House v. JEFFERSON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
Decision Date | 11 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 1031179.,1031179. |
Citation | 907 So.2d 424 |
Parties | Christopher Layne HOUSE v. JEFFERSON STATE COMMUNITY COLLEGE et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Talitha Powers Bailey, Birmingham, for appellant.
William D. Jones III and Shayana Boyd Davis of Johnston Barton Proctor & Powell, L.L.P., Birmingham, for appellees.
Christopher Layne House sued Jefferson State Community College and its president, Dr. Judy Merritt; he also named as defendants Dr. Fred Gainous, chancellor of the Alabama Department of Postsecondary Education, and six members of the State Board of Education (hereinafter the defendants will be referred to collectively as "Jeff State"). The crux of House's complaint was that Jefferson State Community College had improperly terminated his employment by terminating him without a due-process hearing. On January 21, 2004, the trial court, in response to a motion filed by Jeff State, entered a summary judgment for Jeff State. House filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied, and House appealed.
The relevant facts appear to be undisputed. On March 2, 2001, House was employed by Jefferson State Community College as a computer-science instructor. He was employed pursuant to a written contract of employment that he had accepted on October 19, 2000. The contract clearly provided that House was employed in a probationary status, stating, in pertinent part:
"Probationary appointment is made pursuant to The Alabama College System Policy Manual, effective December 8, 1994, policy number 619.01, section 3.1 and the subsequent Memorandum # 95-LGL-119 which states `... the employing authority may remove an employee by furnishing said employee written notification at least fifteen (15) calendar days prior to the effective date of termination.'"
Policy number 619.01 is the Revised Hearing Procedure adopted by the State Board of Education. Section 3.1 of policy number 619.01 provides, in pertinent part:
Memorandum number 95-LGL-119 is Chancellor Gainous's official interpretation of policy number 619.01. That memorandum states, in pertinent part:
On March 2, 2001, Jefferson State Community College furnished House written notification that his employment would terminate on March 17, 2001. House was given no reason for the termination of his employment and was not afforded the opportunity for a hearing under the Revised Hearing Procedure set forth in policy number 619.01.
Jeff State's summary-judgment motion was based on its contention that House, as a probationary employee, had no right to a hearing on his termination and that his employment could be terminated for any reason, without cause. House was, according to Jeff State, properly terminated when he was given the 15-day written notice of termination. In response to Jeff State's summary-judgment motion, House argued, in pertinent part, that his termination had violated the rights given him under section 3.14 of policy number 619.01. Specifically, he argued that, according to section 3.14, he was "entitled to be given cause and the opportunity for a hearing," because he was "a probationary employee under contract [who was] terminated within the period of [the] contract."
Section 3.14 unambiguously provides that "[i]f a probationary employee under contract is terminated within the period of a contract, the employee is entitled to be given cause and the opportunity for a hearing" (emphasis added). However, the trial court concluded that House was employed, not under a contract for a specific period, but, instead, under "an open-ended letter of appointment." Thus, citing Chancellor Gainous's interpretation of section 3.13 in memorandum number 95-LGL-119, the trial court concluded "that any college employee who is under an open-ended letter of appointment [can] be notified that employment would be...
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