Houser v. Lamont

• Decision Date: 11 November 1867
• Citation: 55 Pa. 311
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Houser <I>versus</I> Lamont.

55 Pa. 311

Houser versus Lamont.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 16, 1867.

November 11, 1867.

May 16th 1867.

Before WOODWARD, C. J., THOMPSON and AGNEW, JJ. STRONG and READ, JJ., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland county.

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S. Hepburn and W. M. Penrose, for plaintiff in error, cited Barnet v. Dougherty, 8 Casey 373; Robertson v. Robertson, 9 Watts 41; Myers v. Byerly, 9 Wright 372; Boyer v. Smith, 3 Watts 449; s. c., 5 Id. 55; Greenlee v. Greenlee, 10 Harris 227; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, Id. 243; Act of 22d April 1856, § 6, Purd. 654, pl. 13, Pamph. L. 532; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 11-12; Stewart v. Brown, 2 S. & R. 461; 4 Kent's Com. 306; Fox v. Heffner, 1 W. & S. 376; Haines v. O'Conner, 10 Watts 320; Zentmyer v. Mittower, 5 Barr 409-10; Kisler v. Kisler, 2 Watts 325; Jackman v. Ringland, 4 W. & S. 150; Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns. 222; Jackson v. Bateman, 2 Wend. 573; Wilson v. Clark, 1 W. & S. 554; Patton v. Develin, 2 Phila. Rep. 103; Parrish v. Koons, 1 Parsons 91; Todd v. Campbell, 8 Casey 255; Bowers v. Oyster, 3 Pa. R. 240; Lynch v. Cox, 11 Harris 265; Chadwick v. Felt, 11 Casey 305; Hill on Trustees 144-147; McKowen v. McDonald, 7 Wright 443; Postlethwait v. Frease, 7 Casey 474; Edwards v. Edwards, 3 Wright 377; Bailey v. Boulcott, 4 Russ. 345; Kilpin v. Kilpin, 1 M. & K. 537; Tritt v. Crotzer, 1 Harris 457; Hill on Trustees 97; 2 Sug. on Vend. 131; Kellum v. Smith, 9 Casey 164-5; Kunkle v. Wolfersberger, 6 Watts 126.

J. Ritner, L. Todd, W. H. Miller and H. Newsham, for defendants in error, cited Horn v. Pattison, 1 Grant's Cases 304-6; Alden v. Grove, 6 Harris 387; Kunkle v. Wolfersberger, 6 Watts 126; Reed v. Dickey, 1 Id. 152; Todd v. Campbell, 8 Casey 255; Hiester v. Maderia, 3 W. & S. 387-8; Sheriff v. Neal, Id. 534; McBurney v. Wellman, 42 Barb. 390; 4 Am. Law Reg. 382; Reitenbaugh v. Ludwick, 7 Casey 131.

The opinion of the court was delivered, November 11th 1867, by AGNEW, J.

The verdict of the jury under the specific instruction of the learned judge of the Common Pleas establishes that the deed from Bowman to Houser was a mortgage and not a sale. The evidence fully sustains the finding that he accepted it as a security for the money he advanced for the benefit of Miss Lamont. The peculiar and governing feature of the case is, that Bowman, who purchased the premises at the Orphans' Court sale and had verbally agreed to sell them to Miss Lamont for the same price he paid, did not deny his sale to her, but recognised and made it the foundation of his conveyance to Houser, and came into court and testified to it. Being examined as a witness on part of Miss Lamont, he testified that he had sold the property to her and she had paid him $975 in money and was credited by him with $74, the surplus of the rents he received over the interest. Wishing to realize his money, he asked a Mr. Boss to advance it for Miss Lamont on the security of the property. But on informing Miss Lamont of his purpose, she preferred that Mr. Houser should take it, as he was her friend and neighbor. Houser interested himself for her, spoke to a Mr. Dunlap to advance the money for her, but finally concluded to do it himself. In the mean time he had dissuaded Boss from advancing it. Bowman testifies that then he conveyed the property to Houser upon the same condition he held it, which was that Houser should hold it until all the money was paid. He states that he had paid $1875 for the property, and that the deed was made to Houser on his payment of $825.27, the balance Miss Lamont then owed him. Thus it appears, by the testimony of Bowman himself, the only party who could set up the Statute of Frauds against Miss Lamont, that he not only conceded her title, but conveyed to Houser on the very basis of her ownership, and receiving from Houser the balance only, which she owed him on her purchase. Bowman did not sell, nor did Houser pay for the value of Miss Lamont's interest in the premises. Houser afterwards repeatedly admitted the true relation he sustained to the property, to wit, that of a mere lender of money upon its security; and, indeed, did not deny it until bad feeling sprang up, when, on taking advice, he concluded to set up the Statute of Frauds against her title, and this is now the position taken in the argument.

But Houser does not stand in a position to set up the statute. He is the plaintiff in the ejectment and must stand upon his own title, which is only a mortgage, and the defendant has tendered and brought into court the money due upon it. He is not an absolute purchaser from Bowman and can use his ejectment only to enforce payment of the money due to him; but instead of this he seeks to convert his mortgage into an absolute conveyance, by setting up the Statute of Frauds, which Bowman had waived, and thus to hold the property without having paid the major part of its value. To suffer this would be to permit him to perpetrate a fraud, by obtaining the title on the pretence of a loan of a small part of its value from one who conceded Miss Lamont's title and treated with him expressly upon the basis of her ownership. Bowman did not convey Miss Lamont's interest in the property, except as a security for Houser's advance to pay her debt, and it would be a gross fraud for the latter now to hold that interest under a conveyance made for a different purpose. Probably nothing is better settled in this state than this; that a deed taken as a security for the loan of money is but a mortgage, and cannot by any form of words or other means, be converted into an absolute conveyance: Colwell v. Woods, 3 Watts 188; Kunkle v. Wolfersberger, 6 Id. 126; Holsey v. Trevillo, Id. 407; Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Id. 372; Hiester v. Maderia, 3 W. & S. 384; Todd v. Campbell, 8 Casey 250; K...