House v. Swedish-American Hosp.
| Decision Date | 19 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-90-0185,2-90-0185 |
| Citation | 564 N.E.2d 922,151 Ill.Dec. 467,206 Ill.App.3d 437 |
| Parties | , 151 Ill.Dec. 467 Betty HOUSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SWEDISHAMERICAN HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James G. Madden, Madden & Sisler, Freeport, for betty house.
Lisa A. Jensen, Hugh C. Griffin, Diane I. Jennings, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Rockford, for SwedishAmerican Hosp.
Plaintiff, Betty House, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Winnebago County directing a verdict in favor of defendant, SwedishAmerican Hospital. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in: (1) refusing to release medical records in defendant's possession to plaintiff; (2) prohibiting plaintiff from deposing, contacting, or disclosing the identity of a patient at the hospital; and (3) improperly excluding certain exhibits from evidence at trial. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On June 14, 1985, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant carelessly and negligently permitted a patient in the hospital to inflict injuries upon her in a hospital lounge on November 30, 1983. On July 15, 1985, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was subsequently granted. On October 25, 1985, plaintiff filed an amended complaint which alleged that defendant "knew or should have known" that the patient was dangerous based upon the patient's "prior conduct."
During the discovery process, plaintiff filed a motion to compel the production of documents, including reports concerning the incident in question and "[a]ny and all documents or writings relating to the condition of the patient" who allegedly injured plaintiff. Defendant filed a response opposing plaintiff's motion, arguing that the requested information was privileged and confidential for several reasons. On November 10, 1988, the trial court ordered defendant to produce the documents for an in camera inspection. After inspecting the documents, the court determined that plaintiff was entitled to discovery of the records because the records were "relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory and that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts sought to be established." The court further found that disclosure was important to further the interests of justice. However, all references identifying the nonparty patient would be eliminated before plaintiff received the documents.
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court's decision, again arguing that the records were confidential. Defendant further argued that deleting identifying information would not assure protection of the patient's identity. On December 30, 1988, the trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider, but modified its previous order to state that defendant was only required to produce the patient's hospital records for the admission during the time in question. The court removed seven pages of these records because the information was confidential and not relevant to the lawsuit. The court further ordered that plaintiff was not entitled to discover records of the patient's prior admissions at the hospital.
On January 6, 1989, the trial court granted plaintiff leave to depose Dr. David Stinson, the patient's psychiatrist. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to prohibit plaintiff from deposing Dr. Stinson. Dr. Stinson also filed a petition to quash the subpoena for his deposition. On June 30, 1989, the trial court denied defendant's motion and Dr. Stinson's petition, but ruled that plaintiff could not elicit testimony concerning the patient's identity.
Following Dr. Stinson's deposition, plaintiff became aware of the patient's identity, apparently due to Dr. Stinson's inadvertent disclosure. Defendant then moved for a protective order. On August 1, 1989, the trial court issued a protective order which prevented plaintiff from contacting, deposing or disclosing the identity of the patient. A trial date of November 7, 1989, was then set. On November 8, 1989, defendant made an oral motion in limine seeking to exclude any testimony relating to the patient's medical records. The court asked plaintiff to make an offer of proof before it ruled on defendant's motion. Plaintiff informed the court that exhibit Nos. 11 through 19 contained the notes of the nurses who treated the nonparty patient. These exhibits contained part of the hospital records released to plaintiff pursuant to the trial court's December 30, 1988, order.
Plaintiff's offer of proof pointed out several instances of the patient's conduct while at the hospital. Included among these instances were situations in which the patient drank cups of hot water, drank water from faucets and toilets, snuck coffee from the dietary cart, removed the IV needle, and was found in the lounge smoking a cigarette. The patient was also restless, was walking in the hallways, and refused to put on her hospital gown. In addition, the patient was agitated and had some "behavioral problems," for which Xanax was prescribed. Based on these events, plaintiff contended that defendant should have known of what the patient "could perhaps do."
The court then ruled that exhibit No. 11 would be admitted, but that Nos. 12 through 19 were inadmissible because they contained confidential information protected under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Mental Health Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 91 1/2, par. 801 et seq.). Plaintiff continued with a summary of the testimony for purposes of the offer of proof, after which defendant orally moved for a directed verdict. Defendant argued that plaintiff could not prove that the patient's alleged assault of plaintiff was in any way foreseeable by defendant. Thus, defendant argued that it in no way acted negligently in failing to prevent the alleged assault. The trial court granted defendant's motion, and this appeal followed.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to release the patient's medical records for previous admissions at SwedishAmerican Hospital. Plaintiff argues that the records of the patient's two previous hospital admissions were relevant on the issue of whether defendant had any prior knowledge of the patient's violent tendencies.
Plaintiff points out that the trial court originally determined that she was entitled to all of the patient's records while the patient was at SwedishAmerican Hospital. However, the court modified this decision following defendant's motion to reconsider and ruled that only the records of the November 1983 admission, excluding seven pages, were discoverable.
Plaintiff's production request was premised on section 8-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 8-402) and Supreme Court Rule 201 (107 Ill.2d R. 201). Section 8-402 of the Code provides, in pertinent part:
"The circuit courts shall have power, in any action pending before them, upon motion, and good and sufficient cause shown * * * to require the parties, or either of them, to produce books or writings in their possession of power which contain evidence pertinent to the issue." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 8-402.)
In addition, Supreme Court Rule 201 provides that "discovery or inspection of documents or property" is obtainable. (107 Ill.2d R. 201(a).) The rules goes on to state:
"[A] party may obtain by discovery full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking disclosure or of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or tangible things, and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." (107 Ill.2d R. 201(b)(1).)
Plaintiff asserts that the records at issue in this case were discoverable because she had the burden of establishing that defendant had knowledge of the potential conduct of the patient; thus, any information concerning defendant's knowledge contained in the medical records would be relevant to the issue in the case.
Defendant disagrees, arguing instead that the information in the records was confidential pursuant to the Mental Health Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 91 1/2, par. 803) and was protected under the physician-patient privilege (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 8-802). We will address each of defendant's arguments in turn.
Section 3(a) of the Mental Health Act provides: "all records and communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 91 1/2, par. 803(a).) A "record" encompasses "any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 91 1/2, par. 802(7).) A "communication" includes information which "indicates that a person is a recipient." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 91 1/2, par. 802(1).) The purpose of the Mental Health Act is to protect the confidentiality of the records and communications of those persons receiving mental health services. (Laurent v. Brelji (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 214, 216, 30 Ill.Dec. 164, 392 N.E.2d 929.) This general prohibition against disclosure of this information was enacted to protect the patient's privacy rights, along with providing an inducement to seek such treatment. Laurent, 74 Ill.App.3d at 217, 30 Ill.Dec. 164, 392 N.E.2d 929.
Defendant argues that Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hospital (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 388, 138 Ill.Dec. 658, 547 N.E.2d 1279, controls this issue. In Pritchard, we ruled that a hospital did not have to answer an interrogatory which asked whether the hospital required a physician to undergo psychiatric testing as a condition of employment. (191 Ill.App.3d at 403, ...
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