Housewright v. State
Citation | 573 S.W.2d 233 |
Decision Date | 15 November 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 55651,55651 |
Parties | Ricky Dean HOUSEWRIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
This is an appeal from a conviction for knowingly and intentionally possessing a usable quantity of marihuana in an amount of less than two ounces. Punishment was assessed at 30 days in jail.
In our prior opinion of September 14, 1977, we concluded that the sentence in the instant case had been prematurely pronounced and dismissed the appeal. Upon reconsideration, that opinion is now ordered withdrawn; and, for the reasons to be stated below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Article 42.03, Sec. 1, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., governs the time for pronouncing sentence. It provides that "sentence shall be pronounced in the presence of the defendant except when his presence is not required by Article 42.02 at any time after the expiration of the time allowed for making the motion for a new trial or the motion in arrest of judgment." Article 40.05, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., governs the time for filing a motion for new trial, and Article 41.02, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., governs the time for making a motion in arrest of judgment. Numerous decisions of this Court have held that a sentence, as defined by Article 42.02, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., should not be pronounced until after the expiration of the time for making a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment, unless such time is waived by the defendant. Many of these cases are cited in Ex parte Shields, 550 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). In Shields, on State's motion for rehearing, we discussed the question of whether an untimely pronounced sentence could be collaterally attacked. There we stated:
The only thing in the record before us to suggest that sentence may have been untimely pronounced in the instant case is that it was pronounced on December 16, 1976, which was the same day appellant was convicted and judgment was entered. The only indication of a waiver of the time allowed for filing a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment is an instrument that was filed at the time of appellant's guilty plea, but before the finding of guilt, assessment of punishment, and entry of judgment. If this were the only purported waiver of the time allowed to file such motions, it would be premature and ineffective. McConathy v. State, 545 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Neither the court's docket sheet nor the sentence reflects that appellant waived the time in which to file a motion for new trial or make a motion in arrest of judgment. While it would be the better and recommended practice for them to so reflect, we know of no authority which requires the docket sheet or the sentence to reflect a waiver of the time to file such motions.
Both Articles 42.02 and 42.03, supra, which deal with the imposition of sentence, are procedural in nature. See also Article 42.04, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., which provides that sentence shall be pronounced before an appeal is taken, except in certain specified cases not here applicable. In Green v. State, 510 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), it was contended that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to separate after being charged without the consent of the defendant, in violation of Article 35.23, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. That contention, however, was found to be utterly without foundation in the record. There we stated:
(Footnote omitted.)
See also McCloud v. State, 527 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), where it is stated:
". . . It is a cardinal rule of appellate procedure in this State that we must indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents in the lower court." See also Clopton v. State, 563 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
The instant appeal appears to have been taken for the purposes of delay only. The record before us consists only of the trial court clerk's transcript. There is no transcription of the court reporter's notes or formal bills of exception. No brief was filed in the trial court in appellant's behalf in accordance with Article 40.09(9), Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., and none has been filed here. There is no showing of indigency. Consequently, on the record before us we are unable to determine whether sentence was pronounced in an untimely fashion or whether sentence was pronounced after a waiver by appellant of the time for filing a motion for new trial or making a motion in arrest of judgment.
As stated above, it is the better practice, and we recommend, that in cases where a defendant waives the time in which to file a motion for new trial or make a motion in arrest of judgment such waiver should be reflected on the docket sheet and sentence of the court. However, experience has taught us that, in many cases that come before this Court where a defendant has waived the time for making such motions, such waiver is only reflected in the transcription of the court reporter's notes. Consequently, without a transcription of the court reporter's notes or a formal bill of exception in the present case showing that appellant did not waive the time for making such motions, we will presume that the court pronounced sentence after having obtained a waiver of the right to file such motions from the appellant.
Neither Faurie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), Mendez v. State, 535 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), nor Middleton v. State, 537 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), is contrary to today's decision. In Faurie, we noted that the record in that case did not affirmatively show a waiver of the time in which to file a motion for new trial or make a motion in arrest of judgment prior to the pronouncement of sentence. We also noted that the form sentence and printed notation on the docket sheet which recited that the defendant "waives time" was insufficient to show such waiver. The record in Faurie, however, contained a transcription of the court reporter's notes of the punishment and sentencing proceedings and showed that no such waiver was, in fact, made by the defendant. In Mendez, the record did not reflect that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to file a motion for new trial within 10 days after the assessment of punishment. As in Faurie, the form sentence of the court indicating that appellant "waived time" was held insufficient to show a waiver of this right in the record on appeal. Like the record in Faurie, the record in Mendez contained a transcription of the court reporter's notes of the punishment and sentencing proceedings and showed that no such waiver was, in fact, made by the defendant. In Middleton, the court assessed punishment and imposed sentence the same day. Other than the notation on the docket sheet of "Ten days' time waived," there was no other showing of a waiver of the time in which to file a motion for new trial or make a motion in arrest of judgment. However, the record in Middleton, like the ones in Faurie and Mendez, contained a transcription of the court reporter's notes of the punishment and sentencing...
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Breazeale v. State
...by jury. Creeks v. State, 537 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robert v. State, 613 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Housewright v. State, 573 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The presumption of regularity created by recitals in the judgment can be overcome only when the record otherwise af......
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Breazeale v. State
...the state cites Creeks v. State, 537 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robert v. State, 613 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Housewright v. State, 573 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and Ex parte Reed, 610 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). However, none of these authorities squarely supports the propositi......
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Ex parte Reed
...Here again the petitioner cites the current statutes rather than their forerunners in effect at the time. In Housewright v. State, 573 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this court held that this right may be waived orally and it will be presumed that the right was orally waived in absence of a ......
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Coleman v. State, 55906
...parte Shields, supra. Stare decisis should mean something. Moreover, the present case is clearly distinguishable from Housewright v. State, 573 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), in which it was held that where the record is silent as to waiver of time provided for in Articles 40.05 and 41.02, V......