House v. Cullman County

• Decision Date: 24 January 1992
• Citation: 593 So.2d 69
• Parties: Ronald David HOUSE v. CULLMAN COUNTY, et al. 89-1763.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 69

593 So.2d 69

Ronald David HOUSE v. CULLMAN COUNTY, et al.

89-1763.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Jan. 24, 1992.

J. Doyle Fuller, Montgomery, and John Percy Oliver II of Oliver & Sims, Dadeville, and John David Knight, Cullman, for appellant.

Dan J. Willingham, Cullman, for appellee Cullman County.

Robert E. Parsons, Birmingham, for appellee City of Hanceville.

B. Don Hale, Cullman, for appellees City of Cullman and Clarice Shafer.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Mary Elizabeth Culberson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees Robert Bates and Jeanelle Raney.

ADAMS, Justice.

Ronald House, as a class-action representative, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint challenging the constitutionality of an act authorizing certain costs to be levied against him by the District Court of Cullman County. We affirm.

On July 26, 1989, Mr. House was convicted in the Cullman County District Court of speeding. The district court assessed fines and court costs against him in the amount of $303.50. Included in that amount were costs authorized by Act No. 86-113, 1986 Ala. Acts 135, and charged "[i]n addition to all other costs and charges in criminal cases in any court of Cullman County." Those charges included (1) $6 for use by the juvenile probation division and (2) $5 for use by the county sheriff's office "in connection with administrative duties performed for the courts."

Mr. House, on behalf of himself and others similarly affected by Act No. 86-113, sued Cullman County; Robert Bates, Cullman County Circuit Court Clerk; the City of Cullman; the Clerk of Cullman Municipal Court; the City of Hanceville; the Clerk of the City of Hanceville; and Jeanelle Raney, Clerk of the Cullman County District Court. In this suit, House challenged the constitutionality of the legislation authorizing the charges on the ground that the act, which provided for the additional assessment of fees and charges of court applicable only to Cullman County, violated Ala. Const. 1901, art. IV, §§ 96 and 105. He also sought a refund of the challenged charges and injunctive relief.

The defendants filed motions to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. On July 20, 1990, the trial judge dismissed the action, citing as the ground for dismissal the ratification of Amendment 137 to the Alabama Constitution. The sole issue presented for review is whether Act No. 86-113, which authorizes a charge of $11 for use by the juvenile probation division and the county sheriff's office, is repugnant to §§ 96 and 105 of the Alabama Constitution, Amendment No. 137 notwithstanding.

SECTION 96

Ala. Const. 1901, § 96, provides that "[t]he legislature shall not enact any law not applicable to all the counties in the state, regulating costs and charges of courts, or fees, commissions or allowances of public officers." There is no serious dispute that the additional charges authorized by Act No. 86-113 fall squarely within the scope of § 96. Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1982) (fees designated for sheriff's department fund and for maintenance of the county jail are charges of court within purview of § 96); see also Birmingham Electric Co. v. Harry, 215 Ala. 458, 111 So. 41 (1926) (law library fee a charge of court within purview of § 96). Indeed, were it not for the fact that the people of Alabama, on December 27, 1957, ratified Amendment 137 to the Constitution, we would have no difficulty in holding that § 96 of the Constitution mandates a reversal of the judgment of the trial court. Amendment 137, however, provides:

"The legislature may from time to time, by general or local laws, fix, alter, and regulate the costs and charges of courts in Cullman County, and the fees, commissions, percentages, allowance, and compensation of any officer of Cullman county, and may change the method or basis of compensating any officer of Cullman county, including the power to place any such officer on a salary and to provide for the fees, commissions, percentages, or allowances collectible by such officer to be paid into the treasury from which his salary is paid."

(Emphasis added.)

The disposition of this case turns on the proper construction of the phrase "costs and charges of courts." The appellee construes the phrase as removing the constitutional impediment to the passage of Act No. 86-113. The appellant, however, insists that Amendment 137, and the contested phrase in particular, "is nothing more than another of the many constitutional amendments passed over the years to convert public officials from a fee basis of compensation to a salary basis." Brief of Appellant, at 10-11.

