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1968) ().
On April 9, 2015, Martini noted her appeal in circuit court and filed a proposed statement of facts pursuant to Rule 5A:8. In response, the Commonwealth submitted a proposed statement of facts as well as the audio recordings of the pretrial hearings and trial. After a hearing, the circuit court approved a statement of facts, which has been provided to this Court. To the extent the parties disputed the statement of facts, the audio recordings made by Martini, the courtroom recordings, and the personal notes and memories of the parties were available to the circuit court to resolve any disputes. Although Martini contends, on brief, that the statement of facts was "highly contested by the parties," Martini had only minor non-substantive objections to the prosecutor's proposed statement of facts, which arguably provided more detail than the statement of facts submitted by Martini.
Notably, Martini did not object to the final statement of facts approved by the circuit court below, nor did she specify in her brief why the statement of facts that was presented to this Court was inadequate for appellate review. See Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 8, 13, 548 S.E.2d 230, 232-33 (2001) (). Instead, Martini essentially argues that transcripts are preferable to a statement of facts.
Martini relies on Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971), to support her argument that she was entitled to a court reporter and a transcript of the proceedings. In Mayer, the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that an "appellant cannot be denied a 'record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper consideration of his claims." Id. at 198. However, the Court cautioned that "this does not mean that [appellant] is automatically entitled to a full verbatim transcript." Id. The Mayer Court then noted that in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Court had noted that a claim of insufficient evidence could not "be fairly judged without recourse to the trial record." Id. The Mayer Court continued, "the State of Washington did not undertake to carry its burden of showing that something less than a complete transcript would suffice." Id. at 198-99. Thus, because the record before the Court in Draper was not clear whether an agreed statement of facts would have been adequate, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision. Id. at 199.
The Draper Court specifically held:
[A] State need not purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy it. Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement based perhaps on the trial judge's minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's untranscribed notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, equally as good as a transcript.
372 U.S. at 495 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Mayer does not stand for the proposition that a court reporter and full verbatim transcript is mandatory. To the contrary, Mayer madeclear that an agreed statement of facts can constitute a "record of sufficient completeness" as required by the Constitution.
Thus, we hold that the audio recordings of the hearings coupled with the statement of facts approved by the circuit court pursuant to Rule 5A:8(d) served the "same functions as a transcript," both at trial and on appeal. See Britt, 404 U.S. at 227. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying Martini's request for a court reporter.
Martini's second, third, and fourth assignments of error claim the circuit court erred in denying her various motions to suppress evidence including the certificate of blood analysis, the statements Martini made to police at the scene of the accident, and the fruits of her arrest, which she contends was not supported by probable cause.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, this Court views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from it." Sabo v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 63, 69, 561 S.E.2d 761, 764 (2002). This Court is "bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). "However, we consider de novo whether those facts implicate the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the officers unlawfully infringed upon an area protected by the Fourth Amendment." Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 454, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000) (en banc). Thus, "we determine whether the accused has met his burden to show that the trial court's ruling, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was reversible error." Roberts v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 146, 150, 684 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2009).
Martini's second assignment of error asserts that the circuit court erred in declining to suppress the certificate of blood analysis because Martini claims her blood was taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Drawing blood from a person accused of driving while...
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