Houlton Band of Maliseet v. Maine Human Rights Com

• Decision Date: 02 April 1997
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 96-0066-B.
• Parties: HOULTON BAND OF MALISEET INDIANS, Plaintiff, v. MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION and State of Maine, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

960 F.Supp. 449

HOULTON BAND OF MALISEET INDIANS, Plaintiff, v. MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION and State of Maine, Defendants.

Civ. No. 96-0066-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

April 2, 1997.

Gregory P. Dorr, Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, for Plaintiff.

Paul Stern, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, for Defendants.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians ("the Band"), requests declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 from Defendants' denial of the Band's Request for Administrative Dismissal of claims of unlawful employment discrimination against the Band that were filed with the Maine Human Rights Commission ("MHRC"). The Band also seeks declaratory relief from the Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Maine upon which the MHRC based its denial.¹

The Band contends in a three-count Complaint that It possesses an inherent sovereign and/or federally protected statutory right to adjudicate internal tribal matters without interference from the State of Maine, and that its employment decisions constitute internal tribal matters. Thus, the Band argues, the MHRC does not have jurisdiction to entertain the claims of employment discrimination against the Band that are presently before it and, therefore, should have granted the Band's Request for Administrative Dismissal of the claims (Count I). The Band further seeks a declaration that the MHRC's denial of the Band's Request and the Opinion of the Attorney General violate the Band's right to the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II), and further deprive the Band of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III).² The Band also requests in each Count that the Court enter a permanent injunction preventing the MHRC from asserting jurisdiction over the present claims against the Band as well as over future complaints of unlawful employment discrimination against the Band. The Band filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I on November 14, 1996, and Defendants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I on January 15, 1997. For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that the Band is subject to the laws of the State of Maine and, therefore, the MHRC has jurisdiction over claims of unlawful employment discrimination against the Band. Accordingly, the Court denies the Band's Motion as to Count I and grants Defendants' Cross-Motion as to Count I.

I. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate in the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A material fact is one that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law." Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir. 1993). In this process, the Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir., 1995).

II. Background

In October 1995, the Band, a federally recognized band of Indians in Maine, fired ten of its employees for allegedly violating its tribal Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual. The Band contends that the employees participated in a civil disturbance, including taking over the tribal Administration Building, which allegedly caused the regularly conducted business of the Band to be disrupted. After being terminated, four of the former employees filed charges of retaliation or discrimination with the MHRC, claiming they were fired because of their race, in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4632, or for conduct that is protected by the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831-840.³ On December 20, 1995, the Band requested the MHRC to dismiss two of the complaints for lack of jurisdiction On January 2, 1996, the MHRC denied the Band's Request for Administrative Dismissal, basing its decision on an Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Maine dated August 6, 1994. The Attorney General had expressly stated that the MHRC has jurisdiction over claims of unlawful employment discrimination against the Band. It is the MHRC's denial of the Band's Request for Administrative Dismissal and the Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Maine that are the subjects of this suit.

III. The Maine Implementing Act and the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act

The Supreme Court has recognized that although the sovereign powers of Indian tribes are broad, "[t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character." United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). The Court explained:

[Indian tribes' sovereignty] exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.

Id. In other words, Indian tribes retain their sovereignty solely at the will of Congress. "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). It is upon this backdrop that the Court examines the extent to which Congress has limited the Band's otherwise sovereign rights, and, ultimately, if the Band retains the right to be free from state interference with claims of unlawful employment discrimination.

In 1979, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation entered into a settlement agreement with the State of Maine regarding land claims disputes ("the Maine Implementing Act" or "the Agreement"). See 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 6201-6214. In addition to settling the land claims disputes, the Agreement also sets forth the legal status of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the Band with regard to the State. For instance, the Agreement provides that "[t]he Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians and its lands will be wholly subject to the laws of the State." Id. § 6202. The Agreement also states:

Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all Indians, Indian nations, and tribes and bands of Indians in the State ... shall be subject to the laws of the State and to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State to the same extent as any other person or lands or other natural resources therein.

Id. § 6204. As this section makes explicit, the Band is subject to the laws of the State of Maine unless there is an exemption elsewhere in the Agreement. There is no exemption for the Band from coverage under the Maine Human Rights Act.

The Agreement, moreover, specifically provides that the internal tribal matters of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation "shall not be subject to regulation by the State." Id. § 6206(1).⁴ The Band, however, is glaringly absent from this exemption. Moreover, the Agreement declares:

The Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians shall not exercise nor enjoy the powers, privileges and immunities of a municipality nor exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction within their lands, prior to the enactment of additional legislation specifically authorizing the exercise of those governmental powers.

Id. § 6206-A (emphasis added). There has not been additional legislation that permits the Band to exercise civil or criminal jurisdiction within its lands.

Only Congress has the plenary authority to limit the sovereign rights of Indian groups. Accordingly, in 1980, Congress passed the Maine Indian Cairns Settlement Act (also referred to as "the Act"). See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735. The Act ratified the Agreement between the Penobscot Nation, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the State of Maine, and confirmed "that all other Indians, Indian nations and tribes and bands of Indians now or hereafter existing or recognized in the State of Maine are and shall be subject to all laws of the State of Maine, as provided herein." Id. § 1721(b)(3), (4). Most significantly, the Act states:

Except as provided in section 1727(e) and section 1724(d)(4) of this title, all Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians in the State of Maine, other than the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and their members .... shall be subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, the laws of the State, and the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State, to the same extent as any other person or land therein.

Id. § 1725(a) (emphasis added). Section 1727(e) concerns the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and § 1724(d)(4) pertains to the possibility of future agreements between the Band and the State of Maine permitting the acquisition of land by the United States in trust for the Band. Id. §§ 1727(e), 1724(d)(4). Section 1724(d)(4) provides, however, that "such agreement shall not include any other provisions regarding the enforcement or application of the laws of the State of Maine." Id. § 1724(d)(4). Neither § 1727(e) nor § 1724(d)(4), therefore, exempts the Band from "internal tribal matters" or from the civil law of the State that is within the jurisdiction of the MHRC.

The Act further states that the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the Band may sue and be sued in the courts of the State of Maine to the same extent as any other person in the State; however, "the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and their officers and employees shall be immune from suit to the extent provided in the Maine Implementing Act." Id. § 1725(d)(1). It is noteworthy that § 1725 does not create a similar exemption for the Band. The First Circuit has held: ...