The appellant contends that his interpretation of Amendment 137 is necessitated by this Court's construction, in Green v. Austin, 425 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1982), of Amendment 344 to the Alabama Constitution, and our determination of the effect of that amendment on statutes similar to those under consideration in this case. We agree that Green supports the appellant's contention. However, the rationale in that case is inconsistent with the language in a number of opinions issued by this Court. Consequently, in reviewing the constitutionality of Act No. 86-113, we are compelled to re-examine a number of opinions issued by this Court and to undertake a thorough analysis of the legislative and constitution-making activity bearing on this important issue.

We begin by reaffirming a number of fundamental principles of constitutional and statutory construction. First, "[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we 'approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government.' " Moore v. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala.1991) (quoting Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945). A second and related principle holds: "Where the validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible interpretations In construing a provision of the Constitution, it must be remembered that constitutions "deal with larger topics [than statutes] and are couched in broader phrase than legislative acts." Realty Investment Co. v. City of Mobile, 181 Ala. 184, 187, 61 So. 248, 249 (1913). For this reason, a " 'Constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common-law instrument, or statute.' " Realty Investment Co., 181 Ala. at 187, 61 So. at 249 (quoting Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859)) (emphasis added). ¹

                by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional and by the other would be valid, the courts should adopt the construction which would uphold it."  McAdory, 246 Ala. at 10, 18 So.2d at 815.   In other words, "it is the duty of the courts to adopt the construction of a statute to bring it into harmony with the constitution, if its language will permit."  Id.  See also Home Indem. Co. v. Anders, 459 So.2d 836 (Ala.1984);  Crosslin v. City of Muscle Shoals, 436 So.2d 862 (Ala.1983);  Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 16 So.2d 511 (1944)
                

In searching for the proper construction of Amendment 137, we must first examine the language of the provision itself. It is undisputed that when drafting the phrase authorizing the passage of local laws "fix[ing], alter[ing], and regulat[ing] the costs and charges of courts in Cullman county," the framers of Amendment 137 were attempting to alter the effect of § 96 of the Constitution, which prohibits the legislature from "enact[ing] any law not applicable to all the counties in the state, regulating costs and charges of courts." The appellant contends that the phrase "costs and charges of courts" as used in § 96 prohibits the extra charges assessed pursuant to Act No. 86-113. Paradoxically, he insists that the identical phrase in Amendment No. 137 does not address these same charges. The question thus becomes whether the phrase "costs and charges of courts," as it appears in Amendment 137, carries the same import as the identical phrase does in § 96.

A phrase that is used repeatedly in statutory provisions relating to the same object or subject matter shall "be interpreted to have the same meaning" throughout. See 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §§ 232-33, at 415-16 (1974). This rule applies with particular force in the construction of provisions of the Constitution, where "[e]ach section ... must necessarily be considered in pari materia with all other sections." Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 119 (Ala.1981); Opinion of the Justices, 333 So.2d 125 (Ala.1976). Moreover, "where, in a constitution or statute, a word or phrase is repeated, and in one instance its meaning is definite and clear, and in the other it is susceptible of two meanings, it will be presumed to have been employed in the former sense." State ex rel. Meyer v. Greene, 154 Ala. 249, 46 So. 268 (1908); see also Lehman v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 235 (1877). This phrase appears not only in both § 96 and in Amendment 137, but also in at least 32 other constitutional amendments authorizing local legislation regulating "costs and charges of courts." In addition to these amendments, our present constitution contains at least 35 amendments, which, although they do not include the specific phrase at issue here, nevertheless authorize the regulation of additional court costs or fees, as well as "fees, commissions or allowances of public officers" through legislation applying only to individual counties. Consequently, we consider a comparison of the language of these various amendments relevant in an attempt to ascertain the intent of the framers of Amendment 137.

It is not only possible, but expedient, on the basis of terminology and subject matter, to group these various amendments into four general categories. The first category, Type I, contains the largest number Type II encompasses the...