Houren v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1908
• Citation: 236 Ill. 620,86 N.E. 611
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: HOUREN v. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

236 Ill. 620

86 N.E. 611

HOUREN

v.CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 15, 1908.

Appeal from Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; John W. Houston, Judge.

Action by Thomas F. Houren against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (139 Ill. App. 116) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.O. W. Dynes (John A. Russell, of counsel), for appellant.

Bates, Harding & Atkins, for appellee.

This is an appeal by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company from a judgment of the Branch Appellate Court for the First District affirming a judgment for the sum of $600 recovered by Thomas F. Houren for his own use and for the use of the Buffalo Commercial Insurance Company, appellee, in the municipal court of Chicago, in an action for damages for the destruction of a dwelling house owned by appellee by fire, which destruction is alleged to have been caused by the negligence of appellant. The Branch Appellate Court granted to appellant a certificate of importance. The negligence of appellant charged by appellee is set out in the following bill of particulars filed in the municipal court: ‘Plaintiff's claim is for loss and damage by fire sustained by him to his frame building which formerly stood on rear of lot 12, block 21, being the northwest corner of Sixty-Third and Bloomingdale avenues, Chicago, Cook county, Ill. (Galewood), and which was destroyed by fire on the morning of October 3, 1906, through no fault or neglect of the plaintiff, but by reason of the negligence of the defendant in blocking and closing of the crossing at Sixty-Third avenue and said defendant's railroad tracks, in the said city of Chicago, Cook county, Ill., by leaving and permitting to remain across said public highway a train consisting of a large number of freight cars belonging to or in the charge, custody, and control of the defendant, whereby the fire department of the said city of Chicago were detained and prevented from passing over said public highway for a long space of time, and in the meantime the fire, which was in an adjacent building, was communicated to the plaintiff's building and destroyed and damaged same, whereas, had the said fire department been able to pass over said crossing upon arriving there, the fire would have been extinguished before it was communicated to plaintiff's property, and by reason of such negligence’, etc. Ad damunm $950.

From the record it appears that the building in question was located about 150 feet west of Sixty-Third avenue, on the north side of Bloomingdale road, in the city of Chicago. It was a small frame cottage. On the west side of this cottage were two frame cottages, each of about the same size as this one. The three were separated by spaces of six feet. At about 1:40 o'clock on the morning of October 3, 1906, the building west of the one here involved was discovered to be on fire. The nearest station of the fire department in this part of the city was located about three miles east. Within five minutes after the fire was discovered an alarm was received at this station, and the men of the department, with an engine, hose cart, truck, and other appliances started at once for the fire. Both the burning building and the station of the fire department were located on the south side of the railroad tracks of appellant, which ran east and west through this portion of the city. While the shortest route from the station to the fire would have been at all times on the south side of the railway tracks, in order to secure a better road the firemen drove north on Grand avenue until they reached a street north of appellant's tracks, where they turned west. When they turned south, they came to a crossing of the appellant's tracks a short distance north of the fire. They found this crossing blockaded by box cars to which no engine was attached, extending two blocks east and one block west of the crossing. The cars were coupled together and the brakes were set. Evidence was offered by appellant which tended to show that its track from this point east for some distance was considerably downgrade, and that by uncoupling the train at the crossing and releasing the brakes on the cars those upon and east of the crossing would have moved east without the aid of an engine and the crossing could have thus been opened. With the firemen at the crossing were two policemen, who testified that they knew of these facts and had seen cars moved at this point in that way. The fire apparatus reached the crossing at 10 minutes after 2 o'clock. The firemen immediately notified appellant to remove the cars from the crossing, and it was about 30 minutes later when the engine of the appellant arrived and made an opening at the crossing to let the firemen through. In the meantime Houren's house had taken fire, and was entirely destroyed before the firemen could control the fire. This house took fire about 2:35 o'clock, and it is not disputed that if the crossing had not been blockaded, the firemen would have reached the scene of the fire about 2:12 o'clock. It was a damp, foggy night, and there was no wind blowing. Immediately east of the burning buildings, on the corner of the same block, was located a two-way fire hydrant, to which the firemen attached hose after they arrived. At the close of all the evidence the court denied the motion of appellant for a directed verdict. A number of errors have been assigned. appellee.

SCOTT, J. (after stating the facts as above).

In support of the motion for a directed verdict, it is said that there is no evidence tending to show that the obstruction of the street by the appellant was the proximate cause of the destruction of the house owned by Houren. Section 77, c. 114, Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, forbids a railroad company obstructing a public highway, by stopping any train thereon, for a longer period than 10 minutes. Appellant's train was standing over...