House v. State

• Decision Date: 02 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 86S00-8605-CR-456,86S00-8605-CR-456
• Parties: Jeff HOUSE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 103

535 N.E.2d 103

Jeff HOUSE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 86S00-8605-CR-456.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 2, 1989.

Kenneth J. Fishman, Daniel Patrick Leonard, Bailey & Fishman, Boston, Mass., Forrest Bowman, Jr., Bowman, Tucker & Emery, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Gary Damon Secrest, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant John House was convicted in a jury trial of Murder, and received a sixty (60) year sentence. His Motion to Correct Errors was denied, and he directly appeals to this court.

House raises the following issues on appeal:

1. whether he was denied due process of law when the State failed to disclose possibly exculpatory evidence;

2. trial court error in permitting the State's main witness to invoke the marital communications privilege;

3. trial court error in admitting hearsay statements of two witnesses;

4. trial court error in admitting evidence of possible drug use by House as part of the res gestae of the crime; and

5. trial court error in admitting certain instructions tendered by the State.

The facts most favorable to the verdict show that Donald Hulsey, the victim, was last seen alive at approximately 1:15 a.m. on June 3, 1979. Later that day at approximately 2:00 p.m., his brutally beaten corpse was found in a field in Warren County, Indiana. The cause of death was multiple and massive skull fractures from blows with a blunt instrument. A homemade club fashioned out of a hollow metal table leg filled with gravel and secured with tape was found nearby. The club was bent; blood and hair found on the club matched Donald Hulsey's. The murder was unresolved for nearly six (6) years.

In those years, however, House made some apparently serious "confessions" to the murder, and would then state he was only joking. In April 1985, Jon Wood confessed to participating in the murder, and implicated House, Scott Talbott, and Jeff Wilson. At trial, Wood testified he attended a party at the Wilson residence in Warren County on the evening of June 2, 1979. He stated he left the party at around 12:30 a.m. with House, Talbott, and Wilson to buy more beer. House was driving his car and the others were passengers. The group smoked marijuana and drank beer. Some time during their trip they began discussing finding a "queer" to beat up. They drove around a park and spotted Donald Hulsey by a phone booth. The car stopped and the passengers had a conversation with Hulsey. For some reason, he did not get into the car at that point, but voluntarily got into the car after walking to a different spot in the park.

At this time, House was alone in the back seat. When Hulsey got in, House began speaking in an effeminate tone of voice to him. Wood testified that although he didn't actually see what happened next, he heard House punch Hulsey several times, saw House's fists raised, and heard a groan. The driver of the car then stopped near a mausoleum to decide what to do with Hulsey. There is no clear evidence as to whether Hulsey was dead at this point, but at trial Wood stated he doubted whether Hulsey was alive because he was not moving. He also stated at trial he, Wood, was dropped off at Layton's Star Market before the body was disposed of. Wood later learned from Talbott further details of the beating.

Wood was questioned several times about the murder between 1979 and 1985 while incarcerated on drug trafficking charges. Eventually he admitted he was involved in the murder. Also, evidence was admitted at trial which showed Wood's hand was crushed in a paste machine while he was substituting for House at C & D Battery in April, 1979. Wood admitted he had told friends "this is Jeff House's hand." Other evidence showed he stated at certain times he wanted to get House back for the injury.

Bonnie Sherman was the State's other main witness. She dated House during the summer of 1979. She testified she and House attended the Wilson party together, but he brought her home at 11:30 that evening. Sherman stated she went to House's residence the next morning and found him searching through the newspaper for information about a murder. Later that afternoon he and Sherman went out driving around some back roads searching for something. Apparently when he spotted what he was looking for, he instructed her to drive quickly and not look. Sherman said House had "confessed" to killing Donald Hulsey on several occasions, and made it seem like a joke. One time however, he convinced her he was telling the truth.

At the same time Jeff House was being investigated for the murder, the police were also investigating another possible suspect, Harold Hensley. Hensley's brother, Raymond, implicated him in the crime, but throughout the six year investigation gave conflicting versions of events.

I

House first raises on appeal the claim the State denied him a fair trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose possibly exculpatory evidence to him prior to trial. Before trial, defense counsel made a general request for exculpatory evidence which the trial court granted. House claims statements made by Harold and Raymond Hensley should have been furnished.

It is well founded that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. It is also well founded that where defense counsel either makes no request or requests "all Brady material" or "anything exculpatory," any duty on the prosecutor's part must stem from the obviously exculpatory character of the evidence. United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342. The question is to what level of materiality the evidence must rise to render it obviously exculpatory. The mere possibility an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Id. at 109-110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400-2401. However, if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, and it is withheld from the defendant, constitutional error has been committed. This means the omission of the evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. Id. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. However, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. Id. at 112-113, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-2402.

This court adopted the rules set forth in Agurs in Richard v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 607, 382 N.E.2d 899, cert. denied 440 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 1515, 59 L.Ed.2d 781. However, House asserts that the standard of materiality as enunciated in Agurs has been modified in United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, and therefore the trial court erred when it established materiality according to Agurs and Richard. The issue addressed in Bagley concerned the standard of materiality to be applied in determining whether a conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor failed to disclose requested evidence which could have been used to impeach a government witness. The United States Supreme Court determined that impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. The Bagley court held that the prosecution's failure to disclose requested impeachment evidence amounts to constitutional error only if there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494. "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. This standard of materiality is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant regardless of whether the defense makes no request, a general request, or a specific request." The possibility the defendant's case may have been impaired does not necessitate a different standard of materiality, however. The court found that under the formulation in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh. denied (1984), 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864, the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the defendant's preparation or presentation of his case. "The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384.

This decision is in line with the relevant case law in Indiana which requires the defendant to establish the materiality of the evidence as well as any prejudice regarding unavailability of the evidence. See Birkla v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 37, 323 N.E.2d 645, cert. denied 423 U.S. 853, 96 S.Ct. 99, 46 L.Ed.2d 77, and Murray v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1012. House, however, asserts that Bagley sets a new or looser standard of materiality, that being the reasonable probability standard. This according to House, contrasts with the "reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist" standard of Agurs and Richard.

House's attorney was aware, prior to trial, that Harold Hensley was being...